Ex Libris J. Fuller

1776

1486 de 6

AN ABRIDGMENT OF Mr. LOCKE's ESSAY Concerning Human Understanding.

By John Wynne D.D.

The Third Edition, Corrected.

LONDON:

Printed for A. CHURCHILL, and sold by W. TAYLOR at the *Ship* and *Black Swan* in *Pater-noster-Row*. 1721.

The Contents of 4.
1.t Book

of Innate Notions.

Chap.

1. The Introduct.n
2. ✓ no innate speculative Principles
3. ✓ no innate practical Principles
4. Other Considerations about innate Principles, both speculative & practical

BRITISH MUSEUM 8 SEP 58

To the much Esteemed

Mr. JOHN LOCKE.

Honoured Sir,

I Send you this imperfect Draught of your Excellent *Essay* concerning *Humane Understanding*; which I must confess, falls as much short of the Perfection, as it does of the Length of the Original. Nevertheless, as I lately intimated to you (and you were pleas'd to think, that what I propos'd in

reference to this Deſign, would not be wholly loſt Labour) I am not without Hopes, that it may, in this contracted *Form*, prove in ſome Meaſure ſerviceable to that Noble End, which you have ſo ſucceſsfully aimed at in it, *viz. The Advancement of Real and Uſeful Knowledge.* The Inducement which moved me to think of abridging it, was a Conſideration purely extrinſical to the Work it ſelf, and in effect no other than this; That it would be better ſuited to the Eaſe and Convenience of ſome ſort of Readers, when reduc'd into this narrow Compaſs. In order to this, I thought the *Firſt Book*, which is employed in refuting the Common Opi-

nion

nion of *Innate Notions* and *Ideas*, might be beſt ſpared in this Abridgment; eſpecially ſince the Reader may be convinc'd by what he ſhall find here, that ſuch a Suppoſition is at leaſt needleſs, in regard he may attain to all the Knowledge he has, or finds himſelf capable of, without the help of any ſuch *Innate Ideas*. Beſides this, I have retrench'd moſt of the larger Explications; and ſome uſeful Hints, and inſtructive Theories I have wholly omitted; not becauſe they are leſs conſiderable in themſelves, but becauſe they ſeem'd not ſo neceſſary to be inſiſted on in this *Abridgment*, conſider'd as a previous Inſtrument, and preparatory

Help, to Guide and Conduct the Mind in its *Search after Truth and Knowledge.* I did particularly pass by that accurate Discourse concerning the Freedom and Determination of the *Will*, contained in *Cap.* 21. *L.* 2. because I found it too long to be inserted here at large, and too weighty and momentous to be but slightly and imperfectly represented. This I hope will prove no Prejudice to the *Essay* it self, since none, I presume, will think it reasonable to form a Judgment of the whole Work from this Abridgment of it: And I perswade my self, that few *Readers* will be content with this *Epitome*, who can conveniently furnish themselves

ſelves with the *Eſſay* at large. However, I am apt to think, that this alone will ſerve to make the Way to Knowledge ſomewhat more plain and eaſy; and afford ſuch Helps for the Improvement of Reaſon, as are perhaps in vain ſought after in thoſe Books, which profeſs to teach the *Art of Reaſoning*: But nevertheleſs, whether you ſhall think fit to let it come abroad under the Diſadvantages that attend it in this *Form*, I muſt leave you to judge. I ſhall only add, that I think my own Pains abundantly recompenſed by the Agreeable as well as Inſtructive Entertainment, which this nearer View and cloſer Inſpection into your *Eſſay* afford-

ed me: And I am not a little pleased, that it has given me this Opportunity of expressing the just Value and Esteem I have for it, as well as the Honour and Respect I have for its Author. I am,

Oxon. Ap. 17. 1695.

Honoured SIR,

Your very Humble

and Oblig'd Servant,

JOHN WYNNE.

THE INTRODUCTION.

1. *SINCE it is the* Understanding *that ſets Man above the reſt of Senſible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleneſs, worth the enquiring into.*

2. *My pnrpoſe therefore is to enquire into the* Original, Certainty, *and* Extent *of Humane Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of* Belief, Opinion, *and* Aſſent, *which I ſhall do in the following Method.*

3. First, *I ſhall enquire into the* Original *of thoſe* Idea's *or Notions, which a Man obſerves, and is conſcious to himſelf he has in his Mind, and the* Ways *whereby the Underſtanding comes to be furniſhed with them.*

Secondly, *What* Knowledge *the Underſtanding hath by thoſe Idea's; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.*

Thirdly, *I ſhall make ſome Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of* Faith *and* Opinion.

4. *If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Underſtanding, I can diſcover the Powers thereof,* how far *they reach, and where they fail us, it may be of uſe to prevail with the buſy Mind of Man to be more Cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehenſion, to ſtop when it is at the utmoſt Extent of its Tether, and to ſit down in a quiet Ignorance of thoſe Things, which upon Examination are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities. We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward out of an Affectation of* Univerſal Knowledge,

ledge, *to perplex our ſelves with Diſputes about Things to which our Underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or diſtinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any Notions at all: But ſhould learn to content our ſelves with what is attainable by us in this State.*

5. *For though the* Comprehenſion *of our Underſtanding comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt Extent of Things; yet we ſhall have cauſe enough to magnify the bountiful* Author *of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge he has beſtowed on us ſo far above all the reſt of the Inhabitants of this our Manſion. Men have reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St.* Peter *ſays,* Πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν) *whatſoever is neceſſary for the Conveniencies of* Life, *and Information of* Virtue; *And has put within the reach of their Diſcovery, the comfortable Proviſion for this Life, and*

the Way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their Knowledge may come of an Univerſal, or perfect Comprehenſion of whatſoever is, it yet ſecures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, *and the Sight of their own* Duties. *Men may find Matter ſufficient to buſy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly Quarrel with their own Conſtitution, and throw away the Bleſſings their Hands are fill'd with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every thing. We ſhall not have much Reaſon to complain of the Narrowneſs of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an Unpardonable, as well as Childiſh Peeviſhneſs, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, becauſe there are ſome things that are ſet out of the reach of it. It*

is a very great aſſurance will almoſt amaze us —

will be no Excuſe to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Buſineſs by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sunſhine. The Candle that is ſet up in us, ſhines bright enough for all our Purpoſes. The Diſcoveries we can make with this, ought to ſatisfy us. And we ſhall then uſe our Underſtandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, that they are ſuited to our Faculties; and upon thoſe Grounds they are capable of being propoſed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require Demonſtration, *and demand* Certainty, *where* Probability *only is to be had, and which is ſufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every Thing, becauſe we cannot certainly know all Things; we ſhall do much what as wiſely as he who would not uſe his Legs, but ſit ſtill and periſh becauſe he had no Wings to fly.*

6. *When we know our own* Strength, *we ſhall the better know what to undertake with hopes of Succeſs.*

And

And when we have well ſurvey'd the Powers *of our own Minds, we ſhall not be enclin'd either to ſit ſtill, and not ſet our Thoughts on Work at all, in deſpair of knowing any Thing; nor on the other ſide, queſtion every Thing, and diſclaim all Knowledge, becauſe ſome things are not to be underſtood. Our* Buſineſs *here, is not to know all Things, but thoſe Things which concern our Conduct. If we can find out thoſe Meaſures whereby a* Rational Creature, *put into that ſtate which Man is in, in this World, may and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that ſome other Things eſcape our Knowledge.*

7. *This was that which gave the firſt* Riſe *to this* Eſſay *concerning the Underſtanding. For I thought that the firſt Step towards ſatisfying ſeveral Enquiries the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was to take a Survey of our* Underſtandings, *examine our own* Powers, *and ſee to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I ſuſpected we began at*

at the wrong End, and in vain ſought for Satisfaction in a quiet and ſecure Poſſeſſion of Truths that moſt concern'd us, whilſt we let looſe our Thoughts in the vaſt Ocean *of Being, as if all that boundleſs Extent were the Natural and Undoubted Poſſeſſions of our Underſtandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its Deciſions, or that eſcaped its Comprehenſion. Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into thoſe Depths where they can find no ſure Footing, it is no wonder that they raiſe* Queſtions, *and multiply* Diſputes, *which never coming to any clear Reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their Doubts, and to confirm them at laſt in perfect* Scepticiſm. *Whereas were the Capacities of our Underſtandings well conſider'd, the Extent of our Knowledge once diſcovered, and the* Horizon *found, which ſets Bounds between the enlightned and dark Parts of Things, between what is, and what is not Comprehenſible*

hensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the One, *and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the* Other.

To be endeavouring to know what is not comprehensable by us; is Ignorance —

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

BY the term *Idea*, I mean whatever is the Object of the Understanding, when a Man *Thinks*; or whatever it is which the Mind can be employ'd about in Thinking.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Men's Minds: Every one is conscious of them in himself; and Men's Words and Actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our *first Inquiry* then shall be, How they come into the Mind.

It is an establish'd Opinion amongst some Men, that there are in the Un-

1st Ideas are impress on the mind by external objects

derſtanding certain *Innate Principles*, ſome primary Notions, (Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) *Characters*, as it were ſtamp'd upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very firſt Being, and brings into the World with it. *

This Opinion is accurately diſcuſs'd, and refuted in the *Firſt* Book of this *Eſſay*, to which I ſhall refer the Reader, that deſires ſatisfaction in this particular.

It ſhall be ſufficient here to ſhew, how Men barely by the uſe of their *Natural Faculties*, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any *Innate* Impreſſions; and may arrive at Certainty without any ſuch original Notions or Principles. † For I imagine, any one will eaſily grant, That it would be impertinent to ſuppoſe the *Ideas* of *Colours* innate in a Creature to whom God hath given *Sight*, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from External Objects. I ſhall ſhew by what Ways and Degrees all other *Ideas* come into the Mind; for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own Experience and Obſervation. Let

I think that in Locke's long work on the Understanding he endeavours to prove the contrary viz no innate principles

Let us then ſuppoſe the Mind to be, as we ſay, *White Paper*, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*: How comes it to be furniſh'd? Whence has it all the Materials of Reaſon and Knowledge? To this I anſwer, in one Word, from *Experience* and *Obſervation*. This, when employ'd about external ſenſible Objects, we may call *Senſation*; By this we have the *Ideas* of *Bitter*, *Sweet*, *Yellow*, *Hard*, &c. which are commonly call'd *ſenſible Qualities*, becauſe convey'd into the Mind by the *Senſes*. The ſame *Experience*, when employ'd about the internal Operations of the Mind, perceiv'd, and reflected on by us, we may call *Reflection*. Hence we have the *Ideas* of *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Willing*, *Reaſoning*, &c.

Theſe two, *viz. External Material Things*, as the Objects of Senſation; and the *Operations of our own Minds*, as the Objects of Reflection, are to me the only *Originals* from whence all our *Ideas* take their Beginnings. The Underſtanding ſeems not to have the leaſt glimmering of

All the ideas which we receive, are by Experience & Obſervation *Ideas*

Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two *Sources*.[b] Theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their ſeveral *Modes* and Compoſitions, we ſhall find to contain our whole ſtock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of theſe two Ways.

'Tis evident that Children come by degrees to be furniſh'd with *Ideas* from the Objects they are converſant with. They are ſo ſurrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diverſly affect them, that ſome *Ideas* will (whether they will or no) be imprinted on their Minds. *Light* and *Colours*, *Sounds*, and *Tangible* Qualities, do continually ſollicite their proper *Senſes*, and force an entrance into the Mind.[c] 'Tis late commonly before *Children* come to have *Ideas* of the Operations of their Minds; and ſome Men have not any very clear or perfect *Ideas* of the greateſt part of them all their Lives. Becauſe, tho' they paſs there continually; yet, like floating Viſions, they make not deep Impreſſions enough

enough to leave in the Mind clear and laſting *Ideas*, till the Underſtanding turns inward upon its ſelf, and *reflects* on its own Operations, and makes them the Objects of its own Contemplation. (4).

When a Man *firſt perceives*, then he may be ſaid *to have Ideas*; having *Ideas*, and Perception, ſignifying the ſame thing. It is an Opinion maintain'd by ſome, That the *Soul always Thinks*, and that it always has the actual Perception of *Ideas* as long as it exiſts: And that *actual Thinking* is as inſeparable from the Soul, as *actual Extenſion* is from Body. But I cannot conceive it any more neceſſary for the Soul always to *Think*, than for Body always to *Move*: The Perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to Body, not its *Eſſence*, but one of its *Operations*: And therefore, though Thinking be never ſo much the proper Action of the Soul, yet it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that it ſhould always Think, always be in Action.

That

That perhaps is the priviledge of the Infinite *Author* and Preſerver of all Things, *who never Slumbers nor Sleeps*; but is not competent to any *Finite* Being. We know certainly by Experience, that we ſometimes Think; and thence draw this infallible Conſequence, that there is ſomething in us that has a Power to Think; but whether that Subſtance perpetually Thinks or no, we can be no farther aſſured than Experience informs us. (e).

I would be glad to learn from thoſe Men, who ſo confidently pronounce, that the Humane Soul always Thinks, how they come to know it: Nay, how they come to know that they themſelves Think, when they themſelves do not perceive it? The moſt that can be ſaid of it, is, That 'tis poſſible the Soul may always Think; but not always retain it in *Memory*: And, I ſay, it is as poſſible the Soul may not always Think; and much more probable that it ſhould ſometimes not Think, than that it ſhould often Think, and that a long while together,

ther, and not be conscious to it self the next Moment after that it had Thought.

I see no reason therefore to believe, that the Soul Thinks before the Senses have furnish'd it with *Ideas* to Think on; and as those are increas'd and retain'd, so it comes by Exercise to improve its Faculty of Thinking, in the several parts of it; as well as afterwards by *Compounding* those *Ideas*, and *Reflecting* on its own Operations, it increases its *Stock*, as well as Facility in Remembring, Imagining, Reasoning, and other *Modes* of Thinking.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

OF Ideas some are *Simple*, others *Complex*. A *Simple Idea*, is one uniform Appearance or Conception in the Mind, which is not distinguishable into different *Ideas*. Such

are

are the *Ideas* of *Senſible Qualities*, which though they are in the Things themſelves ſo united and blended, that there is no Separation, no Diſtance between them; yet the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senſes ſimple and unmix'd. Thus, tho' the Hand feels *Softneſs* and *Warmth* in the ſame piece of *Wax*; yet the *Simple Ideas* thus united in the ſame Subject, are as perfectly *diſtinct* as thoſe that come in by different Senſes.

Theſe *Simple Ideas* are ſuggeſted no other way than from the two Ways abovemention'd, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*.

The Mind being once ſtored with the *Simple Ideas*, has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite variety: and ſo can make at pleaſure new *Complex Ideas*. But the moſt enlarged Underſtanding cannot frame one new *Simple Idea*, nor by any force deſtroy them that are there. I would have any one try to fancy any Taſte, which had never affected his Palate, or frame to himſelf the Idea of a Scent, he had never smelt. When he can do this, I will conclude, a blind Man hath Ideas of Colours, a deaf Man true Notions of Sounds. (a)

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Senſe.

IDEAS with Reference to the different ways wherein they approach the Mind, are of *four Sorts*.

Firſt, There are ſome which come into our Minds by *one Senſe* only.

Secondly, There are others conveyed into the Mind by *more Senſes than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are ſome ſuggeſted to the Mind by all the ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

Firſt, Some enter into the Mind only by one Senſe peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Smells*, &c. come in only by the *Eyes*, *Ears* and *Noſe*. And if theſe Organs are any of them ſo diſorder'd

as not to perform their Functions, they have no Poſtern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themſelves in view, and be perceiv'd by the Underſtanding.(a) It will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular *Simple Ideas* belonging to each *Senſe*; nor indeed is it poſſible; there being a great many more than we have *Names* for.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

I Shall here mention one which we receive by our *Touch*, becauſe it is one of the chief Ingredients in many of our complex Ideas; and that is the Idea of *Solidity:* It ariſes from the Reſiſtance, one Body makes to the Entrance of another Body into the Place it poſſeſſes, till *it* has left it. There is no Idea which we more conſtantly receive from *Senſation* than this. In whatever Poſture we are, we

we feel ſomewhat that ſupports us, and hinders us from ſinking downwards: And the Bodies we daily handle, make us perceive, that while they remain between them, they do by an unſurmountable force hinder the approach of the Parts of our Hands that preſs them. This Idea is commonly called *Impenetrability*. I conceive *Solidity* is more proper to expreſs it, becauſe this carries ſomething more of *Poſitive* in it than *Impenetrability*, which is *Negative*, and is perhaps more a Conſequence of Solidity, than Solidity it ſelf. (a) This ſeems to be the moſt *Eſſential* Property of Body, and that whereby we conceive it to fill Space: The Idea of which is, that where we imagine any Space taken up by a ſolid Subſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid Subſtances. This Reſiſtance is ſo great, that no Force can ſurmount it. All the Bodies in the World preſſing a *Drop of Water* on all ſides, will never be able to overcome the Reſiſtance it makes to their

approaching one another, till it be removed out of their Way.

The Idea of Solidity is diſtinguiſhed from that of *pure Space*, in as much as this *latter* is neither capable of Reſiſtance, nor Motion: 'Tis diſtinguiſh'd from *Hardneſs*, in as much as Hardneſs is a firm Coheſion of the ſolid Parts of Matter making up Maſſes of a ſenſible bulk, ſo that the whole doth not eaſily change its Figure. Indeed, *Hard* and *Soft*, as commonly apprehended by us, are but *Relative* to the Conſtitutions of our Bodies: That being called *Hard* which will put us to Pain ſooner than change its Figure, by the preſſure of any part of our Bodies; and that *Soft*, which changes the Situation of its Parts upon an eaſy and unpainful Touch.

This difficulty of changing Situation among the Parts gives no more *Solidity* to the hardeſt Body, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an *Adamant* one Jot more ſolid than *Water*: (6) He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft Body well

well with *Air* or *Water*, will quickly find its Reſiſtance.(c) By this we may diſtinguiſh the Idea of the Extenſion of *Body*, from the Idea of the Extenſion of *Space*: That of *Body*, is the Coheſion or Continuity of ſolid, ſeparable and moveable Parts; that of *Space*, the Continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immovable Parts. Upon the Solidity of Bodies depends their mutual *Impulſe*, *Reſiſtance* and *Protruſion*. Of *pure Space* and *Solidity* there are ſeveral (among which I confeſs my ſelf one) who perſuade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct Ideas: And that they can think on *Space* without any thing in it that reſiſts, or is protruded by Body, as well as on ſomething *that fills Space*, that can be protruded by the Impulſe of other Bodies, or reſiſt their Motion; the Idea of the diſtance between the oppoſite Parts of a Concave Surface, being equally clear without, as with the Idea of any ſolid Parts between. If any one ask what this *Solidity* is, I ſend him to his Senſes to inform him:

Let him put a *Flint* or *Football* between his Hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. (d)

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senſes.

SOME Ideas we get into the Mind by *more than one Senſe*, as *Space*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Reſt* and *Motion*. Theſe are perceivable by the Eyes and Touch.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

SOME are had from *Reflection* only: ſuch are the Ideas we have of the *Operations* of our Minds: of which the two principal are *Perception* or *Thinking*; and *Volition* or *Willing*. The powers of producing theſe

these Operations are called *Faculties*, which are the *Understanding* and *Will*; the several *Modes* of thinking, &c. belong to this Head.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.

THERE are some Simple Ideas convey'd into the Mind by all the ways of *Sensation* and *Reflection*; such are *Pleasure*, *Pain*, *Power*, *Existence*, *Unity*, *Succession*. Pleasure or Delight, Pain or Uneasiness accompany almost every Impression on our Senses, and every Action or Thought of the *Mind*. By *Pleasure* or *Pain* we mean whatever delights or molests us, whether it arises from the Thoughts of our Minds; or any thing operating on our Bodies. Satisfaction, Delight, Pleasure, Happiness, and Uneasiness, Trouble, Torment,

Miſery, &c. are but different Degrees, the one of Pleaſure, the other of Pain.

The Author of our Beings having given us a Power over ſeveral Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at reſt as we think fit; and alſo by their Motion to move our ſelves and other contiguous Bodies; having alſo given a Power to our Minds in ſeveral Inſtances, to chuſe amongſt its Ideas which it will think on: To excite us to theſe Actions of *Thinking* and *Motion*, he has join'd to ſeveral Thoughts and Senſations a Perception of *Delight*: without this we ſhould have no reaſon to prefer one Thought or Action to another, Motion to Reſt. In which State, Man however furniſh'd with the Faculties of Underſtanding and Will, would be a very idle inactive Creature, and paſs his time only in a lazy Lethargick Dream. (a)

Pain has the ſame Efficacy to ſet us on work that Pleaſure has; ſince we are as ready to avoid that, as to purſue this. This is worth our Conſideration, that *Pain is often produc'd by the ſame Objects and Ideas that produce Pleaſure*

ſure in us. This their near Conjunction gives us new occaſion of admiring the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of our *Maker*, who deſigning the Preſervation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the application of many things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm they will do us, and as advices to withdraw us from them. But he not deſigning our Preſervation barely, but the Preſervation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath in many caſes annex'd Pain to thoſe very Ideas which delight us. Thus *Heat* that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater Increaſe of it, proves no ordinary Torment: Which is wiſely order'd by *Nature*, that when any Object does by the Vehemence of its Operation diſorder the Inſtruments of Senſation, whoſe Structures cannot but be very delicate, we might by the Pain be warn'd to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of order. That this is the *end of Pain*, appears from this Conſideration; that tho' great Light is inſufferable to the Eyes; yet the higheſt de-

gree of *darkneſs* does not at all diſeaſe them: becauſe *that* cauſes no diſorderly Motion in that curious Organ the Eye. But Exceſs of *Cold* as well as *Heat* pains us; becauſe it is equally deſtructive to the Temper which is neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life.

Another Reaſon why God hath annex'd ſeveral degrees of Pleaſure and Pain to all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in all things that our Thoughts and Senſes have to do with, is, that we finding Imperfection and Diſſatisfaction, and want of compleat Happineſs in all the Enjoyments of the Creatures, might be led to ſeek it in the Enjoyments of Him *with whom is fulneſs of Joy, and at whoſe right Hand are pleaſures for evermore.* Tho' what is here ſaid concerning *Pleaſure* and *Pain* may not perhaps make thoſe Ideas clearer to us, than our own Experience does, yet it may ſerve to give us due Sentiments of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the *Sovereign* Diſpoſer of all things, which is

not

not unſuitable to the main end of theſe Enquiries: the knowledge and veneration of Him being the *chief End* of all our Thoughts, and the proper Buſineſs of all Underſtandings.

Exiſtence and *Unity* are two other Ideas ſuggeſted by every Object without, and every Idea within. When Ideas are in our Minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they *exiſt*, or have Exiſtence: and whatever we conſider as *one thing*, whether a *Real Being* or *Idea*, ſuggeſts the Idea of *Unity*.

Power is another Idea deriv'd from theſe Sources: for finding in our ſelves that we can *think*, and *move* ſeveral parts of our Bodies at pleaſure; and obſerving the *effects* that natural Bodies produce in one another: by both theſe ways we get the Idea of *Power*.

Succeſſion is another Idea ſuggeſted by our Senſes, and by Reflection on what paſſes in our Minds. For if we look into our ſelves, we ſhall find

our *Ideas* always whilſt we are awake, or have any Thought, paſſing in train, one going and another coming without Intermiſſion. (b)

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Simple Ideas.

WHatſoever is able by affecting our Senſes, to cauſe any Perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Underſtanding a *Simple Idea*; which whatſoever be the Cauſe of it, is look'd upon as a *real poſitive Idea* in the Underſtanding. (a) 5 Thus the Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Light* and *Darkneſs*, *Motion* and *Reſt*, &c. are equally poſitive in the Mind, tho' ſome of their Cauſes may be meer *Privations*. An Enquiry into their Cauſes concerns not the Ideas as in the Underſtanding; but the Nature of the things exiſting without

us. (b) Thus a *Painter* has diſtinct Ideas of White and Black, as well as the Philoſopher, who tells us what kind of Particles, and how rang'd in the Surface, occaſion'd thoſe Colours.

That a *Privative* Cauſe may produce a *Poſitive* Idea, appears from Shadows; which (tho' nothing but the Abſence of Light) are diſcernible; and cauſe clear and poſitive Ideas. The natural Reaſon of which may be this, *viz.* That ſince Senſation is produc'd only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variouſly agitated by external Objects: the Abatement of any former Motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new Senſation as the Increaſe and Variation of it; and thereby introduce a new Idea. We have indeed ſome *negative* Names which ſtand not directly for poſitive Ideas, but for their Abſence; ſuch as *Inſipid*, *Silence*, which denote poſitive Ideas, *viz.* *Taſte* and *Sound*, with a Signification of their Abſence. (c)

It will be uſeful to diſtinguiſh *Ideas* as they are *Perceptions* in our Minds, from what *they are in the Bodies* that cauſe

cauſe ſuch Perceptions in us: for we are not to think the former exact images and Reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the Subject, moſt of thoſe of *Senſation* being in the Mind, no more the Likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the Names that ſtand for them are the Likeneſs of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

Whatſoever the *Mind perceives in its ſelf*, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought or Underſtanding, that I call an Idea: And the power to produce any Idea in our Mind, I call the *quality of the Subject* wherein that Power is: thus a *Snow-ball* having the Power to produce in us the Ideas of *White*, *Cold* and *Round*, thoſe *powers* as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are *Senſations* or *Perceptions* in our Underſtandings, I call them *Ideas*: which Ideas if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe *Qualities* in the Objects which produce them in us. Theſe *Qualities* are

are of *two Sorts*, Firſt, *Original* or Primary, ſuch are *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Motion* or *Reſt*, *Number* and *Figure*. Theſe are inſeparable from Body, and ſuch as it conſtantly keeps in all its Changes and Alterations: Thus take a Grain of *Wheat*, divide it into two Parts, each Part has ſtill *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Mobility*: Divide it again, and it ſtill retains the ſame Qualities, and will do ſtill, tho' you divide it on till the Parts become inſenſible,

Secondly, *Secondary Qualities*, ſuch as *Colours*, *Smells*, *Taſtes*, *Sounds*, &c. which whatever Reality we by miſtake may attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themſelves, but *Powers* to produce various Senſations in us; and depend on the Qualities before-mentioned.

The *Ideas* of *Primary* Qualities of Bodies are Reſemblances of them: and their Patterns really exiſt in Bodies themſelves: But the Ideas produced in us by *Secondary* Qualities, have no reſemblance of them at all: And what is *Sweet*, *Blue* or *Warm*

in the Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the inſenſible Parts in the Bodies themſelves, which we call ſo.

Thus we ſee that Fire at one diſtance produces in us the Senſation of *Warmth*, which at a nearer approach cauſes the Senſation of *Pain*. Now what reaſon have we to ſay that the Idea of *Warmth* is actually in the Fire, but that of Pain not in the Fire, which the ſame Fire produces in us the ſame way? The Bulk, Number, Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them or no; and therefore may be called *Real* Qualities, becauſe they really exiſt in that Body. But *Light* and *Heat* are no more really in it, than Sickneſs or Pain: take away the Senſation of them; let not the Eyes ſee Light or Colours, nor the Ear hear Sounds; let the Palate not taſte, or the Noſe ſmell, and all *Colours*, *Taſtes*, *Odours* and *Sounds*, as they are ſuch particular Ideas vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduc'd to their Cauſes (that is) Bulk, Motion, Figure, *&c.* of Parts. Theſe

Theſe *Secondary* Qualities are of two Sorts, Firſt *immediately perceivable*, which by immediately operating on our Bodies, produce ſeveral different Ideas in us. Secondly, *mediately perceivable*, which by operating on other Bodies, change their primary Qualities, ſo as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us different from what they did before. Theſe laſt are Powers in Bodies which proceed from the particular Conſtitution of thoſe primary and original Qualities, to make ſuch a Change in the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senſes different from what it did before; as in Fire to make Lead fluid: theſe two laſt being nothing but Powers relating to other Bodies, and reſulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities are yet otherwiſe thought of; the former being eſteem'd *Real Qualities*; but the latter barely *Powers*: The reaſon of this miſtake ſeems to be this; That our Ideas of ſenſible Qualities containing nothing

in

in them of Bulk, Figure, &c. we cannot think them the effect of thoſe primary Qualities which appear not to our Senſes to operate in their Productions, and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion: nor can Reaſon ſhew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, &c. ſhould produce in the Mind the Ideas of *Warm*, *Yellow*, &c. But in the other caſe, when Bodies operate upon one another, we plainly ſee that the Quality produced hath commonly no Reſemblance with any thing in the thing producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the effect of Power: But our Senſes not being able to diſcover any Unlikeneſs between the Idea produced in us, and the quality of the Object producing it, we imagine that our Ideas are Reſemblances of ſomething in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers placed in the Modification of the primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no Reſemblance. (e)

This little Excurſion into Natural Philo-

Philoſophy was neceſſary in our preſent Enquiry to diſtinguiſh the *primary* and real Qualities of Bodies which are always in them, from thoſe *ſecondary* and imputed Qualities, which are but the Powers of ſeveral Combinations of thoſe Primary ones, when they operate without being diſtinctly diſcerned; whereby we learn to know what Ideas are, and what are not Reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the Bodies we denominate from them.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

Perception is the firſt Idea we receive from Reflection: it is by ſome called *Thinking* in general: tho' *Thinking* in the Propriety of the *Engliſh* Tongue, ſignifies that ſort of Operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it conſiders any thing with ſome degree of voluntary Attention: for in bare

Perception

Perception the Mind is for the moſt part only *Paſſive*; and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot otherwiſe know, than by Reflecting on what paſſes in our Minds when we *See*, *Feel*, *Hear*, &c.

Impreſſions made on the outward Parts if they are not taken notice of within, cauſe no *Perception:* as we ſee in thoſe whoſe Minds are intently buſied in the Contemplation of certain Objects. A ſufficient Impuſe there may be upon the Organs of Senſation: but if it reach not the Obſervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception; ſo that where-ever there is Senſe or Perception, there ſome Idea is actually produced and preſent in the Underſtanding. (a)

We may obſerve that the Ideas we receive from Senſation, are often in grown People alter'd by the Judgment without our taking notice of it. Thus a Globe of any uniform Colour (as of Gold or Jet) being ſet before our Eyes, the *Idea* thereby imprinted is of a flat Circle variouſly ſhadowed.

But

But being acuſtomed to perceive what kind of Appearances convex Bodies are wont to make in us; the Judgment alters the Appearances into their Cauſes; and from that Variety of Shadow or Colour, frames to its ſelf the Perception of a convex Figure of one uniform Colour.† This in many Caſes by a ſettled Habit is perform'd ſo readily, that we take that for the Perception of our Senſation, which is but an Idea form'd by the Judgment: ſo that one ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of it ſelf. As a Man who reads or hears with Attention, takes little notice of the Characters or Sounds, but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them. Thus Habits come at laſt to produce Actions in us, which often eſcape our Obſervation.

The faculty of *Perception* ſeems to be that which puts the Diſtinction between the animal Kingdom and the inferior parts of Nature: Since Vegetables many of them have ſome degrees of Motion, and upon the different Application of other Bodies to them, do

do very briskly alter their Figures and Motions, and thence have obtain'd the Name of *Sensitive Plants*: which yet is, I suppose, but bare *Mechanism*, and no otherwise produced, than the shortning of a Rope by the affusion of Water. But Perception, I believe, is in some degree in all sorts of Animals: tho' I think we may from the make of an *Oyster* or *Cockle*, reasonably conclude that it has not so many nor so quick Senses as a Man, or several other Animals.

Perception is also the first Step and Degree towards Knowledge, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it: so that the fewer Senses any Man has, and the duller the Impressions that are made by them are, the more remote he is from that Knowledge which is to be found in other Men.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

THE next Faculty of the Mind whereby it makes a farther Progress towards Knowledge, I call *Retention:* which is the keeping of those Ideas it has receiv'd: which is done two ways.

First, By keeping the Idea which is brought into the Mind for some time actually in View, which is called *Contemplation.*

Secondly, By reviving those Ideas in our Minds which have disappear'd, and have been as it were, laid out of sight: and this is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas; for the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under view at once, it was necessary to have a Repository to lay up those Ideas which at another time it may have use of. But our *Ideas* being nothing but actual

actual Perceptions in the Mind which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our *Ideas* in the Repoſitory of the Memory ſignifies no more but this, That the Mind has a Power in many caſes to revive Perceptions it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And it is by the Aſſiſtance of this Faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe Ideas in our Underſtandings, which we can bring in ſight, and make the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention and *Repetition* help much to the fixing *Ideas* in our Memories: but thoſe which make the deepeſt and moſt laſting Impreſſions, are thoſe which are accompanied with *Pleaſure* or *Pain*. *Ideas* but once taken in and never again repeated are ſoon loſt; as thoſe of Colours in ſuch as loſt their Sight when very young.

The Memory in ſome Men is tenacious, even to a Miracle: but yet there

there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our *Ideas*, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt; and in Minds the moſt retentive: So that if they be not ſometimes renewed, the Print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thoſe *Ideas* that are often refreſh'd by a frequent Return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themſelves beſt in the Memory, and remain longeſt there: Such are the *Original Qualities of Bodies*, viz. Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Motion, *&c.* and *thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect us*, as Heat and Cold: and thoſe that are the *Affections of all kind of Beings*, as Exiſtence, Duration, Number: theſe and the like are ſeldom quite loſt while the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In memory the Mind is oftentimes more than barely *paſſive*; for it often ſets it ſelf on work to ſearch ſome hidden *Ideas*; ſometimes they ſtart of their own accord: and ſometimes turbulent and tempeſtuous Paſſions tumble them out of their Cells.

The defects of the Memory are *two*.

First, That it loſes the *Idea* quite, and ſo far it produces perfect *Ignorance*.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and retrieves not the *Ideas* laid up in ſtore quick enough to ſerve the Mind upon occaſions. This, if it be to a great degree, is *Stupidity*. In the having *Ideas* ready at hand on all occaſions, conſiſts what we call *Invention*, *Fancy*, and *Quickneſs of Parts*.

This Faculty other *Animals* ſeem to have to a great degree, as well as *Man*, as appears by Birds learning of Tunes, and their Endeavour to hit the Notes right. For it ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould endeavour to conform their Voices (as 'tis plain they do) to Notes, whereof they have no *Ideas*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of Diſcerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

ANother Faculty of the Mind is, That of *diſcerning between its Ideas*: on this depends the Evidence, and Certainty of ſeveral even general Propoſitions, which paſs for *Innate Truths*: whereas indeed they depend on this clear diſcerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the ſame or different. In being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one thing from another, where there is the leaſt difference, conſiſts in a great meaſure that *Exactneſs of Judgment* and *Clearneſs of Reaſon*, which is to be obſerv'd in one Man above another; which is quite oppoſite to *Wit*, which conſiſts moſt in the Aſſemblage of *Ideas*, and putting thoſe together with quickneſs and variety, which have the

leaſt Reſemblance to form agreeable Viſions: whereas Judgment ſeparates carefully thoſe *Ideas*, wherein can be found the leaſt difference to prevent Error and Deluſion.

To the well diſtinguiſhing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate; and when they are ſo, it will not breed any Confuſion or Miſtake about them, tho' the Senſes ſhould convey them from the ſame Object differently on different occaſions.

The *comparing* of our *Ideas* one with another in reſpect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, or any other circumſtances, is another Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, which is the ground of *Relations*. Brutes ſeem not to have this Faculty in any great degree. They have probably ſeveral *Ideas* diſtinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than ſome ſenſible Circumſtances annex'd to the Objects themſelves. The power of comparing general *Ideas*, which we may obſerve in Men, we may probably conjecture *Beaſts* have not at all.

Compoſition

Compoſition is another Operation of the Mind, whereby it combines ſeveral of its Simple *Ideas* into *Complex* ones: under which Operation we may reckon that of *Enlarging*, wherein we put ſeveral *Ideas* together of the ſame kind, as ſeveral Unites to make a *Dozen*. In this alſo I ſuppoſe Brutes come far ſhort of Man, for tho' they take in and retain together ſeveral combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as poſſibly a Dog does the *Shape*, *Smell* and *Voice* of his Maſter; yet theſe are rather ſo many diſtinct Marks, whereby he knows him, than one *Complex Idea* made out of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ones.

Abſtraction is another Operation of the Mind, whereby the Mind forms general *Ideas* from ſuch as it receiv'd from particular Objects, which it does by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch Appearances ſeparate from the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as *Time*, *Place*, &c. Theſe become general *Repreſentatives* of all of the ſame kind, and their Names applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *Ideas*. Thus the Colour

which I receive from *Chalk*, *Snow* and *Milk*, is made a Repreſentative of all of that kind; and has a Name given it *(Whiteneſs)* which ſignifies the ſame quality, wherever to be found or imagin'd. And thus *Univerſals* both *Ideas* and *Terms* are made

This puts the great difference between Man and Brutes: They ſeem to reaſon about particular Objects, and *Ideas*, but there appear no Footſteps of *Abſtraction* in them, or of making *General Ideas*.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

IN the reception of Simple Ideas the Mind is only *Paſſive*, having no power to frame any one to its ſelf, nor have any Idea which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But about theſe Simple Ideas it exerts ſeveral Acts of its own, whereby out of them as the Materials and Foundations of the

the reſt, the other are fram'd: The Acts of the Mind, wherein it exerts its Power over its Simple Ideas, are chiefly theſe three: Firſt, it combines ſeveral Simple Ideas into one Compound one, and thus all *Complex Ideas* are made. Secondly, It brings two Ideas whether *Simple* or *Complex* together, and ſets them by one another, ſo as to take a View of them at once without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its Ideas of Relations. Thirdly, It ſeparates them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real Exiſtence. And thus all its *General Ideas* are made. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe, and come to the other two in their due Places. As *Simple Ideas* are obſerv'd to exiſt in ſeveral Combinations united together, ſo the Mind may conſider them as united, not only as they are really united in External Objects, but as it ſelf has join'd them. *Ideas* thus made up of ſeveral ones put together, I call *Complex*, as *Man*, *Army*, *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, &c. By this Faculty of repeating and joining together its *Ideas*,

the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts. But it is ſtill confin'd to thoſe Simple *Ideas* which it receiv'd from the two Sources of *Senſation* and *Reflection*. It can have no other *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities, than what come from without by the Senſes, nor any other *Ideas* of the Operations of a thinking Subſtance, than what it finds in it ſelf: but having once got theſe Simple *Ideas*, it can by its own Power put them together and make new *Complex ones*, which it never receiv'd ſo united.

Complex *Ideas* however compounded, and decompounded, tho' their Number be infinite, and their Variety endleſs, may all be reduc'd under theſe three Heads, Firſt *Modes*, Secondly *Subſtances*, Thirdly *Relations*.

Modes, I call ſuch Complex *Ideas* which contain not the Suppoſition of ſubſiſting by themſelves, but are conſider'd as dependences on, and affections of Subſtances, as *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. Theſe Modes are of two ſorts, Firſt *Simple*, which are

are combinations of the ſame Simple *Idea*, as a *Dozen*, *Score*, &c. which are but the *Ideas* of ſo many diſtinct Unites put together. Secondly, *Mix'd*, which are compounded of Simple *Ideas* of ſeveral kinds, as *Beauty*, which conſiſts in a certain Compoſition of Colour and Figure, cauſing delight in the Beholder. *Theft*, which is the concealed Change of the poſſeſſion of any thing without the Conſent of the Proprietor. *Theſe* viſibly contain a combination of *Ideas* of ſeveral kinds.

Secondly, *Subſtances*, the *Ideas* of Subſtances are only ſuch combinations of Simple *Ideas* as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the confuſed *Idea* of Subſtance is always the chief. Thus a combination of the *Ideas* of a certain Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reaſoning join'd to Subſtance, make the ordinary *Idea* of Man.

Theſe again are either of *ſingle Subſtances*, as *Man*, *Stone*; or of *collective*, or ſeveral put together, as

Army, Heap: *Ideas* of ſeveral Subſtances thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle *Idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unite*.

Thirdly, *Relations* which conſiſt in the conſideration and comparing one *Idea* with another. Of theſe ſeveral kinds we ſhall treat in their Order.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and firſt of the Simple Modes of Space.

CConcerning *Simple Modes* we may obſerve that the Modifications of any *Simple Ideas*, are as perfectly different and diſtinct Ideas in the Mind, as thoſe of the greateſt diſtance or contrariety; Thus *Two* is as diſtinct from *Three*, as *Blueneſs* from *Heat*. Under this Head I ſhall firſt conſider the Modes of *Space*.

Space

Space is a Simple Idea which we get both by our Sight and Touch. When we conſider it barely in length between two Bodies, 'tis called *Diſtance*; when in length, breadth and thickneſs it may be call'd *Capacity*. When conſider'd between the Extremities of Matter, which fills the capacity of Space with ſomething Solid, Tangible and Moveable, it is called *Extenſion*; and thus *Extenſion* will be an *Idea* belonging to Body: But *Space* may be conceiv'd without it.

Each different *diſtance* is a different modification of Space; and each *Idea* of any different Space is a *Simple Mode* of this *Idea*. Such are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. which are the *Ideas* of certain ſtated lengths which Men ſettle in their Minds for the uſe, and by the cuſtom of meaſuring. When theſe *Ideas* are made familiar to Mens Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will, without joining to them the *Idea* of Body, and frame to themſelves the *Ideas* of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms be-

yond the utmoſt Bounds of all Bodies, and by adding theſe ſtill one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of Space as much as they pleaſe. From this power of repeating any *Idea* of Diſtance, without being ever able to come to an end, we come by the *Idea* of Immenſity.

Another modification of *Space* is taken from the *Relation* of the parts of the Termination of Extenſion or circumſcrib'd Space amongſt themſelves: and this is what we call *Figure*. This the *Touch* diſcovers in ſenſible Bodies, whoſe Extremities come within our reach: and the *Eye* takes both from Bodies and Colours, whoſe boundaries are within its View; where obſerving how the Extremities terminate either in ſtreight lines, which meet at diſcernible Angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no Angles can be perceiv'd; by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any Body or Space, it has that Idea we call *Figure*: which affords to the Mind infinite Variety.

Another

Another *Mode* belonging to this Head, is that of *Place*. Our Idea of *Place* is nothing but the Relative poſition of any thing with reference to its diſtance from ſome fix'd and certain Points. Whence we ſay, that a thing has or has not changed *Place*, when its Diſtance either is or is not altered with reſpect to thoſe Bodies with which we have occaſion to compare it. That this is ſo, we may eaſily gather from hence; that we can have no Idea of the Place of the *Univerſe*, tho' we can of all its Parts. To ſay that the World is *ſomewhere*, means no more, than that it does *exiſt*. The word *Place* is ſometimes taken to ſignify that *Space* which any body takes up; and ſo the Univerſe may be conceived in a Place.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

THERE is another ſort of *Diſtance*, the *Idea* of which we get from the fleeting, and perpetually periſhing parts of Succeſſion, which we call *Duration*. The Simple Modes of it are any different Lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

The *Idea* of *Succeſſion* is got by reflecting on that Train of *Ideas* which conſtantly follow one another in our Minds as long as we are awake. The diſtance between any parts of this *Succeſſion* is what we call *Duration*: and the continuation of the exiſtence of our Selves, or any thing elſe *commenſurate* to the Succeſſion of any *Ideas* in our Minds, is what we

we call our *own Duration*, or *that* of another thing co-exiſting with our Thinking. That this is ſo, appears from hence, that we have no Perception of Succeſſion or Duration, when that Succeſſion of our *Ideas* ceaſes, as in *Sleep*: the Moment that we ſleep, and awake, how diſtant ſoever, ſeems to be join'd and connected. And poſſibly it would be ſo to a waking Man, could he fix upon one *Idea* without variation, and the ſucceſſion of others. And we ſee that they whoſe Thoughts are very intent upon one thing, let ſlip out of their account a good part of that *Duration*, and think that time ſhorter than it is. But if a Man during his Sleep *dream*, and variety of *Ideas* make themſelves perceptible in his mind, one after another, he hath then, during ſuch Dreaming, a Senſe of *Duration* and of the length of it.

A Man having once got this *Idea* of Duration, can apply it to things which exiſt while he does not think: and thus we meaſure the time of our Sleep,

Sleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

Thoſe who think we get the *Idea* of *Succeſſion* from our obſervation of Motion, by our Senſes, will be of our Opinion, when they conſider that Motion produces in the Mind an *Idea* of Succeſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continued Train of diſtinguiſhable *Ideas*. A Man that looks upon a Body really moving perceives no motion, unleſs that motion produces a conſtant *Train of ſucceſſive Ideas*. But where-ever a Man is, tho' all things be at reſt about him, if he thinks, he will be *conſcious* of *Succeſſion* without perceiving any motion. Hence motions very *ſlow* are not perceived by us; becauſe the change of diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new *Idea* in us, but after a long Interval. The ſame happens in things that move very *ſwift*, which not affecting the Senſe with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable diſtances of their Motion, cauſe not any train of *Ideas* in our Minds, and conſequently are not perceived.

ceived. Thus any thing that moves round in a Circle in leſs time than our *Ideas* are wont to ſucceed one another in our Minds, is not perceived to move, but ſeems to be a perfect intire Circle of that matter which is in motion. Such a part of duration as takes up the time of only one *Idea* in our Minds, wherein we perceive no ſucceſſion, we call an *Inſtant*.

Duration, as mark'd by certain Periods and Meaſures, is what we moſt properly call *Time*: which we meaſure by the Diurnal and Annual *Revolutions* of the Sun, as being conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all Mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another.

It is not neceſſary that Time ſhould be *meaſured by motion*: any conſtant periodical appearance in ſeemingly equidiſtant Spaces, may as well diſtinguiſh the Intervals of *Time* as what we make uſe of. For ſuppoſing the Sun to be lighted, and then extinguiſhed every day: and that in the ſpace of an Annual Revolution, it ſhould ſenſibly encreaſe in Brightneſs, and ſo decreaſe

creaſe again; ſuch a regular appearance would ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of Duration, to all that could obſerve it, as well without, as with Motion. The freezing of Water, the blowing of a Plant returning at equidiſtant Periods in all the parts of the Earth would ſerve for the ſame purpoſe. In effect, we find that a People of *America* counted their Years by the *coming* and *going away* of Birds at certain Seaſons.

The Mind having once got ſuch a meaſure of *Time*, as the Annual Revolution of the Sun, can eaſily apply it to Duration wherein that meaſure it ſelf did not exiſt: and the *Idea* of *Duration* equal to an *Annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as eaſily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration where no Sun, nor Motion was, as the *Idea* of a *Foot* or *Yard* to diſtances beyond the Confines of the World.

By the ſame means, and from the ſame Original that we come to have the *Idea* of Time, we have alſo that *Idea* which we call *Eternity*: For having got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths

of

of Duration, we can in our Thoughts add them to one another as oft as we pleaſe, without ever coming to an end.

And thus it is plain, that from the two Fountains of all Knowledge before-mentioned, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*, we get the Ideas of Duration, and the ſeveral meaſures of it. For,

1. By obſerving what paſſes in our Minds, how our Ideas there in train conſtantly, ſome vaniſh, and others begin to appear, we come by the Idea of *Succeſſion*.

2. By obſerving a diſtance in the parts of this Succeſſion we get the Idea of *Duration*.

3. By obſerving certain appearances at regular and ſeemingly equidiſtant Periods, we get the Ideas of certain Lengths or Meaſures of Duration, as *Minutes, Hours, Days*, &c.

4. By being able to repeat thoſe meaſures of Time, as often as we will, we can come to imagine *Duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt*: Thus we imagine to morrow, next Year, or ſeven Years hence.

5. By

5. By being able to repeat any ſuch Idea of any length of Time, as of a Minute, Year, &c. as often as we will, and add them one to another without ever coming to an end, we come by the Idea of *Eternity*.

6. By conſidering any part of infinite Duration, as ſet out by Periodical Meaſures, we come by the Idea of what we call *Time* in General.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion conſidered together.

TIME is to *Duration* as *Place* is to *Space* or *Expanſion*. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs Oceans of *Eternity* and *Immenſity* as is ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt: And ſo are made uſe of to denote the poſition of finite real Beings in reſpect one to another, in thoſe infinite Oceans of Duration and Space.

Each

Each of theſe have a *twofold acceptation.*

Firſt, Time in general is taken for ſo much of Infinite Duration as is coexiſtent with the Univerſe, and meaſured out by the motions of its great Bodies. Thus it is uſed in the Phraſes *before all Time*, when *Time ſhall be no more.*

Place is likewiſe taken for that *portion* of infinite Space poſſeſſed by the material world, tho' this might be more properly called *Extenſion.* Within *theſe two* are confined the particular Time or Duration, Extenſion or Place of all corporeal Beings.

Secondly, Time is ſometimes applied to Parts of that infinite Duration that were not really meaſur'd out by real Exiſtence, but ſuch as we upon occaſion do ſuppoſe equal to certain Lengths of meaſur'd Time, as in the *Julian Period*, which makes an Excurſion of ſeven hundred ſixty four Years beyond the Creation. Thus we may ſpeak of Place or Diſtance in the great *Inane*, wherein I can conceive a Space equal to, or capable of receiving

receiving a Body of any assigned Dimensions.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

THE Complex *Ideas* of *Number* are form'd by adding several *Unites* together. The *Simple Modes* of it are each several Combinations, as, *Two*, *Three*, &c. These are of all others most distinct, the nearest being as clearly different from each other as the most remote: *Two* beings as distinct from *One*, as Two Hundred. But it is hard to form distinct *Ideas* of every the least excess in Extension. Hence Demonstrations in Numbers are more general in their Use, and more determinate in their Application than those of Extension.

Simple Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds but so many Combinations of Unites which have no variety, but More or Less: *Names* for each

each distinct Combination, seem more necessary than in any other sort of *Ideas*. For without a *Name* or *Mark*, to distinguish that precise Collection, it will hardly be kept from being a heap of Confusion. Hence some *Americans* have no distinct *Idea* of any Number beyond Twenty: so that when they are discoursed with of greater Numbers, they shew the Hairs of their Head. So that to reckon right two things are required:

First, That the Mind distinguish carefully two *Ideas* which are different one from another, only by the Addition or Substraction of one Unit.

Secondly, That it retain in memory the Names or Marks of the several Combinations from an Unit to that Number; and that in exact Order, as they follow one another. In either of which if it fails, the whole Business of *Numbering* will be disturbed; and there will remain only the confused *Idea* of *Multitude*: but the *Ideas* necessary to distinct Numeration will not be attained to.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

THE *Idea* ſignified by the Name *Infinity*, is beſt examin'd, by conſidering to *what* Infinity is by the Mind attributed; and then *how* it frames it. *Finite* and *Infinite* then are look'd upon as the Modes of Quantity, and attributed primarily to things that have Parts, and are capable of Increaſe or Diminution, by the *Addition* or *Subſtraction* of any the leaſt part. Such are the *Ideas* of *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number*.

When we apply this *Idea* to the *Supreme Being*, we do it primarily in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity; more figuratively when to his *Wiſdom*, *Power*, *Goodneſs*, and other Attributes which are properly *inexhauſtible* and *incomprehenſible*: For when we call them Infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what

what carries with it ſome Reflection on the *Number*, or the *Extent* of the *Acts* or *Objects* of God's Power and Wiſdom, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great or ſo many, that theſe Attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, tho' we multiply them in our Thoughts, with the Infinity of *endleſs Number*. I do not pretend to ſay, how theſe Attributes *are in God*, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities: but this is our way of *conceiving them*, and theſe our *Ideas* of their Infinity.

The next thing to be conſidered, is *how we come* by the *Idea* of Infinity. Every one that has any *Idea* of any ſtated lengths of Space, as a *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. finds that he can repeat that *Idea*, and join it to *another*, to a *Third*, and ſo on without ever coming to an end of his Additions: From this Power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space, he takes the *Idea* of Infinite Space or *Immenſity*. By the ſame Power of repeating the *Idea* of any length of Duration we have in our Minds, with all the endleſs addi-

tion of Number, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*.

If our *Idea* of *Infinity* be got by repeating without end our own *Ideas*; why do we not attribute it to other *Ideas*, as well as thoſe of *Space* and *Duration*; ſince they may be as eaſily and as often repeated in our Minds as the other: yet no body ever thinks of infinite *Sweetneſs* or *Whiteneſs*, tho' he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White as frequently as thoſe of *Yard* or *Day*? *I anſwer*, that thoſe *Ideas* that have Parts, and are capable of Increaſe, by the addition of any Parts, afford us by their Repetition an *Idea* of Infinity; becauſe with the endleſs Repetition there is continued an Enlargement, of which there is no end: but it is not ſo in other *Ideas*: For if to the perfecteſt *Idea* I have of *White*, I add another of equal Whiteneſs; it enlarges not my *Idea* at all. Thoſe *Ideas* that conſiſt not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion Men pleaſe, or be ſtretch'd beyond what they have receiv'd by their Senſes,

ſes: but *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number* being capable of increaſe by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endleſs room for more; and ſo thoſe *Ideas* alone lead the Mind towards the Thought of Infinity.

We are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *Idea* of the *Infinity of Space*, and the *Idea* of a *Space Infinite*. The firſt is nothing but a ſuppos'd endleſs Progreſſion of the Mind over any repeated *Idea* of Space. But to have actually in the Mind the *Idea* of a Space Infinite, is to ſuppoſe the Mind already paſſed over all thoſe repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endleſs Repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

This will be plainer, if we conſider *Infinity in Numbers*. The Infinity of Numbers, to the end of whoſe addition every one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear ſoever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evi-

dent, than the Abſurdity of the actual *Idea* of Infinite Number.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

THE Mind has ſeveral diſtinct *Ideas* of *Sliding*, *Rowling*, *Walking*, *Creeping*, &c. which are all but the different modifications of Motion. *Swift* and *Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the meaſures whereof are made out of the diſtances of Time and Space put together.

The like variety we have in *Sounds*: Every articulate Word is a different modification of Sound: as are alſo Notes of different length put together, which make that Complex *Idea* call'd *Tune*.

The Modes of *Colours* might be alſo very various: ſome of which we take notice of, as the different Degrees, or as they are term'd Shades of the ſame Colour. But ſince we ſeldom

dom make assemblages of Colours, without taking in Figure also, as in Painting, &c. those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mix'd Modes, as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

All compounded *Tastes* and *Smells* are also Modes made up of the Simple *Ideas* of those Senses: But they being such as generally we have no names for, cannot be set down in writing, but must be left to the Thoughts and Experience of the Reader.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

WHEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon its self, *Thinking* is the first *Idea* that occurs: wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications; and thereof frames to its self distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception annex'd to any Impression on the Body made by an external Object, is

call'd *Senſation*. When an *Idea* recurs without the preſence of the Object, it is called *Remembrance*. When ſought after by the Mind, and brought again in view, it is *Recollection*. When held there long under attentive conſideration, it is *Contemplation*. When *Ideas* float in the Mind without Regard or Reflection, 'tis call'd in French *Reſvery*, our Language has ſcarce a Name for it. When the *Ideas* are taken notice of, and as it were regiſtred in the Memory, it is *Attention*. When the Mind fixes its View on any one *Idea*, and conſiders it on all ſides, it is *Intention* and *Study*. *Sleep* without Dreaming is Reſt from all theſe. And *Dreaming* is the Perception of *Ideas* in the Mind, not ſuggeſted by any external Objects, or known occaſions; nor under any choice or conduct of the Underſtanding. Of theſe various modes of Thinking, the Mind forms as diſtinct *Ideas*, as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

Pleaſure and *Pain* are Simple *Ideas* which we receive both from Senſation and Reflection. There are Thoughts of the Mind, as well as Senſations, accompanied with Pleaſure or Pain. Their Cauſes are term'd *Good* or *Evil*. For things are eſteem'd Good or Evil only in reference to Pleaſure or Pain. That we call *Good* which is apt to cauſe or increaſe Pleaſure, or diminiſh Pain in us; to procure or preſerve the Poſſeſſion of any Good, or Abſence of any Evil: And on the contrary, that we call *Evil*, which is apt to produce or increaſe any Pain, or diminiſh any Pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleaſure and Pain, I would be underſtood to

mean of *Body* or *Mind*, as they are commonly diſtinguiſh'd; tho' in truth they are only different Conſtitutions of the Mind, ſometimes occaſion'd by diſorder in the Body, ſometimes by thoughts of the Mind. *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and their Cauſes *Good* and *Evil*, are the Hinges upon which our Paſſions turn: by reflecting on the various Modifications or Tempers of Mind, and the internal Senſations which Pleaſure and Pain, Good and Evil produce in us, we may thence form to our ſelves the *Ideas* of our Paſſions. Thus by reflecting upon the Thought we have of the Delight, which any thing is apt to produce in us, we have an *Idea* we call *Love*: and on the contrary, the thought of the Pain, which any thing preſent or abſent produces in us, is what we call *Hatred*. *Deſire* is that uneaſineſs which a Man finds in himſelf upon the abſence of any thing, the preſent enjoyment of which carries the *Idea* of Delight with it. *Joy* is a Delight of the Mind ariſing from the preſent or aſſur'd approaching poſſeſſion of a Good. *Sor-*

row

row is an uneaſineſs of the Mind, upon the thought of a Good loſt, or the ſenſe of a preſent Evil. *Hope* is a pleaſure in the Mind upon the thought of a probable future Enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight. *Fear* is an uneaſineſs of the Mind upon the thought of a future Evil likely to befal us. *Anger* is a Diſcompoſure of Mind upon the Receipt of Injury, with a preſent purpoſe of Revenge. *Deſpair* is the thought of the unattainableneſs of any Good. *Envy* is an uneaſineſs of Mind, cauſed by the conſideration of a Good we deſire, obtain'd by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

It is to be conſidered that in reference to the Paſſions, the Removal or Leſſening of a Pain, is conſidered, and operates as a Pleaſure: and the loſs or diminiſhing of a Pleaſure, as a Pain. And farther, that the Paſſions in moſt Perſons operate on the Body, and cauſe various Changes in it: But theſe being not always ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the *Idea* of each Paſſion. Beſides theſe Modes

of Pleaſure and Pain which reſult from the various Conſiderations of Good and Evil, there are many others, I might have inſtanced in, as the *Pain* of *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, and the Pleaſure of *Eating* and *Drinking*; and of *Muſick*, &c. but I rather choſe to inſtance in the Paſſions, as being of much more Concernment to us.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

THE Mind being every day informed by the Senſes, of the Alteration of thoſe Simple *Ideas* it obſerves in things without: reflecting alſo on what paſſes within it ſelf, and obſerving a conſtant Change of its *Ideas*, ſometimes by the Impreſſions of outward Objects upon the Senſes; and ſometimes by the Determination of its own Choice: and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerv'd to have been, that the like Changes

Changes will for the future be made in the ſame things, by the ſame Agents, and by the like ways, conſiders in one thing, the Poſſibility of having any of its Simple *Ideas* chang'd; and in another, the poſſibility of making that Change, and ſo comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay *Fire* has a Power to *melt Gold*, and make it fluid; and *Gold* has a Power to be *melted*.

Power thus conſider'd, is Twofold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any Change: the one may be call'd *Active*, the other *Paſſive Power*. Of *Paſſive Power* all ſenſible things abundantly furniſh us with *Ideas*, whoſe ſenſible Qualities and Beings we find to be in a continual Flux, and therefore with reaſon we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame change. Nor have we of *Active Power* fewer Inſtances: ſince whatever Change is obſerved, the Mind muſt collect a Power ſomewhere able to make that Change. But yet if we will conſider it attentively, Bodies by

our Senſes do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an *Idea* of *Active* Power, as we have from Reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but two ſorts of *Action*, viz. *Thinking* and *Motion*, let us conſider whence we have the cleareſt *Ideas* of the Powers which produce theſe Actions.

Of *Thinking*, Body affords us no *Idea* at all: it is only from Reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any *Idea* of the beginning of Motion. A Body at Reſt affords us no *Idea* of any *Active* Power to move; and when it is ſet in motion it ſelf, that Motion is rather a Paſſion than an Action in it. The *Idea* of the beginning of Motion we have only by Reflection on what paſſes in our ſelves; where we find by Experience that barely by willing it, we can move the Parts of our Bodies which were before at reſt.

We find in our ſelves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral Actions of our Minds, and Motions

tions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind. This Power which the Mind has thus to order the Conſideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body to its Reſt, and *vice versâ* in any particular Inſtance, is that we call the *Will*. The actual Exerciſe of that Power, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*: The Forbearance or Performance of that Action, conſequent to ſuch Order or Command of the Mind, is called *Voluntary*: And whatſoever Action is performed without ſuch a Thought of the Mind, is called *Involuntary*.

The Power of Perception is that we call the *Underſtanding*. *Perception*, which we make the Act of the Underſtanding, is of *Three* ſorts. *Firſt*, the Perception of *Ideas* in our Minds. *Secondly*, The Perception of the Signification of Signs. *Thirdly*, The Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any diſtinct *Ideas*. Theſe Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of Perceiving and Preferring are uſually

called by another Name; and the ordinary way of ſpeaking is, that the Underſtanding and Will are two *Faculties* of the Mind: A Word proper enough, if it be uſed ſo as not to breed any Confuſion in Mens Thoughts, by being ſuppoſed, (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real Beings in the Soul that performs thoſe Actions of Underſtanding and Volition.

From the Conſideration of the Extent of the Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the *Ideas* of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*: So far as a Man has a Power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, ſo far is a Man *Free*. Where-ever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power, where-ever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind, there he is not *Free*, tho' perhaps the Action may be *voluntary*. So that the *Idea* of *Liberty* is the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent, to do or forbear any Action according

according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other. Where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produc'd by him, according to his Volition, there he is not at liberty; that Agent is under *Neceſſity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no *Thought*, no *Volition*, no *Will*; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition where there is no *Liberty*. Thus a *Tennis-ball*, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying ſtill at Reſt, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent: becauſe we conceive not a *Tennis-ball* to think, and conſequently not to have any Volition or Preference of Motion to Reſt, or *vice verſâ*.[a] So a Man ſtriking himſelf or his Friend by a convulſive Motion of his Arm, which it is not in his Power by Volition or the Direction of his Mind, to ſtop or forbear; no body thinks he has in this *Liberty*, every one pities him as acting by *Neceſſity* and *Conſtraint*. Again, ſuppoſe a Man be carried whilſt

(a) ꝛ therefore ꝺ ~ Liberty, ≈ ȝ a to fast agent; ȝ ꝑ its a motion ꝛ of, ꝺ under ∿ be a ꝛ neceſſary, ꝛ ꝑ ſ. ∿ //.

ꝺ heaviness a — falling ȝ: Water, (a Bridge breaking under ꝺ) ꝺ ȝ, herein Liberty ≈ ȝ a to agent // ∿ c. of ꝺ Volition, c. o prefer ≈ ȝ falling ſ. falling i yet: forbear ran ce

fast asleep into a Room where is a Person he longs to see, and be there lock'd fast in beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to see himself in so desirable Company, which he stays willingly in; that is, prefers his staying to going away. Is not this stay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it, and yet being lock'd fast in, he is not at liberty to stay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an *Idea* belonging to Volition or Preferring, but to the Person having the Power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct.

As it is in the Motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds: Where any one is such that we have Power to take it up, or lay it by according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty. A waking Man is not at liberty to think or not to think, no more than he is at liberty whether his Body shall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one *Idea* to another, is many times in his Choice.

And

And then he is in reſpect of his *Ideas* as much at liberty as he is in reſpect of Bodies he reſts on. He can at pleaſure remove himſelf from one to another: But yet ſome *Ideas* to the Mind, like ſome Motions to the Body are ſuch, as in certain Circumſtances it cannot avoid nor obtain their Abſence by the utmoſt Effort it can uſe. Thus a Man on the Rack is not at liberty to lay by the *Idea* of *Pain*, and entertain other Contemplations.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or forbear, according to the Direction of Thought, there Neceſſity takes place. This is an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to the Preference of his Mind, is call'd *Compulſion*; when the hindring or ſtopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Reſtraint*: Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing neceſſary Agents.

And thus I have in a ſhort Draught given a View of our *Original Ideas*, from

from whence all the reſt are deriv'd, and of which they are made up: And which may be all reduc'd to theſe few primary and original ones, *viz. Extenſion*, *Solidity*, and *Mobility*, which by our Senſes we receive from Body: *Thinking* and the *power of moving*, which by Reflection we receive from our Minds. *Exiſtence*, *Duration*, *Number*, which belong both to the one and to the other. By theſe I imagine might be explain'd the Nature of *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Taſtes*, *Smells*, and all other *Ideas* we have; if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the ſeveral modify'd Extenſions and Motions of theſe minute Bodies which produce thoſe ſeveral Senſations in us.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

Mixed Modes are Combinations of *Simple Ideas* of different kinds, (whereby they are diſtinguiſh'd from

from ſimple Modes, which conſiſt only of Simple *Ideas* of the ſame kind, put together by the Mind) as *Virtue*, *Vice*, a *Lie*, &c. The Mind being once furniſh'd with Simple *Ideas*, can put them together in ſeveral Compoſitions, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in Nature. And hence I think it is, that theſe Ideas are called *Notions*, as if they had their Original and conſtant Exiſtence more in the Thoughts of Men than in the Reality of Things: And to form ſuch Ideas it ſufficed that the Mind put the Parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the Underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real Being. There are three ways whereby we get theſe Complex Ideas of *mixed Modes*.

Firſt, By *Experience* and Obſervation of things themſelves, thus by ſeeing two Men wreſtle, we get the *Idea* of Wreſtling.

Secondly, By *Invention* or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* in our own Minds; ſo he

that

that first invented *Printing*, had an *Idea* of it first in his Mind, before it ever existed.

Thirdly, By *Explaining* the Names of Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerating all those *Ideas* which go to the making them up. Thus the mixed Mode which the Word *Lie* stands for, is made up of these Simple *Ideas*: First, *Articulate Sounds*. Secondly, *Certain* Ideas *in the Mind of the Speaker*. Thirdly, *Those Words, the signs of these* Ideas. Fourthly, *Those Signs put together* by Affirmation or Negation, otherwise than the *Ideas* they stand for, are in the Mind of the Speaker. Since Languages are made, *Complex Ideas* are usually got by the explication of those terms that stand for them: For since they consist of Simple *Ideas* combined, they may by Words standing for those Simple *Ideas* be represented to the Mind of one who understands those Words, tho' that Combination of Simple *Ideas* was never offer'd to his Mind by the real Existence of things.

Mixed

Mixed Modes have their *Unity* from an Act of the Mind, combining those several Simple *Ideas* together, and considering them as one Complex one: The *mark* of this Union is one *name* given to that Combination. Men seldom reckon any number of *Ideas* to make one Complex one: but such collections as there be Names for. Thus the *killing of an old Man*, is as fit to be united into one *Complex Idea*, as that of *a Father*: yet there being no name for it, it is not taken for a particular Complex *Idea*; nor a distinct Species of Action, from that of killing any other Man.

Those Collections of *Ideas* have Names generally affixed, which are of frequent use in conversation: in which cases Men endeavour to communicate their Thoughts to one another with all possible Dispatch. Those others which they have seldom occasion to mention, they tie not together, nor give them Names.

This gives the reason, why there are Words in every Language, which cannot be rendred by any one single Word

of

of another. For the Fashions and Customs of one Nation, make several Combinations of *Ideas* familiar in one, which another had never any occasion to make. Such were Ὀστρακισμὸς among the *Greeks*, *Proscriptio* among the *Romans*. This also occasions the *constant change* of Languages; because the change of Custom and Opinions, brings with it new Combinations of *Ideas*, which, to avoid long Descriptions, have new Names annexed to them, and so they become *new Species* of *Mixed* Modes.

Of all our Simple *Ideas*, those that have had most *mixed Modes* made out of them, are *Thinking*, and *Motion*; (which comprehend in them all Action) and *Power*, from whence these Actions are conceiv'd to flow. For Actions being the great Business of Mankind, it is no wonder if the several Modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of, the *Ideas* of them observ'd and laid up in Memory, and have Names assign'd them. For without such *Complex Ideas* with Names to them, Men cou'd not easi-

ly hold any Communication about them. Of this kind are the Modes of Actions diſtinguiſh'd by their *Cauſes*, *Means*, *Objects*, *Ends*, *Inſtruments*, *Time*, *Place*, and other Circumſtances; as alſo of the Powers fitted for thoſe Actions: Thus *Boldneſs* is the Power to do or ſpeak what we intend without Fear or Diſorder: which Power of doing any thing, when it has been acquir'd by the frequent doing the ſame thing, is that *Idea* we call *Habit*; when forward and ready upon every occaſion to break into Action, we call it *Diſpoſition*: Thus *Teſtineſs*, is a Diſpoſition or Aptneſs to be Angry.

Power being the ſource of all Action, the Subſtances wherein theſe Powers are, when they exert this Power, are called *Cauſes*: and the Subſtances thereupon produc'd, or the Simple *Ideas* introduc'd into any Subject, *Effects*. The Efficacy whereby the new Subſtance or *Idea* is produc'd, is called in the Subject exerting that Power, *Action*; in the Subject wherein any Simple *Idea* is chang'd,

or

or produc'd, *Paſſion*: which Efficacy in *intellectual Agents*, we can, I think, conceive to be nothing elſe but Modes of Thinking and Willing: In *corporeal Agents*, nothing elſe but Modifications of Motion. Whatever ſort of Action, beſides theſe produces any Effect; I confeſs my ſelf to have no Notion, or *Idea* of. And therefore many Words which ſeem to expreſs ſome Action, ſignify nothing of the Action, but barely the Effect, with ſome Circumſtances of the Subject wrought on, or Cauſe operating. Thus *Creation*, *Annihilation*, contain in them no *Idea* of the Action or Manner, whereby they are produc'd, but barely of the Cauſe, and the thing done. And when a Countryman ſays the Cold *freezes Water*, tho' the Word *Freezing*, ſeem to import ſome Action, yet it truly ſignifies nothing but the Effect, *viz.* That Water that was before *fluid*, is become *hard*, and *conſiſtent*, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THE Mind obſerving ſeveral Simple *Ideas* to go conſtantly together, which being preſum'd to belong to one thing, are called ſo united in one Subject by one Name, which we are apt afterward to talk of and conſider as one Simple *Idea*, which indeed is a Complication of many *Ideas* together. We imagine not theſe Simple *Ideas* to ſubſiſt by themſelves, but ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*, wherein they ſubſiſt, which we call *Subſtance*. The *Idea* of pure Subſtance is nothing but the ſuppos'd, but unknown Support of theſe Qualities, which are capable of producing Simple *Ideas* in us.

The *Ideas* of *particular Subſtances* are compos'd out of this obſcure

and general *Idea* of Subſtance, together with ſuch combinations of Simple *Ideas*, as are obſerv'd to exiſt together, and ſuppos'd to flow from the internal Conſtitution and unknown Eſſence of that Subſtance. Thus we come by the *Ideas* of *Man*, *Horſe*, *Gold*, &c. Thus the ſenſible Qualities of *Iron*, or a *Diamond* make the Complex *Ideas* of thoſe Subſtances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philoſopher.

The ſame happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz. Thinking*, *Reaſoning*, &c. which we concluding not to ſubſiſt by themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produc'd by it; we think them the Actions of ſome other Subſtance, which we call *Spirit*: of whoſe Subſtance or Nature we have as clear a Notion as of that of Body; the one being but the ſuppos'd *Subſtratum* of the Simple *Ideas* we have from without; as the other of thoſe Operations which we experiment in our ſelves within: So that the *Idea* of *Corporeal Subſtance* in matter,

ter, is as remote from our Conceptions as that of *Spiritual Subſtance*.

Hence we may conclude that he has the perfecteſt *Idea* of any particular Subſtance, who has collected moſt of thoſe Simple *Ideas* which do exiſt in it: among which we are to reckon its *Active Powers*, and *Paſſive Capacities*, tho' not ſtrictly *Simple Ideas*.

Secondary Qualities for the moſt part ſerve to diſtinguiſh Subſtances. For our Senſes fail us in the diſcovery of the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of the minute Parts of Bodies on which their real Conſtitutions and Differences depend: and Secondary Qualities are nothing but Powers with relation to our Senſes. The *Ideas* that make our Complex ones of Corporeal Subſtances, are of three ſorts. *Firſt*, The *Ideas* of Primary Qualities of Things, which are diſcover'd by our Senſes; Such are *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. *Secondly*, the Senſible ſecondary Qualities, which are nothing but Powers to produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes. *Thirdly*, The Aptneſs we

conſider in any Subſtance to cauſe, or receive ſuch Alterations of Primary Qualities, as that the Subſtance ſo alter'd, ſhould produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before: And they are called *Active* and *Paſſive Powers*. All which, as far as we have any notice, or notion of them, terminate in *Simple Ideas*.

Had we Senſes acute enough to diſcern the minute Particles of Bodies, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; as we find in viewing things with *Microſcopes*. Such Bodies as to our naked Eyes are colour'd and opaque, will through *Microſcopes* appear pellucid. *Blood* to the naked Eye appears all Red; but by a good *Microſcope* we ſee only ſome Red Globules ſwimming in a tranſparent Liquor.

The *Infinite wiſe Author* of our Beings has fitted our Organs and Faculties to the conveniencies of Life and the buſineſs we have to do here: We may by our Senſes know and diſtinguiſh things ſo far as to accommo-

date

date them to the Exigences of this Life. We have also Insight enough into their admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects to admire and magnify the the Wisdom, Power and Goodness of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this which is suited to our present Condition, we want not Faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the conveniences of living.

Besides these Complex *Ideas* we have of material Substances; by the simple *Ideas* taken from the operations of our own Minds, which we experiment in our selves, as *Thinking*, *Understanding*, *Willing*, *Knowing*, &c. co-existing in the same Substance, we are able to frame the Complex *Idea* of a *Spirit*. And this *Idea* of an *immaterial Substance*, is as clear as that we have of a *material*. By joining these with Substance, of which we have no distinct *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of a *Spirit*: and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent, solid Parts, and Power of being mov'd, join'd with Substance, of which like-

wiſe we have no poſitive *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of *Matter*. The one is as clear and diſtinct as the other. The Subſtance of *Spirit* is unknown to us; and ſo is the Subſtance of *Body* equally unknown to us: Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body, *viz. Solid coherent Parts*, and *impulſe*, we have diſtinct clear *Ideas* of: So likewiſe have we, of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit, *Thinking* and a *power of Action*. We have alſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of ſeveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, which are but the various Modifications of the Extenſion of cohering ſolid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewiſe the *Ideas* of the ſeveral Modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, *&c.* as alſo of Willing and Moving the Body conſequent to it.

If this Notion of Spirit may have ſome difficulties in it, not eaſy to be explain'd, we have no more reaſon to deny or doubt of the *exiſtence of Spirits*, than we have to deny or doubt of the *exiſtence of Body*: becauſe

cauſe the notion of Body is cumbred with ſome difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoſſible to be explain'd. The *Diviſibility in infinitum*, for inſtance, of any finite Extenſion involves us whether we grant or deny it in conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent. We have therefore as much reaſon to be ſatisfied with our notion of *Spirit*, as with our notion of *Body*; and the Exiſtence of the one, as well as the other. We have no other *Idea* of the *Supreme Being*, but a Complex one of *Exiſtence*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Duration*, *Pleaſure*, *Happineſs*, and of ſeveral other Qualities, and Powers which it is better to have than be without, with the Addition of *infinite* to each of theſe.

In which Complex *Idea* we may obſerve that there is no Simple one, bating *Infinity*, which is not alſo a part of our Complex *Idea* of other Spirits; becauſe in our *Ideas*, as well of Spirits as other things, we are reſtrain'd to thoſe we receive from *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THERE are other *Ideas* of Subſtances which may be call'd *Collective*, which are made up of many particular Subſtances conſider'd as united into one *Idea*, as a *Troop*, *Army*, &c. which the Mind makes by its power of Compoſition. Theſe *Collective* Ideas are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind bringing things remote, and independent into one View, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them united into one Conception, and ſignified by one Name. For there are no things ſo remote, which the Mind cannot by this Art of Compoſition, bring into one *Idea*, as is viſible in that ſignified by the Name *Univerſe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

THERE is another Sort of *Ideas* which the Mind gets from the *comparing of one thing with another.* When the Mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and ſet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other, this is *Relation* or *Reſpect*: and the Denominations given to things intimating that Reſpect, are what we call *Relatives*, and the things ſo brought together *Related.* Thus when I call *Cajus*, *Husband*, or *Whiter*, I intimate ſome other Perſon, or Thing in both caſes, with which I compare him. Any of our *Ideas* may be the Foundation of Relation.

Where Languages have fail'd to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not ſo eaſily taken notice of: As in

Concubine, which is a Relative Name, as well as *Wife*.

The *Ideas* of Relation may be the ſame, in thoſe Men who have far different *Ideas* of the things that are Related. Thus thoſe who have different *Ideas* of *Man*, may agree in that of *Father*.

There is no *Idea* of any kind, which is not capable of an almoſt infinite number of Conſiderations, in reference to other things: and therefore this makes no ſmall part of Mens Words and Thoughts. Thus one ſingle Man may at once ſuſtain the Relations of *Father*, *Brother*, *Son*, *Huſband*, *Friend*, *Subject*, *General*, *European*, *Engliſhman*, *Iſlander*, *Maſter*, *Servant*, *Bigger*, *Leſs*, &c. to an almoſt infinite number; he being capable of as many Relations as there may be occaſions of comparing him to other things in any manner of Agreement, Diſagreement, or Reſpect whatſoever.

The *Ideas* of Relations are much *clearer* and more *diſtinct* than of the Things

Things related; becauſe the Knowledge of one Simple *Idea* is oftentimes ſufficient to give me the notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any ſubſtantial Being, an accurate Collection of ſundry *Ideas* is neceſſary.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect, and other Relations.

THE *Ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, we get from our obſervation of the *viciſſitude of Things*, while we perceive ſome Qualities or Subſtances begin to exiſt, and that they receive their Exiſtence from the due Application and Operation of other Beings: That which *produces*, is the *Cauſe*; that which is *produced* the *Effect*. Thus *Fluidity* in Wax is the Effect of a certain degree of Heat, which we obſerve to be conſtantly produced by the application of ſuch Heat.

We diſtinguiſh the Originals of things in two ſorts.

Firſt, When the thing is wholly made new, ſo that no part thereof did ever exiſt before, as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exiſt, which had before no Being; 'tis called *Creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles which did all of them before exiſt, but the thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting Particles, which altogether make up ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*; had not any Exiſtence before, as this *Man*, this *Egg*, this *Roſe*, *&c.* This, when referr'd to a Subſtance, produced in the ordinary Courſe of Nature, by an Internal Principle, but ſet on work by ſome External Agent, and working by inſenſible ways which we perceive not, is called *Generation*.

When the Cauſe is Extrinſical, and the Effect produc'd by a ſenſible Separation or Juxta-poſition of diſcernible Parts, we call it *Making*; and ſuch are all Artificial Things. When any ſimple *Idea* is produced, which

was

was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration*.

The Denominations of Things taken from *Time*, are for the moſt part only Relations. Thus when it is ſaid that Queen *Elizabeth* lived Sixty nine, and reigned Forty five Years, no more is meant, than that the duration of her Exiſtence was equal to ſixty nine, and of her Government to Forty five Annual Revolutions of the Sun: And ſo are all Words anſwering, *How long*.

Young and *Old*, and other Words of Time, that are thought to ſtand for poſitive *Ideas*, are indeed Relative; and intimate a Relation to a certain length of Duration, whereof we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus we call a Man Young or Old, that has lived little or much of that time that Men uſually attain to. This is evident from our application of theſe Names to other things; for a *Man* is called Young at Twenty, but a *Horſe* Old, *&c.* The Sun and Stars we call not Old at all, becauſe we know not what

what period God has ſet to that ſort of Beings.

There are other *Ideas*, that are truly *Relative*, which we ſignify by Names that are thought *Poſitive* and *Abſolute*; ſuch as *Great* and *Little*, *Strong* and *Weak*. The Things thus denominated are referred to ſome Standards with which we compare them. Thus we call an *Apple Great*, that is bigger than the ordinary ſort of thoſe we have been us'd to. And a Man *Weak*, that has not ſo much Strength or Power to move as Men uſually have, or thoſe of his own ſize.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

ANother occaſion the Mind takes of comparing, is the very *Being of Things*: when conſidering a Thing as exiſting at any certain time, or place, and comparing it with it ſelf as exiſting at any other time, *&c.*

it

it forms the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diversity*. When we see any thing in any certain time and place, we are sure, it is that very thing; and can be no other, how like soever it may be in all other Respects.

We conceiving it impossible, that two Things of the same kind should exist together in the same place, we conclude that whatever exists any where at the same time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there it self alone. When therefore we demand whether any thing be the *same*, or no, it refers always to something that existed such a Time, in such a Place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with it self, and no other.

We have *Ideas* of three sorts of Substances, First, Of *God*, Secondly, *Finite Intelligences*, Thirdly, *Bodies*.

First, God being Eternal, Unalterable, and every where, concerning his *Identity* there can be no doubt.

Secondly, Finite Spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the Relation to

that

that time and place will always determine to each its *Identity*, as long as it exiſts.

Thirdly, The ſame will hold of every Particle of Matter to which no Addition or Subſtraction is made. Theſe three exclude not one another out of the ſame place, yet each exclude thoſe of the ſame kind, out of the ſame place.

The Identity and Diverſity of *Modes* and *Relations* are determined after the ſame manner that Subſtances are: only the Actions of Finite Beings, as *Motion* and *Thought*, conſiſting in Succeſſion, they cannot exiſt in different times and Places as permanent Beings: For no Motion or Thought conſider'd as at different times can be the ſame, each part thereof having a different beginning of Exiſtence.

From whence it is plain, that Exiſtence it ſelf is the *Principium Individuationis*, which determines a Being to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two Beings of the ſame kind. Thus, ſuppoſe an *Atom* exiſting in a determin'd time and place;

it

it is evident that conſider'd in any inſtant, it is the ſame with it ſelf, and will be ſo, as long as its Exiſtence continues. The ſame may be ſaid of Two, or more, or any number of Particles, whilſt they continue together. The *Maſs* will be the ſame however jumbled: but if one Atom be taken away, it is not the ſame Maſs.

In *Vegetables*, the Identity depends not on the ſame Maſs, and is not applied to the ſame thing. The reaſon of this is the difference between an Animate Body, and Maſs of Matter; *This* being only the Coheſion of Particles any how united; *The other*, ſuch a diſpoſition an Organization of Parts, as is fit to receive and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, Leaves, *&c.* (of an *Oak*, for inſtance) in which conſiſts the vegetable Life. That therefore which has ſuch an Organization of Parts partaking of one common Life, continues to be the ſame *Plant*, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant. The Caſe is not ſo much

much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an *Animal*, and continues it the *same*.

The Identity of the *same Man* likewise consists in a participation of the same continued Life, in succeeding Particles of Matter vitally united to the same organized Body.

To understand *Identity* aright, we must consider what *Idea* the Word it is applied to stands for. It being one thing to be the *same Substance*, another the *same Man*, and a Third the *same Person*.

An *Animal*, is a living organized Body; and the same Animal, is the same continued Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living Body, and our Notion of *Man*, is but of a particular sort of Animal.

Person stands for an Intelligent Being, that reasons and reflects, and can consider it self the same thing in different Times and Places; which it doth by that *Consciousness* that is inseparable from Thinking. By this every one is

to

to himself what he calls *Self*, without considering whether that *Self* be continued in the same, or divers Substances. In this consists *Personal Identity*, or the Sameness of a Rational Being: and so far as this Consciousness extends backward to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person. It is the same *Self* now, it was then: And it is by the same *Self*, with this present one, that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

Self is that conscious thinking Thing, whatever Substance it matters not, which is conscious of Pleasure or Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery; and so is concerned for it self, as far as that Consciousness extends. That with which the Consciousness of this present thinking Thing, can join it self, makes the same Person, and is one Self with it; and so attributes to it Self, and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that Consciousness reaches.

This *Personal Identity* is the Object of Reward and Punishment, being that

that by which every one is concern'd for himſelf. If the *Conſciouſneſs* went along with the little Finger, when that was cut off, it would be the ſame Self that was juſt before concern'd for the whole Body.

If the ſame *Socrates*, waking and ſleeping, did not partake of the ſame Conſciouſneſs, they would not be the ſame *Perſon*. *Socrates* waking, could not be in juſtice accountable for what *Socrates* ſleeping did, no more than one *Twin*, for what his Brother *Twin* did, becauſe their outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed.

But ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the Memory of ſome parts of my Life, beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; Am I not the *ſame Perſon* that did thoſe Actions, tho' I have now forgot them? I anſwer, that we muſt here take notice what the Word *I* is applied to, which in this Caſe is the Man only: And the ſame Man being preſumed to be the ſame Perſon, *I* is eaſily here ſuppos'd to ſtand alſo for the ſame Perſon. But if it be poſ-

ſible

ſible for the ſame Man, to have diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſs at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame Man would, at different times make different Perſons. Which we ſee is the Senſe of Mankind in the ſolemneſt Declaration of their Opinions, Humane Laws not puniſhing the Madman for the Sober Man's Actions, nor the Sober Man for what the Madman did; thereby making them two Perſons. Thus we ſay in *Engliſh*, ſuch a one *is not himſelf*, or is *beſides himſelf*, in which Phraſes it is inſinuated, that *Self* is chang'd, and the *Self ſame Perſon* is no longer in that Man.

But is not a Man Drunk or Sober the ſame Perſon? Why elſe is he puniſh'd for the ſame Fact he commits when Drunk, tho' he be never afterwards conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame Perſon, as a Man that walks and does other things in his Sleep, is the ſame Perſon, and is as anſwerable for any Miſchief he ſhall do in it. Humane Laws puniſh both with a Juſtice ſuitable to their way of Knowledge: Becauſe in theſe Caſes they

cannot

cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, and what is counterfeit; And ſo the Ignorance in Drunkenneſs or Sleep is not admitted as a Plea: For tho' Puniſhment be annexed to Perſonality, and Perſonality to Conſciouſneſs; and the Drunkard perhaps is not conſcious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the Fact is prov'd againſt him; but want of Conſciouſneſs cannot be prov'd for him. But in the great Day wherein the *Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open*, it may be reaſonable to think no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of, but ſhall receive his Doom, his *own Conſcience accuſing*, or elſe *excuſing him*.

To conclude, whatever Subſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt during its Exiſtence be the ſame: Whatever Compoſitions of Subſtances begin to exiſt, during the Union of thoſe Subſtances, the Concrete muſt be the ſame. Whatſoever Mode begins to exiſt, during its Exiſtence it is the ſame: And ſo if the Compoſition be of diſtinct Subſtances, and different Modes, the ſame

Rule

Rule holds. Whence it appears that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this Matter, rather arises from *names ill us'd*, than from any *obscurity in the things* themselves. For whatever makes the specifick *Idea*, to which the Name is applied, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the *same*, and *divers*, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt concerning it.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

ALL Simple *Ideas*, wherein are Parts or Degrees, afford an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein they are to one another in respect of those Simple *Ideas*. As *Whiter*, *Sweeter*, *More*, *Less*, &c. These depending on the equality and excess of the same Simple *Idea*, in several Subjects may be called, *Proportional Relations*.

Another

Another occaſion of comparing things is taken from the Circumſtances of their Origine, as *Father*, *Son*, *Brother*, &c. Theſe may be called *Natural Relations*.

Sometimes the foundation of conſidering things, is ſome act whereby any one comes by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do ſomething: ſuch are *General*, *Captain*, *Burgher*; theſe are *Inſtituted* and *Voluntary Relations*, and may be diſtinguiſhed from the *Natural*, in that they are alterable and ſeparable from the Perſons to whom they ſometimes belonged, tho' neither of the Subſtances ſo Related be deſtroyed. But natural Relations are not alterable, but are as laſting as their Subjects.

Another Relation is the conformity or diſagreement of Mens voluntary Actions to a Rule to which they are referr'd, and by which they are judged of: Theſe may be called *Moral Relations*. It is this Conformity or Diſagreement of our Actions to ſome Law (whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us from the Will and Power of the

Law-

Law-maker, and is what we call *Reward* or *Punishment*) that renders our Actions morally Good, or Evil.

Of these Moral *Rules* or *Laws* there seem to be three sorts with their different Enforcements. *First*, The *Divine Law*. Secondly, *Civil Law*. Thirdly, *The Law of Opinion* or *Reputation*. By their Relation to the First, our Actions are either *Sins* or *Duties*: To the Second, *Criminal* or *Innocent*: To the Third, *Virtues* or *Vices*.

First, By the *Divine Law*, I mean that Law which God has set to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation.

That God has given a Law to Mankind, seems undeniable, since he has, *First*, A right to do it, we are his Creatures. *Secondly*, Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to what is best. *Thirdly*, Power to enforce it by Reward, and Punishment of infinite Weight and Duration. This is the only true Touchstone of Moral Rectitude, and by which Men judge

of the moſt conſiderable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions: That is, Whether as Duties or Sins they are like to procure to them Happineſs or Miſery from the Hands of the Almighty.

Secondly, The *Civil Law*, is the Rule ſet by the Common-wealth, to the Actions of thoſe that belong to it. This Law no body over-looks; the Rewards and Puniſhments being ready at hand to enforce it, extending to the protecting or taking away of Life, Liberty, and Eſtate of thoſe who obſerve or diſobey it.

Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. *Virtue* and *Vice* are Names ſuppoſed every where, to ſtand for Actions in their own Nature, Right and Wrong. As far as they are really ſo applied, they ſo far are coincident with the Divine Law. But it is viſible that theſe Names in the particular inſtances of their Application, through the ſeveral Nations and Societies of Men, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch Actions as in each Country and Society, are in Reputation

putation or Diſcredit. So that the meaſure of what is every where called and eſteemed Virtue and Vice, is the approbation or diſlike, praiſe or blame, which by a tacit Conſent eſtabliſhes it ſelf in the Societies and Tribes of Men in the World; whereby ſeveral Actions come to find Credit or Diſgrace amongſt them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Fashions of the Place.

That this is ſo, appears hence: That tho' that paſſes for Virtue in one place, which is elſewhere accounted Vice; yet every where *Virtue* and *Praiſe*, *Vice* and *Blame* go together; *Virtue* is every where that which is thought Praiſe-worthy: and nothing elſe but that which has the allowance of publick Eſteem, is called *Virtue*. Theſe have ſo cloſe an Alliance, that they are often called by the ſame name.

'Tis true, Virtue and Vice do in a great meaſure every where correſpond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Laws of God have eſtabliſhed; becauſe the obſerva-

tion of theſe Laws viſibly ſecures and advances the general Good of Mankind, and the neglect of them breeds Miſchief and Confuſion: and therefore Men without renouncing all Senſe and Reaſon, and their own Intereſt, could not generally miſtake in placing their commendation and blame on that ſide that deſerved it not.

They who think Commendation and Diſgrace not ſufficient motives to engage men to accommodate themſelves to the Opinions and Rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeem little skill'd in the Hiſtory of Mankind. The greateſt part whereof govern themſelves chiefly by this *Law of Faſhion*.

The Penalties that attend the breach of God's Laws are ſeldom ſeriouſly reflected on, and thoſe that do reflect on them, entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation. And for the puniſhment due from the Laws of the Common-wealth, Men flatter themſelves with the hopes of Impunity: But no Man eſcapes Cenſure and Diſlike who offends againſt Faſhion; nor

is

is there one of ten thouſand ſtiff and inſenſible enough, to bear up under the conſtant diſlike and condemnation of his own Club.

Morality then is nothing but a Relation to theſe Laws or Rules; And theſe Rules being nothing but a collection of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*; The conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the Action, that the Simple *Ideas* belonging to it, may correſpond to thoſe which the Law requires. By which we ſee how Moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in the Simple *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection. For example, Let us conſider the Complex *Idea* ſignified by the word *Murder*. Firſt from Reflection, we have the *Ideas* of *Willing*, *Conſidering*, *Purpoſing*, *Malice*, &c. Alſo of *Life*, *Perception*, and *Self-Motion*. Secondly from Senſation, we have the *Ideas* of *Man*, and of ſome Action whereby we put an end to that Perception and Motion in the Man, all which Simple *Ideas*, are comprehended in the word *Murder*.

This collection of ſimple *Ideas* being found to agree or diſagree with the eſteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of Praiſe or Blame, I call the Action *Virtuous*, or *Vicious*. If I have the Will of a Supreme Inviſible Lawmaker for my Rule, then, as I ſuppoſe the Action commanded or forbidden by *God*, I call it Good or Evil, *Sin* or *Duty*: If I compare it with the Civil-Law of my Country, I call it *Lawful* or *Unlawful*, a Crime or no Crime.

Moral Actions may be conſidered two ways.

Firſt, As they are in themſelves a Collection of Simple *Ideas*, in which Senſe they are poſitive abſolute *Ideas*.

Secondly, As *Good* or *Bad*, or *Indifferent*: in this reſpect they are *Relative*, it being their Conformity or Diſagreement with ſome Rule that makes them be ſo. We ought carefully to diſtinguiſh between the poſitive *Idea* of the Action, and the reference it has to a Rule: both which are commonly comprehended under one

one Name, which often occaſions confuſion, and miſleads the Judgment.

Thus the taking from another what is his, without his Conſent, is properly called *Stealing*: But that Name being commonly underſtood to ſignify alſo the Moral Pravity of the Action, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called *Stealing* as an ill Action, diſagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the private taking away his Sword from a Madman to prevent his doing Miſchief, tho' it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as the Name of ſuch a *mixed Mode*, yet when compared to the Law of God, it is no Sin or Tranſgreſſion, tho' the Name *Stealing* ordinarily carries ſuch an Intimation with it.

It would be infinite to go over all ſorts of Relations; I have here mentioned ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee from whence we get our *Ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear, obſcure, diſtinct and confuſed Ideas.

HAving ſhewn the Original of our *Ideas*, and taken a view of their ſeveral ſorts: I ſhall offer ſome few other Conſiderations concerning them. The firſt is, that ſome are *clear*, others *obſcure*: ſome *diſtinct*, and others *confuſed*.

Our Simple *Ideas* are clear, when they are ſuch as the Objects themſelves from whence they were taken, did in a well-ordered Senſation or Perception preſent them. Whilſt the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them ſo to the Mind when it has occaſion to conſider them, they are clear *Ideas*.

Our *Complex Ideas* are *clear* when the *Ideas* that go to their Compoſition are clear: and the Number and Order

Order of thoſe Simple *Ideas*, that are their Ingredients, is determinate and certain.

The cauſe of *Obſcurity* in Simple *Ideas* ſeems to be either dull Organs, or ſlight Impreſſions made by the Objects, or a Weakneſs in the Memory, not able to retain them as received.

A *diſtinct Idea* is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other: And a *Confuſed*, is ſuch an one as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another from which it ought to be different. Obſcurity is oppoſed to Clearneſs, Confuſion to Diſtinctneſs.

This Confuſion incident to Ideas, is only in reference to their Names. For every Idea a Man has, being viſibly what it is, and diſtinct from all other Ideas but it ſelf, that which makes it *confus'd* is, when it is ſuch that it may as well be called by another Name as that which it is expreſs'd by, the difference which keeps the things diſtinct, and makes ſome of them to belong rather to the one, and ſome of them to the other of thoſe Names being left out; and ſo

the diſtinction which was intended to be kept up by theſe different Names is quite loſt.

Confuſion is occaſioned chiefly by the following Defaults.

Firſt, When any *Complex Idea* (for it is *Complex Ideas* that are moſt liable to Confuſion) is made up of too ſmall a number of Simple *Ideas*, and ſuch as are common to other things: Whereby the differences that make it deſerve a different Name, are left out. Thus an *Idea* of a *Leopard* being conceived only as a ſpotted Beaſt, is confuſed; it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from a *Panther*, and other ſorts of Beaſts that are ſpotted. Where the *Ideas* for which we uſe different Terms, have not a difference anſwerable to their diſtinct Names, and ſo cannot be diſtinguiſhed by them, there it is that they are truly confus'd.

Secondly, When the *Ideas* are ſo jumbled together in the Complex one, that it is not eaſily diſcernible, whether it more belongs to the Name given it, than to any other. We may conceive this Confuſion by a ſort of

Pictures uſually ſhewn, wherein the Colours mark out very odd and unuſual Figures, and have no diſcernible Order in their Poſition. This, when ſaid to be the Picture of a *Man* or *Cæſar*, we reckon confuſed, becauſe it is not diſcernible in that State, to belong more to the Name *Man* or *Cæſar*, than to the Name *Baboon* or *Pompey*. But when a Cylindrical Mirrour rightly placed, hath reduced thoſe irregular Lines on the Table, into their due Order and Proportion, then the Eye preſently ſees that it is a *Man* or *Cæſar*; that is, that it belongs to thoſe Names, and is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from a *Baboon* or *Pompey*; that is, from the *Ideas* ſignified by thoſe Names.

Thirdly, When any one of our *Ideas* ſignified by a Name is uncertain and undetermin'd. Thus he that puts in, or leaves out an *Idea* out of his Complex one of *Church* or *Idolatry*, every time that he thinks of either, and holds not ſteady to any one preciſe Combination of *Ideas*, that makes it up, is ſaid to have a confus'd *Idea* of

Church or *Idolatry*. Confuſion always concerns two *Ideas*, and thoſe moſt which moſt approach one another. To avoid Confuſion therefore we ought to examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot eaſily be ſeparated from; and that will be found an *Idea* belonging to another Name, and ſo ſhould be a different thing, from which yet it is not ſufficiently diſtinct, and ſo keeps not that difference from that other *Idea* which the different Name imports.

It is to be obſerved that our *Complex Ideas* may be very clear and diſtinct in one part, and very obſcure and confuſed in another. Thus in *Chiliaedrum*, or Body of a *Thouſand Sides*, the *Idea* of the Figure may be confuſed, tho' that of the Number be very diſtinct: We can diſcourſe and demonſtrate concerning that part of this *Complex Idea* which depends on the Number Thouſand; tho' it is plain we have no preciſe *Idea* of its Figure, ſo as to diſtinguiſh it by that from One that has but Nine Hundred

dred Ninety Nine Sides. The not obſerving this, cauſes no ſmall Error in Mens Thoughts, and Confuſion in their Diſcourſes.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

OUR *Ideas* in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent, come under a *Threefold* Diſtinction, and are, Firſt, either *Real* or *Fantaſtical*. Secondly, *Adequate* or *Inadequate*. Thirdly, *True* or *Falſe*.

By *Real Ideas* I mean ſuch as have a Foundation in Nature, ſuch as have a conformity with the Real Being and Exiſtence of Things, or with their Archetypes.

Fantaſtical are ſuch as have no Foundation in Nature, nor any conformity with that Reality of Being, to which they are referred as to their *Archetypes*.

chetypes. By examining the ſeveral ſorts of *Ideas* we ſhall find, that, Firſt, our *Simple Ideas* are all Real; not that they are Images or Repreſentations of what does exiſt, but as they are the certain Effects of Powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us ſuch Senſations: They are Real *Ideas* in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the Qualities that are really in things themſelves.

Their Reality lies in the ſteady Correſpondence they have with the diſtinct Conſtitutions of Real Beings. But whether they anſwer to thoſe Conſtitutions as to *Cauſes* or *Patterns* it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them.

Complex Ideas being arbitrary Combinations of *Simple Ideas* put together, and united under one general Name, in forming of which the Mind uſes its Liberty; we muſt enquire which of theſe are Real, and which Imaginary Combinations, and to this I ſay, that,

Firſt, Mixed Modes and Relations having no other Reality than what they

they have in the Minds of Men: Nothing elſe is required to make them Real, but a poſſibility of Exiſting conformable to them. Theſe *Ideas* being themſelves *Archetypes*, cannot differ from their *Archetypes*, and ſo cannot be Chimerical; unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent *Ideas*. Thoſe indeed that have Names aſſigned them in any Language, muſt have a Conformity to the ordinary ſignification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought Fantaſtical.

Secondly, Our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances being made, in reference to things exiſting without us, whoſe Repreſentations they are thought, are no farther real, than as they are ſuch Combinations of *Simple Ideas*, as are really united, and co-exiſt in things without us. Thoſe are Fantaſtical which are made up of ſeveral *Ideas*, that never were found united, as *Centaur*, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas *Adequate or Inadequate.*

REAL *Ideas* are either *Adequate* or *Inadequate*; *First*, *Adequate*, which perfectly represent those Archetypes which the Mind supposes them taken from, and which it makes them to stand for. *Secondly*, *Inadequate*, which are such as do but partially or incompleatly represent those Archetypes to which they are referred: whence it appears.

First, That all our *Simple Ideas* are *Adequate*; for they being but the Effects of certain Powers in things fitted and ordained by God, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be Correspondent and Adequate to such Powers, and we are sure they agree to the reality of things.

Secondly, Our *Complex Ideas of Modes* being voluntary Collections of *Simple Ideas*, which the Mind puts together

together without reference to any real Archetypes, cannot but be *Adequate Ideas*. They are referred to no other Pattern, nor made by any Original, but the Good-liking and Will of him that makes the Combination. If indeed one would conform his *Ideas* to thoſe which are formed by another Perſon, they may be Wrong or *Inadequate*, becauſe they agree not to that which the Mind deſigns to be their Archetype and Pattern. In which reſpect only, any *Ideas* of Modes can be Wrong, Imperfect, or Inadequate.

Thirdly, Our *Ideas of Subſtances*, have in the Mind a double Reference: *Firſt*, They are ſometimes referred to a ſuppoſed real Eſſence, of each Species of Things. *Secondly*, They are deſigned for Repreſentations, in the mind, of Things that do exiſt, by *Ideas* diſcoverable in them: in both which reſpects they are *Inadequate*.

Firſt, If the Names of Subſtances ſtand for Things, as ſuppoſed to have certain real Eſſences, whereby they are of this or that Species, (of which real

real Eſſences Men are wholly ignorant and know nothing) it plainly follows that the *Ideas* they have in their Minds, being referred to real Eſſences, as *Archetypes* which are unknown, they muſt be ſo far from being Adequate, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any Repreſentation of them at all. Our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances are, as have been ſhewn, nothing but certain collections of Simple *Ideas* that have been obſerved, or ſuppoſed conſtantly to Exiſt together. But ſuch a Complex *Idea* cannot be the real Eſſence of any Subſtance: For then the Properties we diſcover in it would be deducible from it, and their neceſſary connection with it be known, as all the Properties of a *Triangle* depend on, and are deducible from the Complex *Idea* of *Three Lines including a Space*: But it is certain that in our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, are not contained ſuch *Ideas* on which all the other Qualities that are to be found in them depend.

Secondly, Thoſe that take their *Ideas* of Subſtances from their ſenſible Qualities,

lities, cannot form Adequate *Ideas* of them: becauſe their Qualities and Powers are ſo various, that no Man's Complex *Idea* can contain them all. Moſt of our Simple *Ideas*, whereof our Complex ones of Subſtances do conſiſt, are Powers which being Relations to other Subſtances; we cannot be ſure we know all the Powers, till we have tried what changes they are fitted to give and receive from other Subſtances, in their ſeveral ways of Application: which being not poſſible to be tried upon one Body, much leſs upon All, it is impoſſible we ſhould have Adequate *Ideas* of any Subſtance, made of a collection of all its Properties.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and Falſe Ideas.

Truth and *Falſhood* in propriety of Speech belong only to Propoſitions; and when *Ideas* are termed

True

True or *Falſe*, there is ſome ſecret or tacit Propoſition, which is the foundation of that Denomination. Our *Ideas* being nothing but *Appearances* or *Perceptions* in the Mind, can in ſtrictneſs of Speech no more be ſaid to be True or Falſe, than ſingle Names of Things can be ſaid to be true or falſe. The *Idea* of *Centaur* has no more Falſhood in it, when it appears in our Minds, than the Name *Centaur* when it is pronounced or writ on Paper. For Truth or Falſhood lying always in ſome Affirmation or Negation, our *Ideas* are not capable any of them, of being falſe, till the Mind paſſes ſome Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them. In a *Metaphyſical* Senſe they may be ſaid to be true, that is, to be really ſuch as they exiſt; tho' in things called true, even in that Senſe, there is perhaps a ſecret reference to our *Ideas*, look'd upon as the Standards of that Truth; which amounts to a *Mental Propoſition*.

When the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to any thing extraneous to it, they

they are then capable of being True or False: because in such a reference the Mind makes a tacit supposition of their Conformity to that thing; which supposition, as it is True or False, so the *Ideas* themselves come to be denominated. This happens in these cases:

First, When the Mind supposes its *Idea*, conformable to that in other Mens Minds; called by the same name, such as that of *Justice*, *Virtue*, &c.

Secondly, When the Mind supposes any *Idea* conformable to some real Existence. Thus that of *Man* is True, that of *Centaur* False, the one having a conformity to what has really existed; the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to that real Constitution, and Essence of any thing whereon all its Properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our *Ideas of Substances*, are false.

As to the *First*, When we judge of our *Ideas* by their conformity to those of other Men, they may be any of them False. But Simple *Ideas* are

leaſt liable to be ſo miſtaken; we ſeldom miſtake *Green* for *Blue*, or *Bitter* for *Sweet*; much leſs do we confound the Names belonging to different Senſes, and call a *Colour* by the name of a *Taſte*. Complex *Ideas* are much more liable to Falſhood in this particular: and thoſe of Mixed Modes more than Subſtances. Becauſe in Subſtances their ſenſible Qualities ſerve for the moſt part to diſtinguiſh them clearly: But in Mixed Modes we are more uncertain, and we may call that *Juſtice* which ought to be called by another name. The Reaſon of this is, That the abſtract *Ideas* of Mixed Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of ſuch a preciſe collection of Simple *Ideas*, we have nothing elſe to refer our *Ideas* of Mixed Modes as Standards to; but the *Ideas* of thoſe who are thought to uſe names in their proper ſignifications: and ſo as our *Ideas* conform or differ from them, they paſs for True or Falſe.

As to the *Second*, When we refer our *Ideas* to the real Exiſtence of Things, none can be termed Falſe,

but

but our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances. For our Simple *Ideas* being nothing but Perceptions in us anſwerable to certain Powers in external Objects, their Truth conſiſts in nothing but ſuch appearances, as are produced in us ſuitable to thoſe Powers: Neither do they become liable to the imputation of Falſhood, whether we judge theſe *Ideas* to be in the Things themſelves, or no. For God having ſet them as Marks of diſtinguiſhing Things, that we may be able to diſcern one thing from another; and thereby chuſe them as we have occaſion: It alters not the nature of our Simple *Ideas*, whether we think the *Idea* of *Blue* (for inſtance) to be in the *Violet* it ſelf, or in the Mind only: And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that cauſes in us that *Idea*: Since the name *Blue* notes properly nothing but that mark of diſtinction, that is in a Violet, diſcernible only by our Eyes, whatever it conſiſts in.

Neither

Neither would our Simple *Ideas* be *Falſe*, if by the different ſtructure of our Organs it were ſo ordered, that the ſame Object ſhould produce in ſeveral Mens Minds different *Ideas*. For this could never be known, ſince Objects would operate conſtantly after the ſame manner. It is moſt probable nevertheleſs, that the *Ideas* produced by the ſame Objects in different Mens Minds, are very near and undiſcernibly like. Names of Simple *Ideas* may be miſ-applied, as a Man ignorant in the *Engliſh* Tongue may call *Purple*, *Scarlet*: but this makes no Falſhood in the *Ideas*.

Complex *Ideas* of Modes, cannot be Falſe in reference to the Eſſence of any thing really exiſting; Becauſe they have no reference to any Pattern Exiſting, or made by Nature.

Our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, being all referred to Patterns in Things themſelves, may be Falſe. They are ſo, *Firſt*, When look'd upon as repreſentations of the unknown Eſſences of Things. *Secondly*, When they put together ſimple *Ideas* which in the

the real Exiſtence of Things, have no Union: as in *Centaur*. *Thirdly*, When from any collection of Simple *Ideas*, that do always exiſt together, there is ſeparated by a direct Negation any one ſimple *Idea*, which is conſtantly joined with them. Thus, if from Extenſion, Solidity, Fixedneſs, Malleableneſs, Fuſibility, *&c.* we remove the Colour obſerved in *Gold*.

If this *Idea* be only left out of the Complex one of *Gold*, it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect, rather than a Falſe one: ſince, tho' it contains not all the Simple *Ideas*, that are united in Nature: yet it puts none together, but what do really Exiſt together.

Upon the whole, I think that our *Ideas* as they are conſidered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper ſignification of their Names, or in reference to the reality of Things, may more properly be called *Right* or *Wrong Ideas*, according as they agree or diſagree to thoſe Patterns to which they are referred. The *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds ſimply conſi-

dered, cannot be wrong, unleſs *Complex Ideas*, wherein inconſiſtent Parts are jumbled together. All other *Ideas* are in themſelves right, and the Knowledge about them right, and true Knowledge. But when we come to refer them to any Patterns, or Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they diſagree with ſuch Archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

THERE is ſcarce any one that does not obſerve ſomething that ſeems odd to him, and is in it ſelf really extravagant in the Opinions, Reaſonings, and Actions of other Men. The leaſt Flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-ſighted enough to eſpy, and forward to condemn in another, tho' he be guilty of much greater Unreaſonableneſs in his own Tenets and Conduct,

Conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly be convinc'd of.

This ſort of Unreaſonableneſs is uſually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and for the moſt part truly enough; tho' that reaches not the bottom of the Diſeaſe, nor ſhews diſtinctly enough whence it riſes, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly aſſigned for the Cauſe; and Prejudice is a good general Name for the thing it ſelf; but yet I think he ought to look a little farther who would trace it to the Root it ſprings from, and ſo explain it, as to ſhew whence this Flaw has its Original in very ſober and rational Minds, and wherein it conſiſts. For this being a Weakneſs to which all Men are liable, and a Taint which univerſally infects Mankind, the greater care ſhould be taken to lay it open.

Some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correſpondence and Connection one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reaſon to trace theſe, and hold them together in that Union and Correſpondence which is

founded in their peculiar Beings. Beſides this there is another Connection of *Ideas* wholly owing to Chance or Cuſtom: *Ideas* that in themſeves are not at all of Kin, come to be ſo united in ſome Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to ſeparate them; they always keep Company, and the one no ſooner comes into the Underſtanding, but its Aſſociate appears with it; and if they are more than Two, the whole Gang always inſeparable ſhew themſelves together. This ſtrong Combination of *Ideas* not allied by Nature, the Mind makes in it ſelf either voluntarily, or by chance: And hence it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their different *Inclinations*, *Educations*, *Intereſts*, &c. Cuſtom ſettles Habits of Thinking in the Underſtanding as well as of Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which ſeem to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once ſet a going, continue on in the ſame Steps they have been us'd to; which by often treading are worn into

to

to a ſmooth Path, and the Motion in it becomes eaſy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, thus *Ideas* ſeem to be produced in our Minds; or if they are not, this may ſerve to explain their following one another in an habitual Train, when once they are put into that Tract, as well as it does to explain ſuch Motions of the Body.

This Connection in our Minds of *Ideas* in themſelves looſe and independent one of another, is of ſo great Force to ſet us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Paſſions, Reaſonings, and Notions themſelves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deſerves more to be look'd after. Thus the *Ideas* of *Goblings* and *Sprights* have really no more to do with Darkneſs than Light; yet let but a fooliſh Maid inculcate theſe often on the Mind of a Child, and raiſe them there together, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives; but Darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it thoſe frightful *Ideas*. A Man has ſuffer'd Pain or

Sickneſs in any Place; he ſaw his Friend die in ſuch a Room; tho' theſe have in Nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *Idea* of the *Place* occurs to his Mind, it brings that of the Pain and Diſpleaſure with it, he confounds them in his Mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted are not leſs frequent and powerful, tho' leſs obſerved. Let the *Ideas* of *Being* and *Matter* be ſtrongly joined either by Education or much Thought, whilſt theſe are ſtill combined in the Mind, what Notions, what Reaſonings will there be about ſeparate Spirits? Let Cuſtom from the very Childhood have join'd Figure and Shape to the *Idea* of God, and what Abſurdities will that Mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the *Idea* of *Infallibility* be join'd to any Perſon, and theſe two conſtantly together poſſeſs the Mind, and then one Body in two places at once, ſhall be ſwallowed for a certain Truth, whenever that imagin'd Infallible Perſon dictates

dictates and demands Aſſent without Enquiry.

Some ſuch wrong Combinations of *Ideas* will be found to eſtabliſh the irreconcilable oppoſition between different Sects of Philoſophy and Religion: For we cannot imagine every one of their Followers to impoſe wilfully on himſelf, and knowingly refuſe Truth offer'd by plain Reaſon. Intereſt, tho' it does a great deal in the Caſe, yet cannot be thought to work whole Societies of Men to ſo Univerſal a Perverſneſs, as that every one of them ſhould knowingly maintain Falſhood: Some at leaſt muſt be allowed to do what all pretend to; *i. e.* to purſue Truth ſincerely. That therefore which captivates their Reaſons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Senſe, will, when examin'd, be found to be, what we are ſpeaking of: Some Independent *Ideas*, are by Education, Cuſtom, and the conſtant Din of their Party ſo coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more ſeparate them in their Thoughts,

than if they were but one *Idea*; and they operate as if they were ſo. This gives Senſe to Jargon, Demonſtration to Abſurdities, and Conſiſtency to Nonſenſe, and is the Foundation of the greateſt, I had almoſt ſaid of all the Errors in the World: Or if it does not reach ſo far, it is at leaſt the moſt dangerous one, ſince ſo far as it obtains it hinders Men from ſeeing and examining. The Confuſion of two different *Ideas* which a cuſtomary Connection of them in their Minds hath to them in effect made but one, cannot but fill Mens Heads with falſe Views, and their Reaſonings with falſe Conſequences.

Having thus given an Account of the *Original Sorts* and *Extent* of our *Ideas*, which are the Inſtruments or Materials of our Knowledge, I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhew, what uſe the Underſtanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. But upon a nearer approach I find that there is ſo cloſe a Connection between *Ideas* and *Words*; and our Abſtract *Ideas* and General *Words* have

have ſo conſtant a Relation one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our Knowledge, which all conſiſts in Propoſitions, without conſidering firſt, the Nature Uſe and Signification of *Language*, which therefore muſt be the Buſineſs of the next Book.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

GOD having deſign'd Man for a ſociable Creature, made him not only with an Inclination, and under a Neceſſity to have Fellowſhip with thoſe of his own Kind, but furniſh'd him alſo with *Language*, which was to be the great Inſtrument and common Tie of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs ſo faſhioned, as to be fit to frame *Articulate Sounds*, which we call Words.

But beſides Articulate Sounds (which Birds may be taught to imitate) it was further neceſſary that he ſhould be able to uſe *theſe Sounds* as Signs of *Internal Conceptions*, and make them ſtand

as Marks of the *Ideas* in his Mind, whereby they might be made known to others.

But neither is it enough for the Perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of *Ideas*, unleſs theſe can be made uſe of, ſo as to comprehend ſeveral particular Things; for the Multiplication of Words would have perplexed their Uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct Name to be ſignified by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the Uſe of *General Terms*, whereby one Word was made to mark a Multitude of particular Exiſtences, which advantagious Uſe of Sounds was obtained only by the Difference of the *Ideas* they were made Signs of. Thoſe Names becoming *General*, which are made to ſtand for *General Ideas*; and thoſe remaining *Particular*, where the *Ideas* they are uſed for are *Particular*. There are other Words which ſignify the *Want* or *Abſence* of *Ideas*, as *Ignorance*, *Barrenneſs*, &c. which relate to *Poſitive Ideas*, and ſignify their Abſence.

It is obſervable that the Words which ſtand for Actions and Notions, quite removed from Senſe, are borrowed from ſenſible *Ideas*, *v. g.* to Imagine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Underſtand, Adhere, Conceive, Inſtill, Diſguſt, Diſturbance, Tranquillity, *&c.* which are all taken from the Operations of Things ſenſible, and applied to *Modes of Thinking*. *Spirit* in its primary Signification is no more than Breath; *Angel*, a Meſſenger. By which we may gueſs what kind of Notions they were, and whence derived; which filled the Minds of the firſt Beginners of Languages, and how Nature, even in the naming of Things unawares, ſuggeſted to Men the Originals of all their Knowledge: Whilſt to give Names that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themſelves, or any other *Ideas*, that came not under their Senſes, they were fain to borrow Words from the ordinary and known *Ideas* of *Senſation*.

The better to underſtand the *Uſe* and *Force* of Language, as ſubſervient

to

to Knowledge, it will be convenient to conſider,

Firſt, To what it is that *Names* in the Uſe of Language are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper Names) are *General*, and ſo ſtand not for this or that ſingle thing, but for *Sorts* and *Ranks*; it will be neceſſary to conſider what thoſe ſorts and kinds of Things are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they come to be made: This ſhall be conſidered in the following Chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

MAN, tho' he have great variety of Thoughts, yet are they all within his own Breaſt, inviſible and hidden from others, nor can of themſelves be made to appear. It was neceſſary therefore, for the Comfort and Advantage of Society, that Man ſhould find

find out ſome *External Signs*, whereby thoſe inviſible *Ideas* might be made known to others. For which Purpoſe nothing was ſo fit, either for Plenty or Quickneſs, as thoſe *Articulate Sounds* he found himſelf able to make. Hence *Words* came to be made uſe of by Men, as Signs of their *Ideas*: Not upon the account of any *Natural* Connection between Articulate Sounds, and certain *Ideas*; for then there would be but one Language amongſt all Men; but by a voluntary Impoſition, whereby ſuch a Word is made *Arbitrarily* the Mark of ſuch an *Idea*. The Uſe then of Words, is to be ſenſible Marks of our *Ideas*; and the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are their *proper* and *immediate Signification*: In which they ſtand for nothing more but the *Ideas* in the Mind of him that uſes them. For when a Man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; that is, that his *Sounds* may make known his *Ideas* to the Hearer.

Words being voluntary Signs, cannot be impoſed on Things we know not: This would be to make them

Signs

Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of *Qualities* in Things, or of *Conceptions* in the Mind of another, whereof he has no *Ideas* in his own.

Words in all Mens Mouths (that ſpeak with any Meaning) ſtand for the *Ideas* which thoſe that uſe them have, and which they would expreſs by them. Thus a *Child* that takes notice of nothing more in the Metal he hears called *Gold*, than the *Yellow Colour*, calls the ſame *Colour* in a Peacock's Tail *Gold*. Another, that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining Yellow, great Weight; and then the Sound Gold ſtands, when he uſes it, for a complex *Idea* of a ſhining Yellow, and very weighty Subſtance.

Tho' Words ſignify properly nothing but the *Ideas* in Mens Minds, yet they are in their Thoughts ſecretly referred to *Two* other Things.

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their Words to be Marks of *Ideas* in the Minds of other Men with whom they communicate; elſe they could not diſcourſe intelligibly

telligibly with one another: In this caſe Men ſtand not to examine whether their *Ideas* and thoſe of other Men be the ſame; they think it enough that they uſe the Word in the common Acceptation of that Language.

Secondly, They ſuppoſe their Words to ſtand alſo for the *Reality of Things*.

Words then being immediately the Signs of Mens *Ideas*, whereby they expreſs their Thoughts and Imaginations to others, there ariſes by conſtant Uſe ſuch a Connection between certain *Sounds* and the *Ideas* they ſtand for; that the Names hear'd, almoſt as readily excite certain *Ideas*, as if the Objects themſelves were preſent to the Senſes.

And becauſe we examine not preciſely the Signification of Words, we often in attentive Conſideration ſet our Thoughts more on Words than Things: Nay, ſome (becauſe we often learn Words before we know the *Ideas* they ſtand for) ſpeak ſeveral Words no otherwiſe than *Parrots* do, without any Meaning at all. But ſo far as Words are of Uſe and Signification, ſo far there is a conſtant Connection between

tween the *Sound* and *Idea*; and a Deſignation that the one ſtand for the other; without which Application of them, they are nothing but inſignificant Noiſe.

Since then Words ſignify only Mens peculiar *Ideas*, and that by an *arbitrary Impoſition*, it follows that every Man has an inviolable Liberty to make Words ſtand for what *Ideas* he pleaſes. It is true, common Uſe by a tacit Conſent appropriates certain Sounds to certain *Ideas* in all Languages; which ſo far limits the Signification of each Sound, that unleſs a Man applies it to the ſame *Ideas*, he cannot *ſpeak properly*: And unleſs a Man's Words excite the ſame *Ideas* in the Hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he cannot *ſpeak intelligibly*. But whatever be the Conſequence of any Man's Uſe of Words, different either from their publick Uſe, or that of the Perſons to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their Signification in his Uſe of them is limited to his *Ideas*, and they can be Signs of nothing elſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

ALL Things that exiſt being Particulars, it might be expected that Words ſhould be ſo too in their Signification: But we find it quite contrary; for moſt of the Words that make all Languages are *General Terms*. This is the Effect of Reaſon and Neceſſity, For,

Firſt, It is impoſſible that every particular Thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar Name, becauſe it is impoſſible to have diſtinct *Ideas* of every particular Thing, to retain its Name, with its peculiar Appropriation to that *Idea*.

Secondly, It would be *Uſeleſs*, unleſs all could be ſuppoſed to have theſe ſame *Ideas* in their Minds. For Names applied to particular Things, whereof I alone have the *Ideas* in my Mind, could not be ſignificant or intelligible

to

to another, who is not acquainted with all thoſe particular Things which had fallen under my Notice.

Thirdly, It would be of no great *Uſe* for the *Improvement of Knowledge*: Which, tho' founded in particular Things, enlarges it ſelf by general Views; to which Things reduced into Sorts under general Names, are properly ſubſervient. In Things where we have occaſion to conſider and diſcourſe of *Individuals*, and Particulars, we uſe *proper* Names; as in *Perſons*, *Countries*, *Cities*, *Rivers*, *Mountains*, &c. Thus we ſee that Jockeys have particular Names for their Horſes, becauſe they often have occaſion to mention this or that particular Horſe when he is out of ſight.

The next thing to be conſidered, is how *General Words* come to be made. Words become general by being made Signs of *General Ideas*: *Ideas* become general by ſeparating from them, the Circumſtances of Time, Place, or any other *Ideas* that may determine them to this or that particular Exiſtence. By this way of *Abſtraction* they become

come capable of repreſenting more Individuals than one: Each of which having a Conformity to that abſtract *Idea*, is of that ſort.

But it may not be amiſs to trace our Notions and Names from their Beginning; and obſerve by what Degrees we proceed and enlarge our *Ideas*, from our firſt Infancy. It is evident that the firſt *Ideas Children* get are only particular, as of the *Nurſe* or *Mother*, and the Names they give them are confined to theſe Individuals. Afterwards obſerving that there are a great many other things in the World that reſemble them in Shape, and other Qualities, they frame an *Idea* which they find thoſe many Particulars do partake in; to that they give with others the Name *Man* for example; in this they make nothing *new*, but only leave out of the Complex *Idea* they had of *Peter*, *James*, *Mary*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all. And thus they come to have a general *Name*, and a general *Idea*.

By

By the ſame Method they advance to more general Names and Notions. For obſerving ſeveral things that differ from their *Idea* of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, to agree with Man in ſome certain Qualities, by retaining only thoſe Qualities, and uniting them into one *Idea*, they have another more general *Idea*, to which giving a Name they make a *Term* of a more comprehenſive Extenſion. Thus by leaving out the Shape, and ſome other Properties ſignified by the Name *Man*, and retaining only a Body with Life, Senſe, and ſpontaneous Motion, we form the *Idea* ſignified by the Name *Animal*. By the ſame way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Subſtance*, and at laſt to *Being*, *Thing*, and ſuch univerſal Terms which ſtand for any *Ideas* whatſoever. Hence we ſee that the whole Myſtery of *Genus* and *Species* is nothing elſe but *Abſtract Ideas*, more or leſs comprehenſive, with *Names* annexed to them.

This ſhews us the Reaſon why in defining Words we make uſe of the *Genus*;

Genus; namely, to ſave the Labour of enumerating the ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, which the next general Term ſtands for. From what has been ſaid it is plain that *General* and *Univerſal* belong not to the *real* Exiſtence of Things; but are Inventions of the Underſtanding, made by it for its own Uſe, and concern only Signs, either *Words* or *Ideas*.

It muſt be conſidered in the next place, what kind of Signification it is that general Words have. It is evident that they do not barely ſignify one particular Thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names: Neither do they ſignify a *Plurality*; for then *Man* and *Men* would ſignify the ſame thing; but that which they ſignify, is a *ſort* of Things, and this they do by being made a Sign of an *Abſtract Idea* in the Mind, to which *Idea*, as Things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be ranked under that Name, or to be of that ſort. The *Eſſences* then of the Sorts or Species of Things, are nothing but theſe *Abſtract Ideas*.

It

It is not denyed here that Nature makes Things alike, and so lays the Foundation of this Sorting and Classing: But the *Sorts* or *Species* themselves are the Workmanship of Human Understanding; so that every distinct *Abstract Idea* is a distinct *Essence*, and the Names that stand for such distinct *Ideas*, are the Names of Things essentially different. Thus *Oval*, *Circle*, *Rain* and *Snow* are essentially different. To make this clearer, it may not be amiss to consider the several Significations of the Word *Essence*.

First, It may be taken for the very Being of any Thing whereby it is, what it is: Thus the real internal, (but unknown) Constitution in *Substances* may be called their *Essence*. This is the proper Signification of the Word.

Secondly, In the *Schools* the Word Essence has been almost wholly applied to the artificial Constitution of *Genus* and *Species*: It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real Constitution of the sorts of Things; and it is past doubt there must be some real Consti-

Conſtitution, on which any Collection of *Simple Ideas*, co-exiſting, muſt depend. But it being evident, that Things are ranked into Sorts, under Names only as they agree to certain *Abſtract Ideas*, to which we have annexed thoſe Names, the Eſſence of each *Genus* or *Species* is nothing but the *Abſtract Idea*, which the Name ſtands for; this the Word *Eſſence* imports in its moſt familiar Uſe.

Theſe two ſorts of *Eſſence* may not unfitly be termed the one *Real*, the other *Nominal*. Between the nominal Eſſence and the Name there is ſo near a Connection, that the Name of any ſort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being but what has the Eſſence whereby it anſwers that *Abſtract Idea*, whereof that Name is the Sign.

Concerning the real Eſſences of corporeal Subſtances there are two Opinions.

Firſt, Some uſing the Word *Eſſence* for they know not what, ſuppoſe a certain Number of thoſe *Eſſences*, according to which all natural Things are

are made, and of which they equally partake, and do become of this or of that Species.

Secondly, Others look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Conſtitution of their inſenſible Parts, from whence flow their ſenſible Qualities, which ſerve us to diſtinguiſh them one from another; and according to which we rank them into Sorts, under common Denominations. The former Suppoſition ſeems irreconcileable with the frequent Production of Monſters, in all the Species of Animals: Since it is impoſſible that two Things partaking of the ſame real *Eſſence*, ſhould have different *Properties*. But were there no other Reaſon againſt it, yet the Suppoſition of Eſſences which cannot be known, and yet the making them to be that which diſtinguiſheth the Species of Things, is ſo wholly uſeleſs and unſerviceable to any part of *Knowledge*, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by.

We may further obſerve, that the nominal and real Eſſences of *Simple*

Ideas and *Modes* are always the ſame; but in *Subſtances* always quite different. Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real as well as nominal Eſſence of a Triangle; it being that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are inſeparably annexed: But it is far otherwiſe in *Gold* or any other ſort of *Subſtance*; it is the real Conſtitution of its inſenſible Parts, on which depend all thoſe Properties that are to be found in it; which Conſtitution ſince we know not, nor have any particular *Idea* of, we can have no Name that is the Sign of it. But yet it is its *Colour*, *Weight*, *Fuſibility*, and *Fixedneſs*, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a Right to that Name; which is therefore its *Nominal Eſſence*, ſince nothing can be called *Gold* but what has a Conformity to that abſtract complex *Idea*, to which that Name is annexed.

That Eſſences are but Abſtract *Ideas*, may farther appear by their being held ingenerable and incorruptible. This cannot be true of the real Conſtitution

ſtitution of Things. All Things in Nature (ſave the *Author* of it) are liable to Change: their *Real Eſſences* and Conſtitutions are deſtroyed and periſh: but as they are *Ideas* eſtabliſh'd in the Mind, they remain immutable. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* or *Bucephalus*, the *Ideas* of Man and Horſe remain the ſame. By theſe means the Eſſence of a *Species* reſts ſafe and entire, without the Exiſtence of one *Individual* of that kind.

It is evident then that this Doctrine of the Immutability of Eſſences proves them to be only Abſtract *Ideas*, and is founded on the relation eſtabliſh'd between them and certain Sounds, as ſigns of them and will always be true, as long as the ſame Name can have the ſame Signification.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

WORDS tho' they ſignify nothing immediately, but the *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker; yet we ſhall find that the Names of Simple *Ideas*, mixed *Modes*, and natural *Subſtances* have each of them ſomething peculiar: And,

Firſt, The Names of *Simple Ideas* and *Subſtances*, with the Abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind, intimate ſome *Real Exiſtence*, from which was deriv'd their original Pattern: but the Names of *Mixed Modes* terminate in the *Idea* that is in the Mind.

Secondly, The Names of *Simple Ideas* and *Modes* ſignify the *Real* as well as *Nominal* Eſſences of their Species: the Names of *Subſtances* ſignify rarely, if ever any thing, but barely the *Nominal Eſſences* of thoſe Species.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The Names of *Simple Ideas* are not capable of *Definitions*; thoſe of *Complex Ideas* are: the reaſon of which I ſhall ſhew from the Nature of our *Ideas*, and the ſignification of *Words*.

It is agreed that a *Definition* is nothing elſe but the ſhewing the meaning of one Word, by ſeveral other, *not Synonymous Terms*. The meaning of Words being only the *Ideas* they are made to ſtand for; the meaning of any Term is then ſhewed, or the Word defined, when by other words the *Idea* it is made the ſign of, is as it were, repreſented or ſet before the view of another, and thus its ſignification aſcertained. The Names then of *Simple Ideas* are incapable of being defined, becauſe the ſeveral Terms of a Definition ſignifying ſeveral *Ideas*, they can altogether by no means repreſent an *Idea* which has no compoſition at all, and therefore a Definition, which is but the ſhewing of the meaning of one word, by ſeveral others not ſignifying each the

ſame thing, can in the names of Simple *Ideas* have no place.

The not obſerving this difference in our *Ideas*, has occaſioned thoſe *triflíng* Definitions which are given us of ſome Simple *Ideas:* ſuch as is that of *Motion*, viz. *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power.*

The Atomiſts who define Motion to be a *Paſſage* from one place to another, What do they more than put one Synonymous Word for another? For what is *Paſſage* other than a Motion? Nor will the ſucceſſive application of the parts of the Superficies of one Body to thoſe of one another, which the *Carteſians* give us, prove a much better definition of Motion when well examined.

The act of Perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous, is another Peripatetick definition of a Simple *Idea*, which it is certain can never make the meaning of the word *Light*, which it pretends to define underſtood by a blind Man. And when the *Carteſians* tell us, that Light is a great number of little Globules

bules ſtriking briskly on the bottom of the Eye; theſe words would never make the *Idea* the word Light ſtands for, known to a Man that had it not before.

Simple Ideas then can only be got by the impreſſions Objects make on our Minds, by the proper *In-letts* appointed to each ſort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the World will never be able to produce in us the *Ideas* they ſtand for. Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other Simple *Ideas* than of thoſe very Sounds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection which they have with ſome *Ideas* which common Uſe has made them ſigns of: and therefore he that has not before received into his Mind by the proper In-lett the Simple *Idea*, which any word ſtands for, can never come to know the Signification of that Word, by any other Words or Sounds whatſoever.

But in *Complex Ideas* which conſiſt of ſeveral Simple ones, the Caſe is quite otherwiſe; for Words ſtanding

for thoſe ſeveral *Ideas* that make up the Compoſition, may imprint Complex *Ideas* in the Mind, that never were there before, and ſo make their Names be underſtood. In them Definitions take place. Thus the Word *Rainbow*, to one who knew all thoſe Colours, but yet had never ſeen that *Phænomenon*, might, by enumerating the *Figure*, *Largeneſs*, *Poſition*, and *Order* of the *Colours*, be ſo well defined, that it might be perfectly underſtood.

The Names of Simple *Ideas*, *Subſtances*, and *Mixed Modes* have alſo this difference, that thoſe of *Mixed Modes* ſtand for *Ideas* perfectly Arbitrary: Thoſe of *Subſtances* are not perfectly ſo, but refer to a Pattern, tho' with ſome Latitude; and thoſe of Simple *Ideas* are perfectly taken from the Exiſtence of Things, and are not Arbitrary at all.

The Names of *Simple Modes* differ little from thoſe of *Simple Ideas*.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes *and Relations.*

THE Names of *Mixed Modes* being general, ſtand for *Abſtract Ideas* in the Mind, as other general Names do; but they have ſomething peculiar which may deſerve our Attention.

And *Firſt*, the *Ideas* they ſtand for, or if you pleaſe the Eſſences of the ſeveral Species of mixed *Modes*, are made by the Underſtanding; wherein they differ from thoſe of *Simple Ideas*.

Secondly, They are made Arbitrarily, without Patterns, or Reference to any real Exiſtence, wherein they differ from thoſe of *Subſtances*. The Mind unites and retains certain Collections, as ſo many diſtinct Specifick *Ideas*, whilſt other Combinations that as often in Nature occur, and are as

plainly ſuggeſted by outward Things, paſs neglected without particular Names, or Specifications.

The Mind in forming thoſe Complex *Ideas*, makes no new *Idea*, but only puts together thoſe which it had before, wherein it does *Three* Things. *Firſt*, It chuſes a certain Number. *Secondly*, It gives them Connection, and combines them into one *Idea*. *Thirdly*, It ties them together by a Name; all this may be done before any one Individual of that Species of Modes ever exiſted: as the *Ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed, before either of them was committed; and we cannot doubt but Law-makers have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Underſtanding.

But tho' *Mixed Modes* depend on the Mind, and are made Arbitrarily; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any Reaſon at all, but are always made for the Convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language, and therefore

therefore ſuch Combinations are only made, as Men have frequent occaſion to mention. Thus Men having joined to the *Idea* of killing the *Idea* of *Father* and *Mother*, and ſo made a diſtinct Species from the killing a Man's *Son* or *Neighbour*, becauſe of the different Heinouſneſs of the Crime, and the diſtinct Puniſhment due to it, found it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct Name, which is the End of making that diſtinct Combination.

In *mixed Modes* it is the *Name* that ſeems to preſerve their Eſſences, and to give them their laſting Duration. The Collection of *Ideas* is made by the Mind, but the Name is as it were the *Knot* which ties them faſt together: hence we ſeldom take any other for diſtinct Species of *mixed Modes*, but ſuch as are ſet out by Names. We muſt obſerve that the Names of *mixed Modes* always ſignify the real Eſſences of their Species, which being nothing but the Abſtract Complex *Ideas*, and not referred to the real Exiſtence of Things; there is no Suppoſition of any thing more

ſignified by any Name of a *mixed Mode*, but barely that *Complex Idea* the Mind it ſelf has formed: which when the Mind has formed, is all it would expreſs by it, and is that on which all the Properties of the *Species* depend, and from which alone they flow; and ſo in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence is the ſame.

This alſo ſhews the Reaſon why the *Names* of *mixed Modes* are commonly got, before the *Ideas* they ſtand for are perfectly known: becauſe there being no Species of theſe ordinarily taken notice of, but ſuch as have Names, and thoſe Species being *Complex Ideas* made Arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not neceſſary, to know the Names, before we learn the *Complex Ideas*; unleſs a Man will fill his Head with a Company of Abſtract *Complex Ideas*, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget again. In the beginning of Languages it was neceſſary to have the *Idea* before one give it the *Name*; and ſo it is ſtill, where a *new*

Complex

Complex Idea is to be made, and a Name given it. In *Simple Ideas* and *Subſtances* I grant it is otherwiſe; which being ſuch *Ideas* as have real Exiſtence and Union in Nature, the *Ideas* or Names are got, one before the other, as it happens.

What has been ſaid here of *mixed Modes*, is with very little difference applicable to *Relations* alſo; which ſince every Man himſelf may obſerve, I may ſpare my ſelf the Pains to enlarge on.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

THE common *Names* of *Subſtances* ſtand for Sorts as well as other General Terms; that is, for ſuch *Complex Ideas*, wherein ſeveral particular Subſtances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable to be comprehended in one common Conception, and be ſignified by

by one Name; I ſay, *do* or *might agree*, for tho' there be but one *Sun* exiſting, yet the *Idea* of it being abſtracted, is as much a *Sort*, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars.

The Meaſure and Boundary of each Sort whereby it is conſtituted that *particular Sort*, and diſtinguiſhed from others, is what we call its *Eſſence*; which is nothing but that Abſtract *Idea* to which that Name is annexed, ſo that every thing contained in that *Idea*, is Eſſential to that Sort. This I call *Nominal Eſſence*, to diſtinguiſh it from that real Conſtitution of *Subſtances*, on which this *Nominal Eſſence*, and all the Properties of that ſort depend, and may be called its *Real Eſſence*: Thus the *Nominal Eſſence* of *Gold* is that *Complex Idea* the Word *Gold* ſtands for, let it be for inſtance a *Body*, Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fuſible, and Fixed: But its real *Eſſence* is the Conſtitution of its inſenſible Parts, on which thoſe Qualities, and all its other Properties depend; which is wholly unknown to us.

That

That *Eſſence* in the ordinary uſe of the Word relates to *Sorts*, appears from hence, that if you take away the Abſtract *Ideas* by which we ſort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, then the thought of any thing eſſential to any of them inſtantly vaniſhes: We have no Notion of the one without the other, which plainly ſhews their Relation. No Property is thought Eſſential to any Individual whatſoever, till the Mind refers it to ſome Sort or *Species* of Things, and then preſently, according to the Abſtract *Idea* of that ſort, ſomething is found Eſſential; ſo that Eſſential or not Eſſential, relates only to our Abſtract *Ideas*, and the Names annexed to them, which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular Thing has not in it thoſe Qualities contained in the *Abſtract Idea* which any general Term ſtands for, cannot be ranked under that Species, nor be called by that Name; ſince that *Abſtract Idea* is the very Eſſence of that *Species*. Thus if the *Idea* of *Body* with ſome People be bare Extenſion,

or

or Space, then *Solidity* is not eſſential to *Body*: If others make the *Idea*, to which they give the Name *Body* to be Solidity and Extenſion; then Solidity is eſſential alſo to *Body*. That alone therefore is conſidered as Eſſential, which makes a part of the *Complex Idea* the Name of a Sort ſtands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be entituled to that Name.

Subſtances are diſtinguiſhed into *Sorts* and *Species* by their *Nominal Eſſence*; for it is that alone, that the Name which is the Mark of the Sort ſignifies: and the *Species* of Things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diſtinct Names, according to the *Complex Ideas* in *Us*, and not according to preciſe, diſtinct, *Real Eſſences* in *Them*.

We cannot rank and ſort Things by their *Real Eſſences*, becauſe we know them not: Our Faculties carry us no farther in the Knowledge of Subſtances, than a Collection of thoſe ſenſible *Ideas* we obſerve in them. But the internal Conſtitution whereon

their Properties depend, is utterly unknown to us. This is evident when we come to examine but the *Stones* we tread on, or the *Iron* we daily handle: We ſoon find that we know not their Make, and can give no Reaſon of the different Qualities we find in them; and yet how infinitely theſe come ſhort of the fine Contrivances and unconceivable real Eſſences of *Plants* and *Animals*, every one knows. The Workmanſhip of the All-wiſe and Powerful *God* in the great Fabrick of the Univerſe, and every part thereof farther exceeds the Comprehenſion of the moſt inquiſitive and intelligent Man, than the beſt Contrivance of the moſt ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the moſt ignorant of Rational Creatures. In vain therefore do we pretend to range things into *Sorts*, and diſpoſe them into certain *Claſſes*, under Names by their *Real Eſſences*, that are ſo far from our Diſcovery or Comprehenſion.

But tho' the *Nominal Eſſences* of Subſtances are made by the Mind, they are not yet made ſo arbitrarily as

as thoſe of mixed Modes. To the making of any *Nominal Eſſence*, it is neceſſary,

Firſt, That the *Ideas* whereof it conſiſts, have ſuch an Union as to make but one *Idea*, how compounded ſoever.

Secondly, That the particular *Ideas* ſo united be exactly the ſame, neither more or leſs: For if two Abſtract Complex *Ideas* differ either in *Number* or *Sorts* of their component Parts, they make two different, and not one and the ſame Eſſence.

In the *Firſt* of theſe, the Mind in making its *Complex Ideas* of Subſtances, only follows *Nature*, and puts none together which are not ſuppoſed to have an Union in Nature. For Men obſerving certain Qualities always joined and exiſting together therein copy Nature, and of *Ideas* ſo united, make their Complex ones of Subſtances.

Secondly, Tho' the Mind in making its Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, never puts any together that do not *really*, or are not ſuppoſed to co-exiſt: yet

yet the Number it combines depends upon the various Care, Induſtry or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themſelves with ſome few obvious Qualities, and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as thoſe that they take in.

In Bodies organized and propagated by Seeds, as *Vegetables* and *Animals*, the *Shape* is that which to us is the leading Quality, and moſt characteriſtical Part that determines the *Species*: In moſt other Bodies not propagated by Seed, it is the *Colour* we chiefly fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the Colour of *Gold*, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities comprehended in our Complex *Idea* of *Gold*, to be there alſo.

Tho' the *Nominal* Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them very imperfect: And ſince the Compoſition of the Complex *Ideas* is in ſeveral Men very different, we may conclude that theſe Boundaries of Species are as *Men*, and not

as

as *Nature* makes them; if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefixed Bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have an Agreement and Likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a Foundation of being ranked into Sorts: but the *Sorting* of Things by us, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general Terms, I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, That Nature ſets the *Boundaries* of the Species of Things. But if it be ſo, our *Boundaries* of Species, are not exactly conformable to Nature.

If the firſt Sorting of Individuals depends on the Mind of Man, variouſly collecting the ſimple *Ideas*, that make the *Nominal* Eſſence of the loweſt Species; it is much more evident that the more *comprehenſive Claſſes*, called *Genera*, do ſo. In forming more general *Ideas* they may comprehend different Sorts, the Mind leaves out thoſe Qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new Collection only ſuch *Ideas* as are common to ſeveral Sorts. Thus by leaving out thoſe Qualites which

which are peculiar to Gold, Silver, &c. and retaining a Complex *Idea*, made up of thoſe that are common to each Species, there is a new *Genus* conſtituted, to which the Name *Metal* is annexed.

So that in this whole Buſineſs of *Genera* and *Species*, the *Genus* or more comprehenſive is but a partial Conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species* but a partial *Idea* of what is to be found in each *Individual*: In all which there is no new Thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive Signs, whereby we may be enabled to expreſs in a few Syllables great Numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more or leſs general Conceptions, which we have framed to that purpoſe. If theſe *Abſtract General Ideas* be thought to be complete, it can only be in reſpect of a certain eſtabliſhed Relation between them, and certain Names, which are made uſe of to ſignify them, and not in reſpect of any thing exiſting as made by Nature.

This is adjuſted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the eaſieſt and

ſhorteſt

ſhorteſt way of communicating our Notions. This is the proper Buſineſs of *Genus* and *Species:* And this Men do without any Conſideration of real Eſſences and ſubſtantial Forms, which come not within the reach of our Knowledge, when we think of thoſe Things: not within the Signification of our Words when we diſcourſe with others.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

BEſides Words which are the Names of *Ideas* in the Mind, there are others made uſe of to ſignify the *Connection* that the Mind gives to *Ideas* or Propoſitions one with another, and to intimate ſome particular *Action* of its own at that time relating to thoſe *Ideas*. This it does ſeveral ways; as *is*, *is Not*, are Marks of the Mind affirming or denying: Beſides which, the Mind does in declaring its Sentiments to others connect not only the

parts of Propoſitions, but whole Sentences one to another with their ſeveral Relations and Dependencies to make a coherent Diſcourſe.

The Words ſignifying that Connection the Mind gives to ſeveral Affirmations and Negations, which it unites in one continued Reaſoning or Narration, are called *Particles*. And it is in the right uſe of theſe, that more particularly conſiſts the Clearneſs and Beauty of a *Good Style*. To expreſs the dependence of his Thoughts and Reaſonings one upon another, a Man muſt have Words to ſhew what Connection, Reſtriction, Diſtinction, Oppoſition, Emphaſis, &c. he gives to each reſpective part of his Diſcourſe.

Theſe cannot be underſtood rightly, without a clear view of the Poſtures, Stands, Turns, Limitations, Exceptions, and ſeveral other Thoughts of the Mind: Of theſe there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles that moſt Languages have to expreſs them by; for which Reaſon it happens that moſt of theſe Particles have divers and ſometimes al-

moſt

moſt oppoſite Significations. Thus the Particle *But* in *Engliſh*, has ſeveral very different Significations; as, *But to ſay no more:* Here it intimates a ſtop of the Mind in the Courſe it was going, before it came to it. *I ſaw but two Planets:* Here it ſhews that the Mind limits the Senſe to what is expreſs'd with a Negation of all other: *You pray, but it is not That God would bring you to the true Religion, but That he would confirm you in your own.* The former of theſe intimates a Suppoſition in the Mind of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be: The latter ſhews, that the Mind makes a direct Oppoſition between that and what goes before. *All Animals have Senſe, but a Dog is an Animal.* Here it ſignifies the Connection of the latter Propoſition with the former. To theſe, divers other Significations of this Particle might be added, if it were my Buſineſs to examine into its full Latitude.

I intend not here a full Explication of this ſort of Signs, the Inſtances I have given in this one may give occaſion

ſion to reflect on their Uſe and Force in Language, and lead us into the Contemplation of ſeveral Actions of our Minds in diſcourſing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by theſe *Particles*, ſome whereof conſtantly, and others in certain Conſtructions have the Senſe of a whole Sentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abſtract and Concrete Terms.

THE Mind, as has been ſhewn, has a Power to *Abſtract* its *Idea*, whereby the Sorts of Things are diſtinguiſhed: Now each *Abſtract Idea* being diſtinct, ſo that the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge perceive their difference; and therefore in Propoſitions, no two whole *Ideas* can ever be affirmed one of another: Nor does the common uſe of Language permit that any two Abſtract Words or Names

of *Abſtract Ideas*, ſhould be affirmed one of another. All our Affirmations are only in *Concrete*, which is the affirming one *Abſtract Idea* to be join'd to another: which *Abſtract Ideas* in *Subſtances*, may be of any ſort, tho' the moſt of them are of *Powers*: In all the reſt theſe are little elſe but Relations.

All our Simple *Ideas* have *Abſtract* as well as *Concrete* Names, as *Whiteneſs White*, *Sweetneſs Sweet*, &c. The like alſo holds in our *Ideas* of Modes and Relations, as *Juſtice Juſt*, *Equality Equal*, &c. But as to our *Ideas* of Subſtances, we have very few Abſtract Names at all. Thoſe few that the Schools have forged, as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of Names of Subſtances, and could never get admittance into common uſe, or obtain the Licence of publick Approbation; which ſeems to intimate the Confeſſion of all Mankind, that they have no *Ideas* of the real Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have not Names for ſuch *Ideas*. It

was

was only the Doctrine of *Subſtantial Forms*, and the Confidence of miſtaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which firſt coin'd, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and the like: which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding Men.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

TO examine the *Perfection* or *Imperfection* of Words, it is neceſſary to conſider their Uſe and End, which is twofold, *Firſt*, to *record* our own Thoughts: *Secondly*, to *communicate* our Thoughts to others: The *Firſt* is for the help of our own Memories, whereby we do as it were talk to ourſelves: for this purpoſe any Words may ſerve our turn: Words being *Arbitrary Signs*, we may uſe which we pleaſe for this purpoſe; and

there will be no Imperfection in them, if we conſtantly uſe the ſame *Sign* for the ſame *Idea*.

Secondly, As to *Communication* by Words; that too has a double Uſe: *Firſt*, their *Civil Uſe*, which is ſuch a Communication of Thoughts and *Ideas* by Words, as may ſerve in common Converſation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniences of civil Life. *Secondly*, The *Philoſophical* Uſe of Words, by which I mean ſuch an uſe of them, as may ſerve to convey the preciſe Notions of Things, and to expreſs certain Truths in general Propoſitions: Theſe two uſes are very diſtinct, and a great deal leſs exactneſs will ſerve in the one, than in the other.

The end of Language in Communication is to be *underſtood*; that is, to excite by Sounds in the *Hearer*, the ſame *Idea* which they ſtand for in the mind of the *Speaker*. The doubtfulneſs and uncertainty of their Signification, which is the Imperfection we are here ſpeaking of, has its cauſe more in the *Ideas* themſelves than

than in any incapacity in the *Sounds* to ſignify them; for in that regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes the difference, is the difference of *Ideas* they ſtand for, which muſt be learned and retained by thoſe, who would diſcourſe together intelligibly. Now this is difficult in theſe caſes,

Firſt, Where the *Ideas* they ſtand for are very Complex. Hence the names of *mixed Modes* are liable to great uncertainty and obſcurity in their Signification; for here the *Idea* being made up of many Parts, it is not eaſy to form and retain it exactly. Of this ſort chiefly are Moral Words, which have ſeldom in two different Men, the ſame preciſe ſignification.

Secondly, Where the *Ideas* they ſtand for, have no certain connection in Nature, and therefore no ſettled *Standard* to rectify and adjuſt them by. This again is the caſe of the names of *mixed Modes*, which are Aſſemblages of *Ideas* put together at pleaſure. Common uſe indeed regulates the meaning of Words pretty

well for common Converſation: but it is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to Philoſophical Diſcourſes, there being ſcarce a Name of any very *Complex Idea*, which in common uſe has not a great Latitude; and is not made the ſign of far different *Ideas*.

The way of learning theſe Names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulneſs of their Signification. For we may obſerve that Children are taught the names of Simple *Ideas*, and Subſtances, by having the Things ſhewn them; and then they repeat the Name that ſtands for it; as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, &c. But in Mixed *Modes* the Sounds are learned firſt, and Men are to learn afterwards their Signification, by their own Obſervation and Induſtry, or the Explication of others: which is the reaſon that theſe words are little more than *bare Sounds* in the Minds of moſt, becauſe few are at the pains to ſettle their *Ideas* and Notions preciſely; and thoſe which are, make them the ſigns of *Ideas*, different from what others underſtand by them, which is the occaſion of moſt diſputes. *Thirdly*,

Thirdly, Where the ſignification of a Word is referred to a *Standard* which is not eaſily known: This is the caſe of the names of *Subſtances*, which being ſuppoſed to ſtand for their *real Eſſences*, muſt needs be of uncertain application, becauſe theſe Eſſences are utterly unknown; and it will be impoſſible to know what is, or is not *Antimony*, *v. g.* when that word is to ſtand for the real Eſſence of it; whereof we have no *Idea* at all.

Or ſuppoſe theſe Names only ſtand for Simple *Ideas*, found to co-exiſt in *Subſtances*, yet thus they will be liable to great uncertainty too: becauſe theſe Simple *Ideas* being very numerous, Men frame different *Ideas* of the ſame Subjects, by putting different *Ideas* into their Complex one; of ſuch Subſtances ſeveral Men obſerve ſeveral Properties in the ſame Subſtance, and none of them all; who having but imperfect deſcriptions of Things, can have but uncertain ſignifications of Words.

Fourthly, Where the ſignification of the Word, and the real Eſſence of

the Thing, are not the ſame, which is ſtill the caſe of Subſtances. From hence we may obſerve,

Firſt, That the names of Simple *Ideas* are leaſt liable to miſtakes: *Firſt* Becauſe the *Ideas* they ſtand for, being each but one ſingle Perception, are eaſier got, and more clearly retained, than the more Complex ones of Subſtances and mixed Modes. *Secondly*, Becauſe they are not referred to any other Eſſence, but barely that Perception they immediately ſignify.

Secondly, Names of *Simple Modes* are next to *Simple Ideas* leaſt liable to Doubt or Uncertainty, eſpecially thoſe of *Figure* and *Number*, of which Men have ſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas*.

Thirdly, In *Mixed Modes*, when they are compoſed of a few and obvious *Ideas*, their Names are clear and diſtinct enough; otherwiſe doubtful and uncertain.

Fourthly, The Names of *Subſtances* being annexed to *Ideas*, that are neither the real Eſſences, nor exact Repreſentations of Things, are liable yet

yet to greater Imperfection, when we come to a Philoſophical uſe of them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuſe of Words.

BEſide the natural and unavoidable Imperfections of Languages, there are *wilful Faults* and *Neglects* which Men are often guilty of in their uſe of Words. For,

Firſt, They uſe Words *without clear and diſtinct* Ideas, or which is worſe, Signs without any thing ſignified; ſuch are for the moſt part introduced by *Sects* of Philoſophy and Religion, either out of an affectation of *Singularity*, or to ſupport ſome ſtrange *Opinion*; or to cover the weakneſs of their *Hypotheſis*. Theſe are commonly ſuch as had no determinate collection of *Ideas* annexed to them, when they were firſt invented; or at leaſt ſuch, as if well examined will be found inconſiſtent, and there-

fore may juſtly be called inſignificant Terms: Inſtances of this kind may eaſily be had from the *School men* and *Metaphyſicians*. Others learn Words which the propriety of Language has affixed to very important *Ideas*, and often upon occaſion uſe them without any diſtinct meaning at all: whence their Notions being unſteady and confuſed, their Diſcourſe muſt be filled with empty unintelligible *Noiſe* and *Jargon*, eſpecially in Moral Matters where the Words ſtand for arbitrary, and numerous Collections of *Ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature.

Secondly, Another abuſe is *Inconſtancy in the uſe of Words*. It is hard to find a Diſcourſe on any Subject wherein the ſame words are not uſed ſometimes for one collection of *Ideas*, ſometimes for another: The wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Diſhoneſty: And a Man in his Accompts with another, may with as much fairneſs make the characters of Numbers, ſtand ſometimes for one, and ſometimes

times for another collection of *Unites*; as in his Diſcourſe, or Reaſoning, make the ſame Words ſtand for different collections of Simple *Ideas*.

Thirdly, Another is an *affected obſcurity*, either by uſing old Words in new Significations, or by introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining them; or putting them together, ſo as to confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the *Peripatetick Philoſophy* has been moſt eminent this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. The admir'd *Art of Diſputing* hath added much to the natural imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of, and fitted to perplex the ſignification of Words, more than to diſcover the Knowledge and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that ſort of Learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obſcure uncertain, and undetermined in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

Fourthly, Another is the *Taking Words for Things*: This, tho' it in

ſome degree concerns all Names in general; yet more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. Thus in the *Peripatetick Philoſophy*, *Subſtantial Forms*, *Abhorrence of Vacuum*, &c. are taken for ſomething Real. To this Abuſe thoſe Men are moſt ſubject, who confine their Thoughts to any one *Syſtem*; and give themſelves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received *Hypotheſis*; whereby they come to be perſwaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are ſo ſuited to the nature of Things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real Exiſtence.

Fifthly, Another is the *Setting them in the place of Things which they can by no means ſignify*. We may obſerve that in the general names of Subſtances, whereof the Nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain ſort of Subſtances. Thus when a Man ſays *Gold* is *malleable*, he would inſinuate ſomething more than this, what I call

call *Gold* is *malleable*, (tho' truly it amounts to no more) *namely*, That what has the real Eſſence of *Gold* is *malleable*, that is, that *malleableneſs* depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of *Gold*. But a Man not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts, the Connection in his Mind that *malleableneſs*, is not truly with an *Eſſence* he knows not, but with the Sound *Gold* he puts for it. It is true, the names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful; and Propoſitions expreſt by them much more certain, were the real Eſſences of Subſtances the *Ideas* in our Minds, which thoſe Words ſignified. And it is for want of thoſe real Eſſences that our Words convey ſo little Knowledge, or certainty in our Diſcourſes about them. But to ſuppoſe theſe Names to ſtand for a Thing, having the real Eſſence on which the Properties depend, is ſo far from diminiſhing the imperfection of our Words, that by a plain abuſe it adds to it; when we would make them ſtand for ſomething, which not being in our Complex *Ideas*, the

the Name we uſe can no way be the ſign of it. In *Mixed Modes*, any *Idea* of the Complex one being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, that is, to be of another *Species*, as is plain in *Chance-medley*, *Man-ſlaughter*, *Murder*, &c. becauſe the Complex *Idea* ſignified by that Name, is the *Real* as well as *Nominal* Eſſence; and there is no ſecret reference of that Name to any other Eſſence but that. But in Subſtances it is not ſo; for tho' in that called *Gold*, one puts in his Complex *Idea*, what another leaves out, and *vice versâ*, yet Men do not uſually think the Species changed, becauſe they refer the Name in their Minds to a real immutable Eſſence of a Thing exiſting, on which thoſe Properties depend: But this reference of the Name to a Thing we have not the *Idea* of, is ſo far from helping us at all, that it only ſerves the more to involve us in difficulties. This reference is grounded on this ſuppoſition, namely, that the ſame preciſe Internal Conſtitution goes always with the ſame ſpecifick

cifick Name: In which are contained theſe two falſe *Suppoſitions.*

Firſt, There are certain preciſe *Eſſences*, according to which, Nature makes all particular Things; and by which they are diſtinguiſhed into *Species.*

Secondly, This tacitly inſinuates as if we had *Ideas* of theſe Eſſences; for why do we enquire, whether this or that Thing have the real Eſſence of that Species *Man* for Inſtance, if we did not ſuppoſe it known, which yet is utterly falſe; and therefore ſuch applications of Names as would make them ſtand for *Ideas* we have not, muſt needs cauſe great diſorder in Diſcourſe and Reaſonings about them; and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by Words.

Sixthly, Another more general, tho' leſs obſerved, Abuſe of Words, is, that Men having by long and familiar uſe, annexed to them certain *Ideas*, they *are apt to imagine ſo near and neceſſary a Connection, between the Names, and the Significations they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe*

poſe one cannot but underſtand what their Meaning is; As if it were paſt doubt, that in the uſe of theſe common received Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had neceſſarily the ſame preciſe *Ideas*. And ſo likewiſe taking the Words of others, as naturally ſtanding for Juſt, what they themſelves have been accuſtomed to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand another's meaning: From whence commonly proceeds Noiſe, and Wrangling without improvement or information; whilſt Men take Words to be the conſtant regular Marks of agreed Notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unſteady Signs of their own *Ideas*. Thus *Life*, is a Term, none more familiar: Any one almoſt would take it for an affront, to be asked what he meant by it, and yet if it comes in queſtion, whether ſuch a Thing has *Life*, or not, it is eaſy to perceive, that a clear diſtinct ſettled *Idea*, does not always accompany the uſe of ſo known a Word.

Seventhly,

Seventhly, *Figurative Speech* is alſo an abuſe of Language: for tho' in Diſcourſes, where we ſeek rather Pleaſure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, ſuch Ornaments as are borrowed from Figurative Speeches and Alluſions, can ſcarce paſs for Faults; yet if we would ſpeak of Things as they are, we muſt allow, that all the *Art of Rhetorick*, beſides Order and Clearneſs, all the Artificial and Figurative application of Words, Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe but to inſinuate wrong *Ideas*, move the Paſſions, and thereby miſlead the Judgment, and ſo indeed are a perfect Cheat. And therefore however allowable they may be in Harangues and popular Addreſſes; they are certainly in all Diſcourſes that pretend to inform and inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great Fault, either of the Language or Perſon that makes uſe of them.

To conclude this Conſideration, the

Ends

Ends of *Language* in our Diſcourſe with others, are chiefly theſe *Three*.

Firſt, To make our Thoughts or *Ideas* known to another; this we fail in, *Firſt*, When we uſe Names without clear and diſtinct *Ideas* in our Minds. *Secondly*, When we apply received Names to *Ideas*, to which the common uſe of that Language does not apply them. *Thirdly*, When we apply them unſteadily, making them ſtand now for one, and by and by for another *Idea*.

Secondly, To make known our Thoughts *with as much Eaſe* and Quickneſs as is poſſible. This Men fail in when they have Complex *Ideas*, without having diſtinct Names for them, which may happen either thro' the defect of a Language, which has none, or the Fault of that Man who has not yet learned them.

Thirdly, To convey the Knowledge of Things: This cannot be done, but when our *Ideas* agree to the reality of Things.

He that hath *Names* without *Ideas*, wants meaning in his Words, and ſpeaks

ſpeaks only empty Sounds: He that hath *Complex Ideas*, without Names for them, wants diſpatch in his Expreſſion. He that uſes his Words looſely and unſteadily, will either not be minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his Names to *Ideas*, different from their common Uſe, wants *Propriety* in his Language, and ſpeaks Gibberiſh. And he that hath *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, diſagreeing with the real Exiſtence of Things, ſo far wants the Materials of true Knowledge in his Underſtanding, and has inſtead thereof, *Chimæras*.

Language being the great Conduct whereby Men convey their Diſcoveries, Reaſonings, and Knowledge from one to another; he that makes an ill uſe of it, tho' he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge which are in Things themſelves, yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or ſtop the Pipes whereby it is diſtributed to the publick uſe and advantage of Mankind. He that uſes Words without any clear and ſteady meaning, what does he but lead himſelf and others into

into Errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be look'd on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge.

If we look into Books of Controversy of any kind, we shall see that the Effect of obscure, unsteady, and equivocal Terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding. For if the *Idea* be not agreed between Speaker and Hearer, for which the Words stand, the Argument is not about *Things* but *Names*.

It deserves to be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the Disputes in the World, are not merely *Verbal*, and about the Signification of Words; and that if the Terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their Significations, to the single *Ideas* they stand for, those Disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

TO remedy the Defects of Speech abovementioned, the following Rules may be of uſe.

Firſt, A Man ſhould take care to uſe no Word without a Signification, no *Name* without an *Idea* for which he makes it ſtand. This Rule will not ſeem needleſs to any one, who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with ſuch Words, as *Inſtinct*, *Sympathy*, *Antipathy*, &c. ſo made uſe of as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe that uſed them had no *Ideas* in their Minds to which they applied them.

Secondly, Thoſe *Ideas* he annexes them to ſhould be *clear* and *diſtinct*, which in Complex *Ideas* is by knowing the particular ones that make that Compoſition; of which, if any one be

be again Complex, we must know also the precise Collection that is united in each, and so till we come to Simple ones. In Substances the *Ideas* must not only be distinct, but also conformable to *Things* as they exist.

Thirdly, He must apply his Words, as near as may be, to such *Ideas*, as common Use has annexed them to: for Words, especially of Languages already framed, are no Man's private Possession, but the common Measure of Commerce and Communication; and therefore it is not for any one to change the Stamp they are current in, nor alter the *Ideas* they are affixed to; or at least, when there is a Necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. And therefore,

Fourthly, When common Use has left the Signification of a Word uncertain and loose, or where it is to be used in a peculiar Sense; or where the Term is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake, there it ought to be defined, and its Signification ascertained.

Words standing for *Simple Ideas* being not *definable*, their Signification must

muſt be ſhewn either, *Firſt*, By a Synonymous Word. *Secondly*, By naming a Subject, wherein that Simple *Idea* is to be found. *Thirdly*, By preſenting to the Senſes that Subject, which may produce it in the Mind, and make him actually have the *Idea* that Word ſtands for. *Mixed Modes* may be perfectly defined, by exactly enumerating thoſe *Ideas* that go to each Compoſition. This ought more eſpecially to be done in Mixed Modes belonging to *Morality:* ſince Definition is the only way whereby the preciſe meaning of *Moral Words* can be known: and yet a way whereby their preciſe meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any Conteſt about it.

For the explaining the Signification of the Names of *Subſtances*, both the forementioned ways, *viz.* of Shewing, and Defining are requiſite in many Caſes to be made uſe of; their Names are beſt defined by their *leading Qualities*, which are moſtly *Shape* in Animals and Vegetables, and *Colour* in inanimate Bodies; and in ſome, both

both together. Now theſe leading Qualities are beſt made known by ſhewing, and can hardly be made known otherwiſe. The Shape of a *Horſe* or *Caſſowary* will be but imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words: the ſight of the Animals doth it much better. And the *Idea* of the particular Colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any Deſcription of it, but only by the frequent Exerciſe of the Eyes about it. The like may be ſaid of thoſe other Simple *Ideas*, peculiar in their Kind to any Subſtance, for which preciſe *Ideas* there are no peculiar Names.

But becauſe many of the Simple *Ideas*, which make up our Specifick *Ideas* of Subſtances, are Powers which lie not obvious to our Senſe in the Things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the Signification of our Names of Subſtances, ſome part of the Signification will be better made known, by enumerating thoſe Simple *Ideas*, than in ſhewing the Subſtance it ſelf. For he that to the *Yellow ſhining Colour of* Gold, got by ſight, ſhall

ſhall from my enumerating them have the *Ideas* of great *Ductibility*, *Fuſibility*, *Fixedneſs*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regia* will have a perfecter *Idea* of *Gold*, than he can have by ſeeing a piece of *Gold*, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities.

It were to be wiſhed that Words ſtanding for Things, which are known and diſtinguiſhed by their outward Shapes, ſhould be expreſs'd by little Draughts and Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this faſhion, would perhaps with more eaſe, and in leſs time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, eſpecially in Languages of remote Countries, or Ages; and ſettle truer *Ideas* in Mens Minds of ſeveral Things, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. *Naturaliſts* that treat of *Plants* and *Animals*, have found the benefit of this way: and he that conſults them will find that he has a clearer *Idea* of *Apium* and *Ibex* from a little Print of that Herb or Beaſt, than he could have from a long Definition

of the Names of either of them; and ſo no doubt he would have of *Strigil*, and *Siſtrum*, if inſtead of a *Curry-comb* or *Cymbal*, which are the Engliſh Names Dictionaries render them by, he could ſee ſtamped in the Margin ſmall Pictures of theſe Inſtruments, as they were in uſe amongſt the Ancients.

Fifthly, The laſt Rule that I ſhall mention is, That in all Diſcourſes wherein one Man pretends to inſtruct or convince another, he ſhould uſe the ſame Word, conſtantly in the ſame Senſe; if this were done (which no body can refuſe without great Diſingenuity) many of the Books extant might be ſpared; many of the Controverſies in Diſpute, would be at an end; ſeveral of thoſe great Volumes ſwollen with ambiguous Words, now uſed in one Senſe, and by and by in another, would ſhrink into a very narrow Compaſs: and many of the *Philoſophers* (to mention no other) as well as *Poets* Works, might be contained in a *Nutſhel*.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

SInce the Mind in all its Thoughts and Reaſonings, has no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*, which alone it does or can contemplate; it is evident that our Knowledge is only converſant about them. *Knowledge* then ſeems to be nothing but the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Diſagreement and Repugnancy of any of our *Ideas:* Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there tho' we fancy, gueſs, or believe, yet we always come ſhort of *Knowledge.* When we know that *White* is not *Black*, what do we but

perceive that these two *Ideas* do not agree? Or that the three Angles of a *Triangle*, are equal to two Right ones; what do we more but perceive that Equality to two Right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle? But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agreement or Disagreement consists; we may reduce it all to these *four Sorts*; First, *Identity* or *Diversity*; Secondly, *Relation*; Thirdly, *Co-existence*; Fourthly, *Real Existence*.

1. *Identity* or *Diversity*: 'Tis the first Act of the Mind, *to perceive its* Ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby to perceive their Difference, that is, the one not to be the other: by this the Mind clearly perceives each *Idea* to agree with it self, and to be what it is; and all distinct *Ideas* to disagree. This it does without any Pains or Deduction, by its natural Power of Perception and Distinction. This is what Men of Art have reduced to those General Rules, *viz. What is, is.* And

It

It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be. But no *Maxim* can make a Man know it clearer, that *Round* is not *Square*, than the bare Perception of thoſe two *Ideas*, which the Mind at firſt ſight perceives to diſagree.

2. The next ſort of Agreement or Diſagreement the Mind perceives in any of its *Ideas*, may be called *Relative*, and is nothing but the Perception of the Relation, between any two *Ideas* of what kind ſoever: that is, their Agreement or Diſagreement one with another in ſeveral ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

3. The Third ſort of Agreement or Diſagreement to be found in our *Ideas*, is *Co-exiſtence*, or *Non-co-exiſtence* in the ſame Subject; and this belongs particularly to Subſtances. Thus when we pronounce concerning *Gold*, that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this, that Fixedneſs, or a Power to remain in the Fire unconſumed, is an *Idea* that always accompanies that particular ſort of *Yellowneſs*, *Weight*,

Fuſibility, &c. which make our Complex *Idea* ſignified by the Word *Gold*.

4. The Fourth ſort is that of actual and *real Exiſtence* agreeing to any *Idea*. Within theſe Four ſorts of Agreement or Diſagreement, I ſuppoſe is contained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all that we know or can affirm concerning any *Idea*, is, that it is, or is not the ſame with ſome other: As that *Blue is not Yellow*. That it does, or does not co-exiſt with another in the ſame Subject: As that *Iron is ſuſceptible of Magnetical Impreſſions*: That it has that or this Relation to ſome other *Ideas*: As that *Two Triangles upon equal Baſes between two Parallels are equal*; or that it has a real Exiſtence without the Mind: As *That God is*.

There are ſeveral ways wherein the Mind is poſſeſs'd of Truth, each of which is called Knowledge. *Firſt*, There is *Actual Knowledge*, when the Mind has a preſent view of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*, or of the Relation they have

have one with another. *Secondly*, A Man is ſaid to know any Propoſition, when having once evidently perceived the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* whereof it conſiſts, and ſo lodged it in his Memory, that whenever it comes to be reflected on again, the Mind aſſents to it without Doubt or Heſitation, and is certain of the Truth of it. And this may be called *Habitual Knowledge*: And thus a Man may be ſaid to know all thoſe Truths which are lodged in his Memory, by a foregoing, clear, and full Perception.

Of *Habitual Knowledge* there are two ſorts: The one is of ſuch Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation that is between thoſe *Ideas*. And this is in all thoſe Truths, where the *Ideas* themſelves, by an immediate view, diſcover their Agreement or Diſagreement one with another. The other is of ſuch Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus

a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonſtration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, knows it to be true, when that Demonſtration is gone out of his Mind, and poſſibly cannot be recollected: But he knows it in a different way from what he did before; namely, not by the Intervention of thoſe intermediate *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe in the Propoſition was at firſt perceived; but by remembring, *i. e.* knowing that he was once certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones. The Immutability of the ſame Relations between the ſame immutable Things, is now the *Idea* that ſhews him, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two Right ones, they will always be ſo. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true, is always true; what *Ideas*, once agreed will always agree; and conſequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be

be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

ALL our Knowledge conſiſting in the view the Mind has of its own *Ideas*, which is the utmoſt Light, and greateſt Certainty we are capable of: The *different clearneſs of our Knowledge*, ſeems to lie in the different way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*.

When the Mind perceives this Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas immediately* by themſelves, without the Intervention of any other; we may call it *Intuitive Knowledge*, in which Caſes the Mind perceives the Truth, as the Eye does Light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the Mind perceives that *White is not Black*, that *Three are*

more than Two, and *equal to One and Two*. This part of Knowledge is irreſiſtible, and like the bright Sunſhine, forces it ſelf immediately to be perceived as ſoon as ever the Mind turns its view that way. It is on this *Intuition*, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of our other Knowledge; which Certainty every one finds to be ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater.

The next Degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives not this Agreement or Diſagreement immediately, or by the *Juxta-poſition* as it were of the *Ideas*, becauſe thoſe *Ideas* concerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be ſo put together, as to ſhew it. In this Caſe the Mind is fain to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement which it ſearches, by the Intervention of other *Ideas*: and this is that which we call *Reaſoning*: And thus if we would know the Agreement or Diſagreement in bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Triangle,

and

and two Right Angles; we cannot by an immediate view, and comparing them do it; becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two Angles. And ſo of this, the Mind has no Immediate or Intuitive Knowledge. But we muſt find out ſome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have equality, and finding thoſe equal to two Right ones, we come to know the equality of theſe three Angles to two Right ones. Thoſe intervening *Ideas*, which ſerve to ſhew the Agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*. And where the Agreement or Diſagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonſtration*. A quickneſs in the Mind to find thoſe Proofs, and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called *Sagacity*.

This Knowledge, tho' it be certain, is not ſo clear and evident as *Intuitive* Knowledge. It require Pains and Attention, and ſteady Application of Mind, to diſcover the Agreement or

Diſagreement of the *Ideas* it conſiders, and there muſt be a Progreſſion by Steps and Degrees, before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty. Before Demonſtration there was a Doubt, which in *Intuitive Knowledge* cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of diſtinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye (that can diſtinctly ſee *White* and *Black*) whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour.

Now in every Step that Reaſon makes in *Demonſtrative Knowledge*, there is an *Intuitive Knowledge* of that Agreement or Diſagreement it ſeeks with the next intermediate *Idea*, which it uſes as a Proof; for if it were not ſo, that yet would need a a Proof; ſince without the Perception of ſuch Agreement or Diſagreement, there is no Knowledge produc'd. By which it is evident, that every Step in Reaſoning, that produces Knowledge, has *Intuitive Certainty*; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to

make

make the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* concerning which we enquire, Viſible and Certain. This *Intuitive Perception* of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the intermediate *Ideas* in each Step and Progreſſion of the Demonſtration, muſt alſo be exactly carried in the Mind; and a Man muſt be ſure that no part is left out; which becauſe in long Deductions, the Memory cannot eaſily retain; this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than *Intuitive*; and Men often embrace Falſhoods, for Demonſtrations.

It has been generally taken for granted, that *Mathematicks* alone are capable of Demonſtrative Certainty. But to have ſuch an Agreement or Diſagreement as may be *Intuitively* perceiv'd, being as I imagine not the Priviledge of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extenſion* and *Figure* alone; it may poſſibly be the want of due Method and Application in us, and not of ſufficient Evidence in Things, that Demonſtration has been thought to have ſo little to do in other parts of Knowledge.

ledge. For in whatever *Ideas* the Mind can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement immediately, there it is capable of *Intuitive Knowledge:* And where it can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an *Intuitive Perception* of the Agreement or Diſagreement they have with any intermediate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonſtration, which is not limited to the *Ideas* of Figure, Number, Extenſion, or their Modes. The reaſon why it has been generally ſuppoſed to belong to them only, is becauſe in comparing their Equality or Exceſs, the *Modes of Numbers* have every the leaſt difference, very clear and perceivable: And in *Extenſion*, tho' every the leaſt Exceſs is not ſo perceptible, yet the Mind has found out ways to diſcover the juſt Equality of two Angles, Extenſions, or Figures; and both, that is, Numbers and Figures can be ſet down by viſible and laſting Marks.

But in other Simple *Ideas*, whoſe Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quanti-

ty,

ty, we have not ſo nice and accurate a Diſtinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find ways to meaſure their juſt Equality, or the leaſt Differences. For thoſe other Simple *Ideas* being Appearances or Senſations produced in us, by the *Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. of minute Corpuſcles ſingly inſenſible; their different Degrees alſo depend on the variation of ſome, or all of thoſe Cauſes; which ſince it cannot be obſerved by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too ſubtile to be perceived, it is impoſſible for us to have any exact Meaſures of the different Degrees of theſe Simple *Ideas*. Thus, for Inſtance, not knowing what number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any preciſe Degree of *Whiteneſs*; we cannot demonſtrate the certain Equality of any two Degrees of *Whiteneſs*, becauſe we have no certain Standard to meaſure them by, nor means to diſtinguiſh every the leaſt Difference: the only help we have being from our Senſes, which in this Point fail us.

But

But where the Difference is ſo great as to produce in the Mind *Ideas* clearly diſtinct; there *Ideas* of *Colours*, as we ſee in different kinds, *Blue* and *Red* (for inſtance) are as capable of Demonſtration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extenſion. What is here ſaid of Colours, I think, holds true in all Secondary Qualities. Theſe two then, *Intuition* and *Demonſtration*, are the Degrees of our *Knowledge*: whatever come ſhort of one of theſe, is but *Faith* or *Opinion*, not *Knowledge*, at leaſt in all *General Truths*. There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employed about the *particular Exiſtence of Finite Beings*, without us, which going beyond Probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing Degrees of Certainty, paſſes under the Name of Knowledge.

Nothing can be more certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an External Object is in our Minds: This is *Intuitive Knowledge*; but whether we can thence certainly infer the Exiſtence of any thing without us, correſponding to that *Idea*, is that

whereof

whereof ſome Men think there may be a Queſtion made, becauſe Men may have ſuch an *Idea* in their Minds, when no ſuch Thing exiſts, no ſuch Object affects their Senſes. But 'tis evident that we are invincibly conſcious to our ſelves of a different Perception, when we look upon the *Sun* in the Day, and think on it by Night; when we actually taſte *Wormwood*, or ſmell a *Roſe*, or only think on that *Savour* or *Odour*: ſo that I think we may add to the two former ſorts of Knowledge, this alſo of the Exiſtence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Conſciouſneſs we have, of the actual entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow theſe three Degrees of Knowledge, *viz. Intuitive*, *Demonſtrative*, and *Senſitive*.

But ſince our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our *Ideas* only: Will it follow thence that it muſt be conformable to our *Ideas*, and that where our *Ideas* are clear and diſtinct, obſcure and confuſed, there our Knowledge will be ſo too? *I anſwer*, *No*: For our Knowledge conſiſting in the Per-

Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*; its Clearneſs or Obſcurity conſiſts in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearneſs or Obſcurity of the *Ideas* themſelves. A Man (for inſtance) that has a clear *Idea* of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two Right ones, may yet have but an obſcure Perception of their Agreement; and ſo have but a very obſcure Knowledge of it. But obſcure and confuſed *Ideas* can never produce any clear or diſtinct Knowledge; becauſe, as far as any *Ideas* are obſcure or confuſed, ſo far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree or diſagree: Or, to expreſs the ſame thing in a way leſs apt to be miſunderſtood: He that hath not determin'd *Ideas* to the Words he uſes, cannot make Propoſitions of them, of whoſe Truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

FROM what has been ſaid concerning Knowledge, it follows *Firſt*, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we have *Ideas*.

Secondly, That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, either by *Intuition*, *Demonſtration*, or *Senſation*.

Thirdly, We cannot have an *Intuitive* Knowledge that ſhall extend it ſelf to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another, by Juxta-poſition, or an immediate Compariſon one with another. Thus we cannot *intuitively* perceive the equality of two Extenſions, the difference of whoſe Figures makes their

Parts

Parts uncapable of an exact immediate Application.

Fourthly, Our *Rational* Knowledge cannot reach to the whole Extent of our *Ideas*; becauſe between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find ſuch *Proofs* as we can connect one to another, with an *Intuitive Knowledge* in all the parts of the Deduction.

Fifthly, *Senſitive* Knowledge reaching no farther than the Exiſtence of Things actually preſent to our Senſes, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the *extent of our Knowledge*, comes not only ſhort of the Reality of *Things*, but even of the Extent of our own *Ideas*. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle* and *Equality*, and yet perhaps ſhall never be able to find a *Circle equal to a Square*.

The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, being reduced to the four Sorts abovementioned, *viz. Identity*, *Co-exiſtence*, *Relation*,

Relation, and *Real Existence*; I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these.

First, As to *Identity and Diversity*, our *Intuitive Knowledge* is as far extended as our *Ideas* themselves; and there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not presently by an *Intuitive Knowledge*, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

Secondly, As to the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas* in *Co-existence*: in this our Knowledge is very short, tho' in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge, concerning *Substances*. For our *Ideas* of *Substances*, being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain *Collections of Simple* Ideas, *co-existing in one Subject*, (our *Idea* of *Flame*, for Instance, is a Body *hot*, *luminous* and *moving upward*.) When we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of Substance, What do we but enquire what other Qualities or Powers these Substances have or have not? which

is

is nothing elſe but to know what other Simple *Ideas* do, or do not *coexiſt* with thoſe that make up that Complex *Idea*. The reaſon of this is, becauſe the Simple *Ideas* which make up our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, have no viſible neceſſary Connection or Inconſiſtence with other Simple *Ideas*, whoſe Co-exiſtence with them we would inform our ſelves about. Theſe *Ideas* being likewiſe for the moſt part *Secondary Qualities* which depend upon the *Primary* Qualities of their minute or inſenſible Parts, or on ſomething yet more remote from our Comprehenſion; it is impoſſible we ſhould know which have a neceſſary Union, or Inconſiſtency one with another, ſince we know not the Root from whence they ſpring, or the Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and from which they reſult.

Beſides this, there is no *diſcoverable Connection* between any *Secondary* Quality, and thoſe *Primary* Qualities that it depends on. We are ſo far from knowing what Figure, Size,

or

or Motion produces (for Inſtance) A *Yellow Colour*, or *Sweet Taſte*, or a *Sharp Sound*, that we can by no means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure*, or *Motion* can poſſibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour*, *Taſte*, or *Sound* whatſoever; and there is no conceivable Connection between the one and the other.

Our Knowledge therefore of Co-exiſtence reaches little farther than *Experience*. Some few indeed of the *Primary* Qualities have a neceſſary Dependence, and viſible Connection one with another: As *Figure* neceſſarily ſuppoſes *Extenſion*, *receiving or communicating Motion by Impulſe*, ſuppoſes *Solidity*. But Qualities co-exiſtent in any Subject, without this Dependence and Connection, cannot certainly be known to co-exiſt any farther, than Experience by our Senſes informs us. Thus, tho' upon trial we find *Gold* Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fuſible and Fixed, yet becauſe none of theſe have any evident Dependence, or neceſſary Connection with the other; we cannot certainly know,

know, that where any *Four* of these are, the *Fifth* will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: But the highest Degree of *Probability*, amounts not to *Certainty*; without which there can be no true Knowledge: For this Co-existence can be no further known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in *particular* Subjects, by the observation of our Senses; or in *general*, by the necessary Connection of the *Ideas* themselves.

As to *Incompatibility*, or *Repugnancy to Co-existence*, we may know that any Subject can have of each sort of *Primary* Qualities, but one particular at once. One Extension, one Figure; and so of sensible *Ideas* peculiar to each Sense: For whatever of each kind is present in any Subject, excludes all other of that sort: For Instance, one Subject cannot have *two Smells*, or *two Colours* at the same time.

As to *Powers of Substances* which, make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and are no inconsiderable Branch of our Knowledge: Our

Knowledge

Knowledge as to these reaches little farther than *Experience*; because they consist in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover; and I doubt whether with those *Faculties* we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this part. *Experience* is that which in this part we must depend on; and it were to be wished that it were more improved: we find the Advantages some Mens generous pains, have this way brought to the stock of *Natural Knowledge*. And if others, especially the *Philosophers by Fire* who pretend to it, had been so wary in their Observations, and sincere in their Reports, as those who call themselves *Philosophers* ought to have been: our acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our insight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater.

As to the Third Sort the *Agreement or Disagreement of our* Ideas *in any other Relation*: This is the largest field of Knowledge, and it is

hard to determine how far it may extend. This part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate *Ideas*, that may ſhew the Habitudes and Relations of *Ideas*; It is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of ſuch Diſcoveries. They that are ignorant of *Algebra* cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind, are to be done by it: and what farther Improvements and Helps, advantagious to other parts of Knowledge, the Sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, it is not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe, that the *Ideas* of *Quantity*, are not thoſe alone that are capable of Demonſtration and Knowledge: and that other, and perhaps more uſeful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Paſſions, and domineering Intereſt did not oppoſe or menace Endeavours of this kind.

The *Idea* of a *Supream Being*, infinite in Power, Goodneſs, and Wiſdom, whoſe Workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of *our Selves*, as underſtanding rational

rational Creatures, would I ſuppoſe, if duly conſidered, afford ſuch Foundations of our *Duty*, and *Rules of Action*, as might place *Morality* among the Sciences capable of Demonſtration: wherein I doubt not but from Principles as Inconteſtable as thoſe of the *Mathematicks*, by neceſſary Conſequences, the meaſure of *Right* and *Wrong* might be made out, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame Indifferency and Attention to the One, as he does to the Other of theſe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as thoſe of Number and Extenſion. *Where there is no Property, there is no injuſtice*, is a Propoſition as certain as any Demonſtration in *Euclid*: for the *Idea* of *Property* being a right to any thing; and the *Idea* of *Injuſtice*, being the invaſion or violation of that Right: It is evident that theſe *Ideas* being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Propoſition to be true, as that a *Triangle has three Angles equal*

to two right ones. Again, *No Government allows abſolute Liberty.* The *Idea* of *Government* being the eſtabliſhment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them; and the *Idea* of *Abſolute Liberty*, being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes, I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, as of any in *Mathematicks.*

What has given the advantage to the *Ideas* of *Quality*, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonſtration, is,

Firſt, That they can be repreſented by ſenſible Marks, which have a nearer Correſpondence with them, than any Words or Sounds. *Diagrams* drawn on Paper, are Copies of the *Ideas*, and not liable to the uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. But we have no ſenſible Marks that reſemble our *Moral Ideas*, and nothing but Words to expreſs them by; which tho', when written, they remain the ſame; yet the *Ideas* they ſtand for, may change in the ſame Man;

and

and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different Perſons.

Secondly, *Moral Ideas* are commonly more complex than Figures: whence theſe two Inconveniences follow: *Firſt*, That their Names are of more uncertain Signification; the preciſe collection of Simple *Ideas* they ſtand for, not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the ſign that is uſed for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame *Idea*. *Secondly*, The Mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe Combinations ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary; in the examination of the Habitudes and Correſpondencies, Agreements or Diſagreements of ſeveral of them one with another, eſpecially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of ſeveral other Complex *Ideas*, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of two remote ones.

Now one part of theſe Diſadvantages in *Moral Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of De-

monſtration, may in a good meaſure be remedied by *Definitions*, ſetting down that collection of Simple *Ideas* which every term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the Terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe Collection.

As to the Fourth ſort of Knowledge, *viz.* of *the real actual Exiſtence of Things*, we have an *Intuitive* Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence*: a *Demonſtrative* Knowledge of *the Exiſtence of God*; and a *Senſitive* Knowledge of the *Objects that preſent themſelves to our Senſes*.

From what has been ſaid we may diſcover the *Cauſes of our Ignorance*, which are chiefly theſe Three; *Firſt*, Want of *Ideas*; *Secondly*, Want of a diſcoverable Connection between the *Ideas* we have; *Thirdly*, Want of tracing and examining our *Ideas*.

Firſt, There are ſome things we are ignorant of for *want of Ideas*. All the Simple *Ideas* we have, are confined to the obſervation of our Senſes, and the operations of our own Minds, that we are conſcious of in our Selves. What other *Ideas* it is poſſible

poſſible other Creatures may have, by the aſſiſtance of other Senſes and Faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine; but to ſay or think, there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch thing as Sight and Colours, becauſe he had no manner of *Idea* of any ſuch thing. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmoſt Conſtitutions of Things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want other views of them, beſides thoſe we have to make diſcoveries of them more perfect. The *Intellectual* and *Senſible* World are in this perfectly alike, that the Parts which we ſee of either of them, hold no proportion with that we ſee not; and whatſoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almoſt nothing, in compariſon of the reſt.

Another great cauſe of Ignorance, is the *want of* Ideas *that we are capable of*. This keeps us in ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known. Bulk, Figure and Motion we have *Ideas* of: yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk, Motion and Figure of the greateſt part of the Bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies and ways of Operation, whereby the effects we daily ſee, are produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome things, by being *too Remote*, in others by being *too Minute*.

When we conſider the vaſt diſtance of the known and viſible parts of the World, and the reaſons we have to think that what lies within our Ken, is but a ſmall part of the immenſe Univerſe; we ſhall then diſcover an huge Abyſs of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Maſſes of Matter, which make up the whole ſtupendious frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, and what is their Motion, and how continued, and what influence they have

have upon one another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it; What several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and Intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may probably be in other *Planets*, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain *Ideas* into our Minds?

There are other Bodies in the Universe, no less concealed from us by their *Minuteness*. These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter, and the great instruments of Nature, on which depend all their *Secondary* Qualities and Operations, our want of precise distinct *Ideas* of their *Primary* Qualities, keeps us in

incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. Did we know the Mechanical Affections of *Rhubarb* and *Opium*, we might as easily account for their Operations of *Purging* or *causing Sleep*, as a Watch-Maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The dissolving of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, or Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *Vice versâ*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a *Smith*, to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of Senses, acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us *Ideas* of their Mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few Trials we make, are able to reach: but whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of Universal Truths concerning Natural Bodies: and our

Reason

Reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular Matters of Fact. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever Human Induſtry may advance uſeful and *Experimental Philoſophy* in Phyſical Things, yet *Scientifical* will ſtill be out of our reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate *Ideas* of thoſe very Bodies which are neareſt to us, and moſt under our Command.

This at firſt ſight ſhews us how diſproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent, even of *Material* Beings: to which, if we add the Conſideration of that infinite number of *Spirits* that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance: we ſhall find this cauſe of Ignorance, conceal from us, in an impenetrable Obſcurity, almoſt the whole *Intellectual* World: a greater certainly and a more beautiful World than the *material*. For bating ſome very few *Ideas* of Spirit, we get from our own Mind by Reflection, and from thence the beſt we can collect, of the

Father of all Spirits, the Author of them, and us, and all Things: we have no certain Information, ſo much as of the *Exiſtence* of other Spirits but by Revelation: much leſs have we diſtinct *Ideas* of their different Natures, States, Powers, and ſeveral Conſtitutions, wherein they agree or differ one from another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an abſolute Ignorance.

The *Second* Cauſe of Ignorance is the *want of diſcoverable Connexion* between thoſe *Ideas* we have; where we want that, we are utterly incapable of *Univerſal* and *Certain* Knowledge; and are as in the former Caſe, left only to *Obſervation* and *Experiment*. Thus the Mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no Affinity at all with the *Ideas* they produce in us, we can have no diſtinct Knowledge of ſuch Operations beyond our Experience; and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as the Effects or Appointment of an Infinitely *Wiſe*

Agent, which perfectly ſurpaſs our Comprehenſions.

The Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies, is as unconceivable. How any *Thought* ſhould produce a Motion in *Body*, is as remote from the Nature of our *Ideas*, as how any *Body* ſhould produce any *Thought* in the *Mind*. That it is ſo, if Experience did not convince us, the Conſideration of the Things themſelves, would never be able in the leaſt to diſcover to us.

In ſome of our *Ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, ſo viſibly included in the Nature of the *Ideas* themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any Power whatſoever: In theſe only we are capable of Certain and Univerſal Knowledge. Thus the *Idea* of a *Right-lin'd Triangle*, neceſſarily carries with it an *Equality of its Angles to two Right ones*. But the Coherence and Continuity of the Parts of Matter; the Production of Senſation in us, of *Colours* and *Sounds*, &c. by Impulſe, and Motion,

being

being ſuch wherein we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any *Ideas* we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleaſure of the wiſe Architect.

The Things that we obſerve conſtantly to proceed regularly, we may conclude to act by a Law ſet them; but yet by a Law that we know not; whereby, tho' Cauſes work ſteadily, and Effects conſtantly flow from them; yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not diſcoverable in our *Ideas*, we can have but an experimental Knowlege of them. Several Effects come every Day within the notice of our *Senſes*, of which we have ſo far *Senſitive* Knowledge. But the Cauſes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, we muſt for the foregoing Reaſons be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we can go no farther than particular *Experience* informs us of Matter of Fact, and by *Analogy*, gueſs what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce. But as to perfect Science of *Natural Bodies* (not to mention

Spiritual

Spiritual Beings) we are, I think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch thing, that I conclude it loſt labour to ſeek after it.

The *Third* Cauſe of Ignorance is our *Want of tracing thoſe* Ideas *we have*, or may have; and finding out thoſe intermediate *Ideas* which may ſhew us what Habitude of Agreement or Diſagreement they may have one with another: and thus many are ignorant of *Mathematical* Truths, for want of application in enquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing thoſe *Ideas*.

Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in reſpect of the ſeveral ſorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent* of it, in reſpect of *Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſider'd; and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our *Ideas*. If the *Ideas* are *Abſtract*, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is *Univerſal*. For what is known of ſuch general *Ideas*, will be true of every particular thing in which

that

that *Eſſence*, that is, that *Abſtract Idea* is to be found: And what is once known of ſuch *Ideas*, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own Minds: and it is only the examining of our own *Ideas*, that furniſhes us with that. Truths belonging to Eſſences of Things (that is, to *Abſtract Ideas*) are *Eternal*, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of thoſe Eſſences; as the Exiſtence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But I ſhall ſay more of this in the following Chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of *General*, and *Real* Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

I Doubt not but my Reader by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building

ing

ing a *Caſtle* in the Air; and be ready to object, If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*, the Viſions of an *Enthuſiaſt*, and the Reaſonings of a *Sober* Man will be equally Certain: It is no matter how Things are, ſo a Man obſerve but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. That an *Harpy* is not a *Centaur*, is by this way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But of what uſe is all this Knowledge of Mens own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the Reality of Things?

To which *I anſwer*, That if our Knowledge of our *Ideas* ſhould terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious Thoughts would be of little more uſe, than the *Reveries* of a crazy Brain. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of *Certainty* by the Knowledge of our own *Ideas*, goes

goes a little farther than bare Imagination: And that all the Certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing elſe but this Knowledge of our *Ideas*.

'Tis evident that the Mind knows not Things immediately, but by the Intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is *real*, only ſo far as there is a Conformity between our *Ideas*, and the reality of Things. But how ſhall we know when our *Ideas* agree with Things themſelves? I anſwer, There be *Two ſorts* of *Ideas* that we may be aſſured agree with Things: Theſe are,

Firſt, *Simple* Ideas; which ſince the Mind can by no means make to it ſelf, muſt be the Effect of Things operating upon the Mind in a natural way; and producing therein thoſe Perceptions, which by the Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence it follows, that *Simple Ideas* are not Fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular Productions of Things without us, really operating

rating upon us; which carry with them all the Conformity our State requires, which is to repreſent Things under thoſe Appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the *Idea* of *Whiteneſs*, as it is in the Mind, exactly anſwers that Power which is in any Body to produce it there. And this Conformity between our *Simple Ideas*, and the Exiſtence of Things is ſufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All our *Complex Ideas*, except thoſe of Subſtances, being *Archetypes* of the Mind's own making, and not referred to the Exiſtence of Things as to their Originals, cannot want any Conformity neceſſary to real Knowledge. For that which is not deſigned to repreſent any thing but it ſelf, can never be capable of a wrong Repreſentation. Here the *Ideas* themſelves are conſidered as *Archetypes*, and Things no otherwiſe regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the *Mathematician* conſiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a *Rectangle* or *Circle* only, as they are *Ideas* in his own Mind,

Mind, which poſſibly he never found exiſting Mathematically, that is, preciſely true: yet his Knowledge is not only Certain, but *Real*; becauſe Real Things are no farther concern'd nor intended to be meant by any ſuch Propoſitions, than as Things really agree to thoſe *Archetypes* in his Mind. It is true of the *Idea* of a *Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two Right ones*; It is true alſo of a *Triangle* where-ever it *Exiſts*: What is true of thoſe *Figures*, that have barely an *Ideal* Exiſtence in his Mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they come to have a *Real* Exiſtence in Matter.

Hence it follows, that *Moral* Knowledge is as capable of *Real Certainty* as *Mathematicks*. For *Certainty* being nothing but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, and Demonſtration nothing but the Perception of ſuch Agreement by the intervention of other *Ideas*; our *Moral Ideas* as well as *Mathematical*, being *Archetypes* themſelves, and ſo Adequate or Complete *Ideas*, all the Agreement or Diſagreement we ſhall find

find in them, will produce *Real* Knowledge as well as in *Mathematical Figures*. That which is requiſite to make our Knowledge *Certain*, is the clearneſs of our *Ideas*; and that which is required to make it *Real*, is, that they anſwer their *Archetypes*.

But it will here be ſaid, That if *Moral* Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own *Moral Ideas*; and thoſe be of our own making, what ſtrange Notions will there be of *Juſtice* and *Temperance*? What Confuſion of *Virtues* and *Vices*, if every Man may make what *Ideas* of them he pleaſes? *I Anſwer*, No Confuſion nor Diſorder at all, in the Things themſelves, nor the Reaſonings about them, no more than there would be a Change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man ſhould make a *Triangle* with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four Right Angles; that is, in plain Engliſh, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which is called ordinarily by another. The change of Name will indeed at

firſt diſturb him, who knows not what *Idea* it ſtands for: but as ſoon as the Figure is drawn, the Conſequences and Demonſtration are plain and clear. Juſt the ſame is it in *Moral* Knowledge: Let a Man have the *Idea* of taking from others, without their Conſent, what they are juſtly poſſeſſed of, and call this Juſtice if he pleaſes; he that takes the Name here, without the *Idea* put to it, will be miſtaken by joyning another *Idea* of his own to that Name; but *ſtrip* the *Idea* of that Name, or take it ſuch as it is in the Speakers Mind; and the ſame Things will agree to it, as if you call'd it Injuſtice.

One thing we are to take notice of, That where *God*, or any other Lawmaker, has defined any *Moral Names*, there they have made the Eſſence of that *Species* to which that Name belongs: And there it is not ſafe to apply, or uſe them otherwiſe. But in other Caſes it is bare Impropriety of Speech, to apply them contrary to the common Uſage of the Country they are uſed in.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, But the Complex *Ideas* which we refer to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and ſo our Knowledge about them may come ſhort of being Real: and ſuch are our *Ideas* of *Subſtances*. Theſe muſt be taken from ſomething, that does or has exiſted, and not be made up of *Ideas* arbitrarily put together, without any real Pattern. Herein therefore is founded the reality of our Knowledge concerning *Subſtances*, that all our Complex *Ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch Simple ones, as have been diſcovered to co-exiſt in Nature. And our *Ideas* being thus true, tho' not perhaps very exact Copies, are the Subjects of *Real* Knowledge of them. Whatever *Ideas* we have, the Agreement we find they have with others will be Knowledge. If thoſe *Ideas* be Abſtract, it will be *General* Knowledge: But to make it *Real* concerning *Subſtances*, the *Ideas* muſt be taken from the real Exiſtence of Things. Where-ever therefore we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, there

is

is *Certain Knowledge*: and wherever we are ſure thoſe *Ideas* agree with the reality of Things, there is *certain Real Knowledge*.

CHAP. V.

Of Truth in General.

Truth in the proper import of the Word, ſignifies the joining or ſeparating of Signs; as the Things ſignified by them, do agree or diſagree one with another. The joining or ſeparating of Signs, is what we call *Propoſitions*; ſo that *Truth* properly belongs only to *Propoſitions*; whereof there are *Two* ſorts, *Mental* and *Verbal*, as there are *Two* ſorts of Signs commonly made uſe of, *Ideas* and *Words*.

'Tis difficult to treat of *Mental* Propoſitions without *Verbal*: becauſe in ſpeaking of *Mental*, we muſt make uſe of *Words*, and then they become *Verbal*. Again, Men commonly in their

their Thoughts and Reasonings, use *Words* instead of *Ideas*; especially if the Subject of their Meditation contains in it *Complex Ideas*. If we have occasion to form *Mental* Propositions about *White*, *Black*, *Circle*, &c. we can, and often do, frame in our Minds the *Ideas* themselves, without reflecting on the *Names*. But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more *Complex Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, &c. we usually put the *Name* for the *Idea*; because the *Idea* these *Names* stand for, being for the most part confused, imperfect, and undetermined; we reflect on the *Names* themselves, as being more Clear, Certain and Distinct, and readier to occur to our Thoughts, than pure *Ideas*: and so we make use of these *Words* instead of the *Ideas* themselves, even when we would Meditate and Reason within our selves, and make tacit *Mental Propositions*.

We must then observe two sorts of *Propositions*, that we are capable of making. *First*, *Mental Propositions*,

wherein the *Ideas* in our Underſtandings are put together, or ſeparated by the Mind, perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Secondly*, *Verbal Propoſitions*, which are Words put together, or ſeparated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences: So that *Propoſition* conſiſts in joining or ſeparating Signs: and *Truth* conſiſts in putting together, or ſeparating theſe Signs according as the Things they ſtand for agree or diſagree.

Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Diſtinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; That being only *Verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are joined according to the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* they ſtand for, without regarding whether our *Ideas* are ſuch as really have or are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature. But then it is they contain *Real Truth*, when theſe Signs are joined, as our *Ideas* agree; and when our *Ideas* are ſuch as we know, are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature; which in Subſtances we cannot know, but by knowing that ſuch have exiſted.

isted. *Truth* is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, as it is. *Falshood* is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, otherwise than it is; and so far as these *Ideas* thus marked by Sounds, agree to their *Archetypes*, so far only is the *Truth Real*. The Knowledge of this *Truth* consists in knowing what *Ideas* the Words stand for, and the Perception of the Agreemement or Disagreement of those *Ideas*, according as it is marked by those Words.

Besides *Truth* taken in the strict Sense before-mentioned, there are other sorts of *Truths*: As, *First*, *Moral Truth*, which is speaking Things according to the Perswasion of our own Minds. *Secondly*, *Metaphysical Truth*, which is nothing but the Real Existence of things conformable to the *Ideas* to which we have annexed their Names.

These Considerations of *Truth* either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present

purpoſe, it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Univerſal Propoſitions, their Truth and Certainty.

THE prevailing Cuſtom of uſing *Sounds* for *Ideas*, even when Men think and reaſon within their own Breaſts, makes the Conſideration of *Words* and *Propoſitions* ſo neceſſary a part of the Treatiſe of Knowledge, that it is very hard to ſpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other. And ſince *General Truths*, which with Reaſon are moſt ſought after, can never be well made known, and are ſeldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreſſed in Words; it is not out of our way in the Examination of our own Knowledge, to enquire into the *Truth* and *Certainty* of *Univerſal Propoſitions*.

But

But it must be observed, that Certainty is twofold, Certainty of *Truth*, and Certainty of *Knowledge*.

Certainty of Truth is, when Words are so put together in *Propositions*, as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for; as really it is. *Certainty of Knowledge*, is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* as expressed in any *Propositions*. This we usually call *Knowing*, or being Certain of the Truth of any *Proposition*.

Now because we cannot be certain of the Truth of any *General Proposition*, unless we know the precise Bounds and Extent of the *Species* its Terms stand for; it is necessary we should know the Essence of each *Species*, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This in all *Simple Ideas* and *Modes* is not hard to do: for in these the *Real* and *Nominal* Essence being the same, there can be no doubt how far the *Species* extends, or what Things are comprehended under each Term: which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity

with the *Idea* it ſtands for, and no other. But in *Subſtances*, wherein a *Real* Eſſence, diſtinct from the *Nominal*, is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, and bound the *Species*, the Extent of the general Word is very uncertain; becauſe not knowing this Real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*, and conſequently what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it.

Hence we may ſee that the Names of Subſtances, when made to ſtand for *Species*, ſuppoſed to be conſtitued by *Real Eſſences*, which we know not, are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Underſtanding. Of the *Truth* of *General Propoſitions* made up of ſuch Terms, we cannot be ſure. For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, for Inſtance, when we know not what is, or is not *Gold*; that is, what has, or has not the *Real Eſſence* of *Gold*, whereof we have no *Idea* at all. On the other ſide, the Names of Subſtances when made uſe of for the *Complex Ideas* Men have in their Minds; tho' they carry

carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, will not yet ſerve us to make many Univerſal *Propoſitions*, of whoſe Truth we can be certain: becauſe the *Simple Ideas*, out of which the *Complex* are combined, carry not with them any diſcoverable Connection or Repugnancy, but with a very few other *Ideas*. For inſtance, *All Gold is fixed*, is a Propoſition we cannot be certain of, how Univerſally ſoever it be believed: For if we take the Term *Gold* to ſtand for a *Real Eſſence*, it is evident we know not what particular Subſtances are of that *Species*, and ſo cannot with Certainty affirm any thing univerſally of *Gold*. But if we make the Term *Gold* ſtand for a *Species*, determined by its *Nominal Eſſence*, be its *Complex Idea* what it will; for Inſtance, a Body *Yellow*, *Fuſible*, *Malleable*, and *very heavy*; no Quality can with Certainty be denied or affirmed univerſally of it, but what has a diſcoverable Connection, or Inconſiſtency with that *Nominal Eſſence*: *Fixedneſs*, for Inſtance, having no neceſſary Connec-

tion that we can discover with any *Simple Idea* that makes the *Complex* one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impossible that we should certainly know the Truth of this Proposition, *All Gold is fixed.*

But is not this an Universal certain Proposition, *All Gold is Malleable?* I answer, It is so, if *Malleableness* be a part of the *Complex Idea*, the Word *Gold* stands for: But then here is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that, that Sound stands for an *Idea*, in which *Malleableness* is contained. And such a sort of Truth and Certainty it is, to say, a *Centaur is Four-footed.* I imagine amongst all the Secondary Qualities of Substances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary Co-existence or Repugnance to Co-exist can be certainly known, unless in those of the same Sense, which necessarily exclude one another. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what *Smell*, *Taste*, &c. any Body is of. 'Tis no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in very few general

general Propoſitions concerning Subſtances: Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very ſeldom farther than our Senſes reach, or inform us. Inquiſitive and Obſerving Men may by ſtrength of Judgment, penetrate farther; and on Probabilities taken from wary Obſervations, and hints well laid together, often gueſs right at what Experience has not yet diſcovered to them: But this is but *gueſſing* ſtill; it amounts only to *Opinion*; and has not that Certainty which is requiſite to *Knowledge*.

To conclude: General Propoſitions of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms uſed in them, ſtand for ſuch *Ideas*, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, as there expreſſed is capable to be diſcovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falſhood, when we perceive the *Ideas* they ſtand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another; whence we may take notice, that general Certainty is never to be found but in our *Ideas*. Whenever

we go to ſeek it elſewhere in Experiment or Obſervations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

THERE are a ſort of Propoſitions, which under the Name of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have paſſed for Principles of Science: and becauſe they are Self-evident, have been ſuppoſed *Innate*. It may be worth while to enquire into the Reaſon of their Evidence, and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge.

Knowledge being but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, where that Agreement or Diſagreement is perceived immediately by it ſelf, without the Intervention or help of any other *Ideas*, there our *Knowledge* is *Self-evident*: which being ſo, not only *Maxims*, but an infinite

infinite number of other Propoſitions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence. For,

In reſpect of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, we may have as many Self-evident Propoſitions as we have diſtinct *Ideas*. 'Tis the Firſt Act of the Mind, to know every one of its *Ideas* by its ſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the *Ideas* he has; that he knows alſo when any one is in his Underſtanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly, one from another; ſo that all Affirmations, or Negations concerning them, are made without any poſſibility of doubt or uncertainty; and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to as ſoon as underſtood: that is, as ſoon as we have in our Minds the *Ideas* clear and diſtinct, which the Terms in the Propoſition ſtand for. Thus a *Circle is a Circle*, *Blue is not Red*, are as Self-evident Propoſitions, as thoſe general ones, *What it is*, and *'Tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not*

to be; nor can the consideration of these *Axioms* add any thing to the Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of them.

As to the Agreement or Disagreement of *Co-existence*, the Mind has an immediate perception of this, but in very few. And therefore, in this sort we have very little *Intuitive* Knowledge: tho' in some few Propositions we have. *Two Bodies cannot be in the same place*, I think is a self-evident Proposition. The *Idea* of fitting a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies being annexed to our *Idea* of Body.

As to the Relations of *Modes*, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality, as *Equals taken from Equals, the remainder will be Equal*, &c. which however received for Axioms, yet I think have not a clearer Self-Evidence than these, that *One and One are equal to Two*: that if from the Five Fingers of one Hand, you take Two, and from the Five Fingers of the other Hand Two, the

remaining Numbers will be equal. Theſe and a thouſand other ſuch Propoſitions may be found in Numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater clearneſs than thoſe Mathematical Axioms.

As to *Real Exiſtence*, ſince that has no Connection with any other of our *Ideas*, but that of our Selves, and of a *Firſt Being*; we have not ſo much as a Demonſtrative, much leſs a Self-Evident Knowledge, concerning the *Real Exiſtence* of other Beings.

In the next place let us conſider what influence theſe Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge. The Rules eſtabliſhed in the Schools, That all Reaſonings are *Ex præcognitis & præconceſſis* ſeem to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in theſe Maxims, and to ſuppoſe them to be *Præcognita*; whereby I think is meant two Things: *Firſt*, That theſe Axioms are thoſe Truths that are firſt known to the Mind: *Secondly*, That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend.

Firſt,

First, That theſe Axioms are not the Truths firſt known to the Mind, is evident from *Experience*: For who knows not that a *Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother*, long before he knows, that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be. And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of before it ever thought on theſe general Maxims? Of this the Reaſon is plain; for that which makes the Mind aſſent to ſuch Propoſitions, being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of its *Ideas*, according as it finds them affirmed or denied in Words one of another; and every *Idea* being known to be what it is, and every two diſtinct *Ideas* not to be the ſame, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that ſuch Self-evident Truths muſt be firſt known, which conſiſt of *Ideas*, that are firſt in the Mind; and the *Ideas* firſt in the Mind, it is evident, are thoſe of particular Things; from whence, by ſlow degrees the Underſtanding proceeds

ceeds to ſome few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Senſe, are ſettled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular *Ideas* are firſt received and diſtinguiſhed, and ſo Knowledge got about them; and next to them the leſs general or ſpecifick, which are next to particular ones.

For *Abſtract Ideas* are not ſo obvious or eaſy to *Children*, or the yet unexerciſed Mind, as particular ones. If they ſeem ſo to grown *Men*, 'tis only becauſe by conſtant and familiar uſe they are made ſo.

Secondly, From what has been ſaid, it plainly follows, that theſe magnified *Maxims* are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge: for if there be a great many other Truths, as Self-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impoſſible that they ſhould be the Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Thus, that *One and Two are equal to Three*, is as evident, and eaſier known than that the *Whole is equal to all its Parts*.

Parts. Nor after the knowledge of this Maxim, do we know that One and Two are equal to Three, better, or more certainly, than we did before. For if there be any odds in these *Ideas*, the *Ideas* of *Whole*, and *Parts*, are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the Mind, than those of *One*, *Two* and *Three*. Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain *Præcognita*, or general Maxims, called Principles; or else, such as these *(That One and One are Two, that Two and Two are Four*, &c.) and a great part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the Self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct *Ideas*; Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of those innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view earlier or later, they are all known by their Native Evidence, and receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof one from another;

another; much leſs the more Particular, from the more general; or the more ſimple from the more compounded: the more ſimple, and leſs abſtract, being the moſt familiar, and the eaſier and earlier apprehended.

Theſe *general Maxims* then, are only of uſe in diſputes, to ſtop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of much uſe to the diſcovery of unknown Truths; or to help the Mind forwards in its ſearch after Knowledge. Several general Maxims, are no more than bare verbal Propoſitions; and teach us nothing but the reſpect and import of Names, one to another; as, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*: What real Truth does it teach us more, than what the ſignification of the word *Totum*, or *whole* does of it ſelf import?

But yet, *Mathematicians* do not without reaſon place this, and ſome other ſuch amongſt their *Maxims*; that their Scholars having in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with theſe Propoſitions made

made in ſuch general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular Caſes: not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular Inſtances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to ſatisfy the Underſtanding. But this, I ſay, is more from our Cuſtom of uſing them, than the different Evidence of the Things.

So that, if rightly conſider'd, I think we may ſay, that where our *Ideas* are clear and diſtinct, there is little, or no uſe at all of theſe *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of them. He that cannot diſcern the Truth, or Falſhood of ſuch Propoſitions, without the help of theſe and the like Maxims, will not be helped by theſe Maxims to do it. He that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his aſſent to this Propoſition, that *Two are equal to Two*, or that *White is not Black*, will alſo have need of a Proof to

make

make him admit that, *What is, is*, or, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be.*

And as theſe *Maxims* are of little uſe, where we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; ſo they are of dangerous uſe, where our *Ideas* are confuſed, and where we uſe words that are not annexed to clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; but to ſuch as are of a looſe and wandering ſignification, ſometimes ſtanding for one, and ſometimes for another *Idea*, from which follows Miſtake and Error, which theſe Maxims (brought as proofs to eſtabliſh Propoſitions wherein the Terms ſtand for confuſed and uncertain *Ideas*) do by their Authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling Propoſitions.

THERE are Univerſal Propoſitions, which tho' they be certainly true, yet add no Light to our Under-

Underſtandings, bring no increaſe to our Knowledge: ſuch are,

Firſt, All *Purely Identical Propoſitions*. Theſe at firſt *bluſh*, appear to contain no Inſtruction in them: for when we affirm the ſame Term of it ſelf, it ſhews us nothing but what we muſt certainly know before, whether ſuch a Propoſition be either made by, or propoſed to us.

Secondly, Another ſort of trifling Propoſitions is, when a *part of the Complex* Idea *is predicated of the name of the whole*; a part of the definition, of the word defined, as, *Lead is a Metal*, *Man an Animal*. Theſe carry no Information at all, to thoſe who know the Complex *Ideas*, the Names *Lead*, and *Man* ſtand for: Indeed to a Man that knows the ſignification of the word *Metal*, and not of the word *Lead*, it is a ſhorter way to explain the ſignification of the word *Lead*, by ſaying it is a *Metal*, than by enumerating the Simple *Ideas* one by one, which make up the Complex *Idea* of *Metal*.

Alike

Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the Simple *Ideas* of a Complex one, of the name of the whole Complex *Idea*: as *All Gold is fusible*; for fusibility being one of the Simple *Ideas* that goes to the making up the Complex one, the Sound *Gold* stands for; what can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its received signification? What Instruction can it carry, to tell one that which he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me.

The general Propositions that are made about Substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but *trifling*; and if they are Instructive, Uncertain: and such as we have no knowledge of their real Truth, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in *Guessing*. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For names of

Substan-

Subſtantial Beings, as well as others, having ſettled Significations affixed to them, may with great Truth be joined negatively aud affirmatively in Propoſitions, as their Definitions make them fit to be ſo joined; and Propoſitions conſiſting of ſuch Terms, may with the ſame clearneſs be deduced one from another, as thoſe that convey the moſt real Truths; and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things exiſting without us. Thus he that has learnt the following words, with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them, *viz. Subſtance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Senſitive, Rational,* may make ſeveral undoubted Propoſitions about the *Soul*, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this ſort a Man may find an infinite number of Propoſitions, Reaſonings and Concluſions in Books of *Metaphyſicks*, *School-Divinity*, and ſome part of *Natural Philoſophy*; and after all, know as little of *God*, *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he ſet out.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The worſt ſort of *Trifling* is, *To uſe words looſely and uncertainly*, which ſets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occaſions this, is, That Men may find it convenient to ſhelter their Ignorance or Obſtinacy, under the obſcurity or Perplexedneſs of their Terms; to which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Cuſtom does in many Men much contribute.

To conclude, barely *Verbal Propoſitions* may be known by theſe following Marks.

Firſt, All Propoſitions, wherein two Abſtract Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the ſignification of Sounds. For ſince no Abſtract *Idea* can be the ſame with any other, but it ſelf; when its Abſtract Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can ſignifie no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that Name; or that theſe two Names ſignify the ſame *Idea*.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, wherein a part of the Complex *Idea*, which

any

any Term ſtands for, is predicated of that Term, are only *Verbal:* and thus all Propoſitions wherein more comprehenſive Terms called *Genera*, are affirmed of Subordinate, or leſs Comprehenſive, called *Species*, or *Individuals*, are barely *Verbal*. When by theſe two Rules we examine the Propoſitions that make up the Diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of Books; we ſhall, perhaps find, that a greater part of them, than is uſually ſuſpected, are purely about the ſignification of Words, and contain nothing in them but the uſe and application of theſe Signs.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Exiſtence.

Hitherto we have only conſider'd the *Eſſences* of Things, which being only *Abſtract Ideas*, and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Exiſtence, give us no Knowledge

ledge of *Exiſtence* at all. We proceed now to enquire concerning our *Knowledge of the Exiſtence* of Things and how we come by it.

I ſay then, that we have the Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence*, by *Intuition*; of the *Exiſtence of God*, by *Demonſtration*; and of *other Things*, by *Senſation*. As for our *own Exiſtence*, we perceive it ſo plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. I think, I reaſon; I feel Pleaſure and Pain: Can any of theſe be more evident to me than my *own Exiſtence*? If I doubt of all other Things, that very *Doubt* makes me perceive my *own Exiſtence*, and will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the *Thing* Doubting, as of that *Thought* which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us that we have an *Intuitive Knowledge of our own Exiſtence*; and an Internal Infallible Preception that we are. In every act of Senſation, Reaſoning or Thinking, we are conſcious to our ſelves of our own Being, and in this

Matter come not ſhort of the higheſt Degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a God.

THO' *God* has given us no *innate Ideas* of himſelf, yet having furniſhed us with thoſe Faculties our Minds are endow'd with, he hath not *left himſelf without a Witneſs*, ſince we have Senſe, Perception, and Reaſon, and cannot want a clear Proof of him, as long as we carry our ſelves about us: Nor can we juſtly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, ſince he has ſo plentifully provided us with Means to diſcover, and know him, ſo far as is neceſſary to the End of our Being, and the great Concernment of our Happineſs. But tho' this be the moſt obvious Truth that Reaſon diſcovers, yet it requires Thought and Attention; and the Mind muſt apply

apply it ſelf to a regular Deduction of it, from ſome part of our *Intuitive* Knowledge; or elſe we ſhall be as ignorant of this as of other Propoſitions which are in themſelves capable of clear Demonſtration. To ſhew therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, *being certain*, that *there is a God*, and how we may come by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than our ſelves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own *Exiſtence*. I think it is beyond queſtion, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*: He knows certainly that he Exiſts, and that he is Something. In the next place, Man knows by an *Intuitive* Certainty, that *bare Nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two Right-Angles*. If therefore we know there is ſome Real Being, it is an evident Demonſtration, that *from Eternity there has been Something*; ſince what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, muſt be produced by ſomething

elſe. Next it is evident, that *what has its Being from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too:* All the Powers it has, muſt be owing to, and received from the ſame Source. This Eternal Source then of all Being muſt be alſo the Source and Original of all Power; and ſo this *Eternal Being* muſt be alſo the *moſt powerful.*

Again, Man finds in himſelf *Perception* and *Knowledge:* We are certain then that there is not only ſome Being, but ſome Knowing, Intelligent Being in the World. There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, or elſe there has been a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be ſaid, there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge; I reply, that then it is impoſſible there ſhould have ever been any Knowledge: It being as impoſſible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, ſhould produce a knowing Being,

Being, as it is that a Triangle ſhould make it ſelf three Angles, bigger than two Right ones.

Thus from the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that *there is an Eternal, moſt Powerful, and Knowing Being*, which, whether any one will call *God*, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this *Idea* duly conſidered, will eaſily be deduced all thoſe other *Attributes* we ought to aſcribe to this *Eternal Being*.

From what has been ſaid, it is plain to me, we have a more certain Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a *God*, than of any thing our Senſes have not immediately diſcovered to us. Nay, I preſume I may ſay, that we more certainly know that there is a *God*, than that there is any thing elſe without us. When I ſay, we know, I *mean*, there is ſuch a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miſs, if we will but apply our Minds

to that, as we do to ſeveral other Enquiries.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that *Something has exiſted from Eternity*; let us next ſee what *kind of Thing* that muſt be. There are but two ſorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives: *Firſt*, Such as are purely material, without Senſe or Perception, as the Clippings of our Beards, and Parings of our Nails. *Secondly*, Senſible perceiving Beings; ſuch as we find our ſelves to be. Theſe two ſorts we ſhall hereafter call *Cogitative* and *Incogitative* Beings: which to our preſent purpoſe are better than *Material* and *Immaterial*.

If then there muſt be ſomething *Eternal*, it is very obvious to Reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a *Cogitative* Being; becauſe it is as impoſſible to conceive that ever bare *Incogitative* Matter ſhould produce a *Thinking* Intelligent Being, as that nothing ſhould of it ſelf produce Matter. Let us ſuppoſe any Parcel of Matter *Eternal*, we ſhall find it in it ſelf unable

to

to produce any thing. Let us suppose its Parts firmly at rest together: If there were no other Being in the World, must it not Eternally remain so, a dead unactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to it self, or produce any thing? *Matter* then by its own Strength cannot produce in it self, so much as *Motion*. The Motion it has, must also be from Eternity, or else added to Matter by some other Being, more powerful than Matter. But let us suppose Motion Eternal too, yet Matter, *Incogitative* Matter and Motion could never produce *Thought*: *Knowledge* will still be as far beyond the *Power* of *Motion* and *Matter* to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of Nothing to produce. Divide *Matter* into as minute Parts as you will, vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much as you please, it will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than it did before this Division. The minutest Particles of Matter, knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do,

and that is all they can do, ſo that if we will ſuppoſe *Nothing Eternal, Matter can never begin to be.* If we ſuppoſe *bare Matter* without Motion *Eternal, Motion can never begin to be.* If we ſuppoſe only Matter and Motion Eternal, *Thought can never begin to be:* For it is impoſſible to conceive, that Matter, either with or without Motion, could have originally in and from it ſelf, Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, muſt be a Property Eternally inſeparable from Matter, and every Particle of it. Since therefore whatſoever is the firſt Eternal Being, muſt neceſſarily be *Cogitative:* and whatſoever is firſt of all Things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the Perfections that can ever after exiſt, it neceſſarily follows, that the *Firſt Eternal Being cannot be Matter.*

If therefore it be evident that Something neceſſarily muſt exiſt from Eternity, it is alſo evident that, that *Something muſt neceſſarily be a Cogitative*

gitative Being. For it is as impoſſible that *Incogitative Matter* ſhould produce a *Cogitative Being*, as that Nothing, or the Negation of all Being ſhould produce a poſitive Being or Matter.

This diſcovery of the neceſſary Exiſtence of an Eternal Mind, does ſufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of *God*. For it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that have a Beginning, muſt depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledge or extent of Power, than what he gives them: and therefore if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs excellent Pieces of this Univerſe, all *inanimate Bodies*, whereby his *Omniſcience*, *Power*, and *Providence* will be eſtabliſh'd; and from thence all his other Attributes neceſſarily follow

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

THE Knowledge of our own Being we have by *Intuition*: The Existence of a *God*, *Reason* clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn: The *Knowledge of the Existence* of any other Thing, we can have only by *Sensation*; for there being no necessary Connection of *Real Existence* with any *Idea* a Man hath in his Memory; nor of any other Existence, but that of *God*, with the Existence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only, when by actually operating upon him, it makes it self be perceived by him. The having the *Idea* of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream, make thereby a true History. It is therefore

therefore the actual receiving of *Ideas* from without that gives us notice of the Existence of other Things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that *Idea* in us, tho' perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it; for it takes not from the *Certainty* of our Senses, and the *Ideas* we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced. This *Notice* we have by our *Senses* of the existing of Things without us, tho' it be not altogether so certain as *Intuition* and *Demonstration*, deserves the Name of Knowledge, if we perswade our selves that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Existence of those Objects that affect them. But besides the Assurance we have from our *Senses* themselves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Existence of Things without us, we have other concurrent Reasons: As, *First*, It is plain those Perceptions are produced in us, by Exterious Causes affecting our Senses, because those that want the *Organs* of any *Sense*, never

can have the *Ideas* belonging to that Senſe produced in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be aſſured, that they come in by the Organs of that Senſe, and no other way.

Secondly, Becauſe we find ſometimes that we cannot avoid the having thoſe *Ideas* produced in our Minds; when my Eyes are ſhut, I can at pleaſure recall to my Mind the *Ideas* of *Light* or the *Sun* which former Senſations had lodged in my Memory; but if I turn my Eyes towards the *Sun*, I cannot avoid the *Ideas* which the *Light* or the *Sun* then produces in me: which ſhews a manifeſt difference between thoſe *Ideas* laid up in the Memory, and ſuch as force themſelves upon us, and we cannot avoid having. And therefore it muſt needs be ſome *Exterior* Cauſe, whoſe Efficacy I cannot reſiſt, that produces thoſe *Ideas* in my Mind, whether I will or no.

Beſides, there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himſelf, between actually looking upon the *Sun*, and contemplating the *Idea* he has of it in his Memory; and there-

fore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory or Fancy; but that actual Seeing has a Cauſe without.

Thirdly, Add to this, that many *Ideas* are produced in us with Pain, which we afterwards remember without the leaſt Offence. Thus the Pain of *Heat* or *Cold*, when the *Idea* of it is received in our Minds, gives us no Diſturbance; which when felt was very troubleſome; and we remember the Pain of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Head-ach*, &c. without any Pain at all; which would either never diſturb us, or elſe conſtantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *Ideas* floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Exiſtence of Things affecting us from abroad.

Fourthly, Our *Senſes* in many Caſes bear witneſs to the Truth of each others Report, concerning the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things without us: He that doubts when he ſees a *Fire*, whether it be *Real*, may if he pleaſe, feel it too; and by the exquiſite Pain

he

he will be convinced, that it is not a bare *Idea* or *Phantom*.

If after all this, any one will be ſo *Sceptical*, as to diſtruſt his Senſes, and to queſtion the Exiſtence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing; let him conſider that the certainty of Things exiſting in *Rerum natura*, when we have the Teſtimony of our Senſes for it, is not only as great as our Frame can attain to, but as our Condition needs. For our *Faculties* being not fuited to the full extent of Being, nor a clear comprehenſive Knowledge of all Things, but to the preſervation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the uſe of Life; they ſerve our purpoſe well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of thoſe Things, that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a *Candle* burning, and has experimented the force of the Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt, that this is ſomething exiſting without him, which does him harm and puts him to pain, which is Aſſurance enough; when no Man requires

quires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themſelves: So that this Evidence is as great as we can deſire, being as certain to us as our Pleaſure or Pain, that is, *Happineſs* or *Miſery*, beyond which we have no Concernment either of Knowing or Being.

In fine, when our *Senſes* do actually convey into our Underſtandings any *Idea*, we are aſſured that there is ſomething at that time *really exiſting* without us. But this Knowledge extends only as far as the preſent Teſtimony of our Senſes, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. My ſeeing a *Man* a Minute ſince, is no certain Argument of his preſent Exiſtence.

As when our *Senſes* are actually employed about any Object, we know that it does exiſt; ſo by our Memory we may be aſſured, that heretofore Things that affected our *Senſes*, *have exiſted*: and thus we have the Knowledge of the paſt Exiſtence of ſeveral Things; whereof our *Senſes* having inform'd us, our Memories ſtill retain

the

the *Ideas*: and of this we are paſt all doubt, ſo long as we remember well.

As to the *Exiſtence* of *Spirits*, our having *Ideas* of them, does not make us know, that any ſuch Things do exiſt without us; or that there are any *Finite Spirits*; or any other *Spiritual Beings* but the *Eternal God*. We have Ground from *Revelation*, and ſeveral other Reaſons, to believe with aſſurance, that there are ſuch Creatures: but our Senſes not being able to diſcover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Exiſtence; for we can no more know that there are *Finite Spirits* really exiſting, by the *Idea* we have of ſuch Beings, than by the *Ideas* any one has of *Faries* or *Centaurs*, he can come to know that Things anſwering thoſe *Ideas*, do really exiſt.

Hence we may gather, that there are *Two ſorts* of Propoſitions, *One* concerning the Exiſtence of any Thing anſwerable to ſuch an *Idea*; as that of an *Elephant*, *Phœnix*, *Motion*, or *Angel*, *viz.* Whether ſuch a Thing does any where exiſt: and this Knowledge

ledge is only of *Particulars*, and not to be had of any Thing without us, but only of *God*, any other way than by our *Senses*.

Another sort of Propoſition is, wherein is expreſſed the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Abſtract Ideas*, and their Dependence one on another. And theſe may be *Univerſal* and Certain: So having the *Idea* of *God* and my *Self*, of *Fear* and *Obedience*, I cannot but be ſure that *God is to be feared and obeyed by me*; and this Propoſition will be certain concerning *Man* in general; If I have made an *Abſtract Idea* of ſuch a *Species*, whereof I am one Particular. But ſuch a Propoſition, how certain ſoever, proves not to me the Exiſtence of Men in the World; but will be true of all ſuch Creatures, whenever they do exiſt: which *Certainty* of ſuch general Propoſitions, depends on the Agreement or Diſagreement diſcoverable in thoſe *Abſtract Ideas*. In the former Caſe, our Knowledge is the Conſequence of the *Exiſtence of Things*, producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Senſes:

Senſes: In the latter, the Conſequences of the *Ideas* that *are in our Minds*, and producing theſe general Propoſitions, many whereof are called, *Eternæ veritates*; and all of them indeed are ſo, not from being written all, or any of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were any of them Propoſitions in any ones Mind, till he having got the *Abſtract Ideas*, joined or ſeparated them by Affirmation or Negation: But whereſoever we can ſuppoſe ſuch a Creature as *Man* is, endowed with ſuch Faculties, and thereby furniſhed with ſuch *Ideas* as we have; we muſt conclude, he muſt needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Conſideration of his *Ideas*, know the truth of certain Propoſitions, that will ariſe from the Agreement or Diſagreement he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propoſitions being once made about *Abſtract Ideas*, ſo as to be true, they will, whenever they can be ſuppoſed to be made again, at any time paſt, or to come, by a Mind having thoſe *Ideas*, always be true. For Names being ſuppoſed to

ſtand

ſtand perpetually for the ſame *Ideas*; and the ſame *Ideas* having immutably the ſame Habitudes one to another; Propoſitions concerning any *Abſtract Ideas* that are once true, muſt needs be *Eternal Verities*.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

IT being the received Opinion amongſt Men of Letters, that *Maxims are the Foundations of all Knowledge*, and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain *Præcognita*, from whence the Underſtanding was to take its riſe, and by which it was to Conduct it ſelf in its Inquiries in the Matters belonging to that *Science*, the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propoſitions, called *Principles*, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge, that was to be had of that Subject.

That

That which gave occaſion to this way of proceeding, was, I ſuppoſe, the good Succeſs it ſeemed to have in *Mathematicks*, which of all other Sciences, have the greateſt Certainty, Clearneſs, and Evidence in them. But if we conſider it, we ſhall find that the great *Advancement* and Certainty of *Real Knowledge* Men arrived to in theſe *Sciences*, was not owing to the influence of theſe Principles, but to the clear diſtinct and compleat *Ideas* their Thoughts were employed about; and the relation of *Equality* and *Exceſs*, ſo clear between ſome of them, that they had an *Intuitive Knowledge*; and by that a way to diſcover it in others: and this without the help of thoſe *Maxims*. For I ask, Is it not poſſible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, *The whole is bigger than the Part*; nor be aſſured of it, till he has learned that *Maxim*? Let any one conſider from what has been elſewhere ſaid, which is known firſt and cleareſt by moſt People, the *particular*

ticular Inſtance, or the *general* Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. Theſe *general Rules* are but the comparing our more general and *Abſtract Ideas*, which *Ideas* are made by the Mind, and have Names given them, for the eaſier diſpatch in its reaſonings: But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on *Particulars*, tho' afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind, to lay up thoſe general Notions, and make the proper uſe of them, which is to diſburthen the Memory of the cumberſome load of Particulars.

The way to *improve in Knowledge*, is not to ſwallow Principles, with an implicite Faith, and without examination, which would be apt to miſlead Men, inſtead of guiding them into Truth; but to get and fix in our Minds *clear* and *complete Ideas*, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them *proper* and *conſtant* Names: and thus barely by conſidering our *Ideas*, and comparing them together, obſerving their Agreement or Diſagreement,

ment, their Habitudes and Relations, we ſhall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one *Rule*, than by taking up *Principles*, and thereby putting our Minds into the Diſpoſal of others.

We muſt therefore, if we will proceed as *Reaſon* adviſes, adapt our methods of Enquiry to the nature of the *Ideas* we examine, and the Truth we ſearch after. *General* and *Certain Truths*, are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of *Abſtract Ideas*. Therefore a Sagacious Methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out theſe Relations, is the only way to diſcover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propoſitions. By what ſteps we are to proceed in theſe, is to be learned in the Schools of the *Mathematicians*, who from very plain and eaſy beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a continued chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the Diſcovery and Demonſtration of *Truths*, that appear at firſt ſight beyond Humane Capacity. This, I think I may ſay that if other *Ideas*,

that

that are *Real* as well as *Nominal* Eſſences of their *Species*, were perſued in the way familiar to *Mathematicians*, they would carry our Thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs, than poſſibly we are apt to imagine. This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *Chapter* the Third, viz. that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as *Mathematicks*: for *Moral Ideas* being real Eſſences, that have a diſcoverable Connection and Agreement one with another, ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far as we ſhall be poſſeſſed of *Real* and *General Truths*.

In our knowledge of *Subſtances*, we are to proceed after a quite different Method: the bare Contemplation of their *Abſtract Ideas* (which are but *Nominal* Eſſences) will carry us but a very little way, in the ſearch of Truth and Certainty. Here *Experience* muſt teach us what *Reaſon* cannot: and it is by trying alone, that we can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of our

Complex

Complex Idea; (for Inſtance) Whether that *Yellow*, *Heavy*, *Fuſible* Body, I call *Gold*, be *Malleable* or no; which Experience (however it prove in that particular Body we examine) makes us not certain that it is ſo in all, or any other *Yellow*, *Heavy*, *Fuſible* Bodies, but that which we have tried; becauſe it is no conſequence one way or the other from our *Complex Idea*: The neceſſity or inconſiſtence of *Malleability*, hath no viſibile Connection with the combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility* in any Body. What I have here ſaid of the *Nominal* Eſſence of *Gold*, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of a Body of ſuch a determinate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility*, will hold true, if other other Qualities be added to it. Our Reaſonings from thoſe *Ideas*, will carry us but a little way in the certain diſcovery of the other *Properties*, in thoſe Maſſes of Matter wherein all thoſe are to be found. As far as our Experience reaches, we may have certain Knowledge, and no farther.

I deny

I deny not, but a Man accuſtomed to rational and regular Experiments, ſhall be able to ſee farther into the nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a ſtranger to them. But this is but *Judgment* and *Opinion*, not *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. This makes me ſuſpect that *Natural Philoſophy* is not capable of being made a *Science*: From Experiments and Hiſtorical Obſervations we may draw advantages of Eaſe and Health, and thereby increaſe our ſtock of Conveniencies for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our *Talents* reach not; nor are our Faculties, as I gueſs, able to advance.

From whence it is obvious to conclude, That ſince our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the *Real Eſſences* of Bodies, but yet plainly to diſcover to us the *Being* of a *God*, and the *Knowledge* of our *Selves*; enough to give us a clear diſcovery of our *Duty*, and great Concernment; it will become us as Rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties, about what they are moſt adapted to, and

follow the direction of Nature, where it ſeems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in thoſe Enquiries, and that ſort of Knowledge which is moſt ſuited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greateſt Intereſt, that is, *the condition of our Eternal State*: And therefore it is, I think, that *Morality* is the proper Science and Buſineſs of *Mankind* in general (who are both concerned and fitted to ſearch out their *Summum Bonum*) as ſeveral *Arts* converſant about the ſeveral parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common uſe of Humane Life, and their own particular Subſiſtence in this World.

The ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, ſeem to me to be *theſe Two*: The *Firſt* is to get and ſettle in our Minds, as far as we can, clear, diſtinct, and conſtant *Ideas* of thoſe Things we would conſider and know. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our *Ideas*; where they are either imperfect,

fect, confuſed, or obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. The *other* is the Art of finding out the intermediate *Ideas*, which may ſhew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other *Ideas*, which cannot be immediately compared.

That theſe *Two* (and not the relying on *Maxims*, and drawing Conſequences from ſome general Propoſitions) are the right method of improving our Knowledge, in the *Ideas* of other *Modes*, beſides thoſe of Quantity, the conſideration of *Mathematical* Knowledge will eaſily inform us. Where *Firſt*, We ſhall find that he that has not clear and perfect *Ideas* of thoſe *Angles* or *Figures*, of which he deſires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppoſe a Man not to have an exact *Idea* of a *Right Angle*, *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium*, and it is clear, that he will in vain ſeek any Demonſtration about them. And *farther* it is evident, that it was not the influence of *Maxims* or *Principles*,

that has led the Masters of this *Science* into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the *Maxims* of *Mathematicks* never so well, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their Assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know, that the Square of the *Hypotenuse, in a Right-angled Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the Two other sides.* This, and other *Mathematical* Truths have been discovered by the Thoughts, otherwise applied. The Mind has other Objects, other views before it, far different from those *Maxims* which Men well enough acquainted with those received *Axioms*, but ignorant of their Method, who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Knowledge.

OUR *Knowledge*, as in other things, ſo in this, has a great Conformity with our *Sight*, that it is neither wholly *Neceſſary*, nor wholly *Voluntary*. Men that have Senſes cannot chuſe but receive ſome *Ideas* by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain ſome of them; and if they have any diſtinguiſhing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſome of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by Day, cannot but ſee ſome Objects, and perceive a difference in them; yet he may chuſe whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object, curiouſly ſurvey it, and obſerve accurately all that is viſible in it. But what he does ſee, he cannot ſee otherwiſe than

he does: It depends not on his *Will*, to ſee that *Black* which appears *Yellow*. Juſt thus it is with our *Underſtanding*: All that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing or withholding any of our Faculties from this or that ſort of *Objects*; and a more or leſs accurate Survey of them: But they being employed, our *Will* hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind, one way or other. That is done only by the *Objects* themſelves, as far as they are clearly diſcovered.

Thus he that has got the *Ideas* of *Numbers*, and hath taken the Pains to compare *One*, *Two* and *Three*, to *Six*, cannot chuſe but know that they are equal. He alſo that hath the *Idea* of an Intelligent, but weak and frail *Being*, made by, and depending on another, who is *Eternal*, *Omnipotent*, perfectly *Wiſe* and *Good*, will as certainly know, that *Man* is to Honour, Fear, and Obey *God*, as that the Sun ſhines when he ſees it. But yet theſe Truths, being never ſo certain, never ſo clear, he may be ignorant

rant of either or both of them, who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he ſhould, to inform himſelf about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

THE *Underſtanding Faculties* being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but alſo for the Conduct of his Life: A Man would be at a great loſs if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true Knowledge. He that will not *Eat* till he has Demonſtration that it will nouriſh him; nor *Stir*, till he is infallibly aſſured of Succeſs in his Buſineſs, will have little elſe to do but *Sit ſtill* and *periſh*.

Therefore as *God* hath ſet ſome things in broad *Day-light*; as he has given us ſome certain Knowledge, tho' limited to a few Things, in compariſon, (probably as a Taſte of what *In-*

tellectual Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Deſire and Endeavour after a better State) ſo in the greateſt part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the *Twilight*, as I may ſo ſay, of *Probability*, ſuitable to that State of *Mediocrity* and *Probationer-ſhip*, he has been pleaſed to place us in here.

The Faculty which *God* has given *Man* to enlighten him, next to certain Knowledge is *Judgment*, whereby the Mind takes its *Ideas* to agree or diſagree, without perceiving a demonſtrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind exerciſes this Judgment, ſometimes out of *neceſſity*, where demonſtrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and ſometimes out of *Lazineſs*, Unskilfulneſs, or Haſte, even where they are to be had.

This Faculty of the Mind when it is exerciſed immediately about Things, is called *Judgment*; when about Truths delivered in Words, is moſt commonly called *Aſſent*, or *Diſſent*. Thus the Mind has *Two Faculties* converſant

converſant about Truth and Falſhood: *Firſt*, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfied of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any *Ideas*. *Secondly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* together, or ſeparating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Diſagreement is not *perceived*, but preſumed to be ſo. And if it ſo unites or ſeparates them, as in Reality things are, it is *Right Judgment*.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

Probability is nothing but the appearance of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of Proofs, whoſe Connection is not conſtant, and immutable; or is not perceived to be ſo; but is, or appears for the moſt part to be ſo, and is enough to induce the Mind

to judge the Propoſition to be *true* or *falſe*, rather than the contrary.

Of *Probability* there are Degrees from the Neighbourhood of *Certainty* and *Demonſtration*, quite down to *Improbability* and *Unlikeneſs*, even to the Confines of *Impoſſibility*: And alſo Degrees of *Aſſent* from certain Knowledge and what is next it, full Aſſurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Diſtruſt, and Disbelief.

That Propoſition then is *Probable*, for which there are Arguments or Proofs to make it paſs, or be received for *True*. The Entertainment the Mind gives to this ſort of Propoſitions, is called *Belief*, *Aſſent*, or *Opinion*. *Probability* then being to ſupply the Defect of our Knowledge, is always converſant about Propoſitions, whereof, we have no *Certainty*, but only ſome *Inducements* to receive them for true. The *Grounds* of it are in ſhort *theſe two* following.

Firſt, The *Conformity* of any thing with our own Knowledge, Experience, or Obſervation.

Secondly,

Secondly, The *Teſtimony* of others, vouching their Obſervation and Experience. In the *Teſtimony* of others, is to be conſidered; *Firſt*, The Number; *Secondly*, The Integrity; *Thirdly*, The Skill of the Witneſſes; *Fourthly*, The Deſign of the Author, if it be a Teſtimony cited out of a Book; *Fifthly*, The Conſiſtency of the Parts and Circumſtances of the Relation; *Sixthly*, Contrary Teſtimonies.

The Mind before it rationally *aſſents* or *diſſents* to any probable Propoſition, ought to examine all the Grounds of *Probability*, and ſee how they make, more or leſs, for or againſt it; and upon a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm *Aſſent*, according to the Preponderancy of the greater *Grounds* of *Probability*, on one ſide or the other.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Aſſent.

THE *Grounds of Probability* laid down in the foregoing *Chapter*, as they are the Foundations on which our *Aſſent* is built, ſo are they alſo the Meaſure whereby its ſeveral *Degrees* are (or ought to be) regulated. Only we are to take notice, that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind, which ſearches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at leaſt in the firſt Judgment, or Search that the Mind makes. It is indeed in many Caſes impoſſible, and in moſt very hard, even for thoſe who have admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which upon a due Examination, made them embrace that ſide of the Queſtion. It ſuffices that they have once with Care and Fairneſs, ſifted the Matter as far as they could; and

and having once found on which ſide the *Probability* appeared to them, they lay up the Concluſion in their Memories, as a *Truth* they have diſcovered; and for the future remain ſatisfied with the Teſtimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once ſeen of it, deſerves ſuch a *Degree* of their *Aſſent* as they afford it.

It is unavoidable then that the Memory be relied on in this Caſe, and that Men be perſuaded of ſeveral *Opinions*, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall: without this the greateſt part of Men, muſt be either *Scepticks*, or change every Moment, when any one offers them Arguments, which for want of Memory, they are not preſently able to anſwer.

It muſt be owned that Mens ſticking to paſt Judgments, is often the cauſe of great *Obſtinacy* in Error and Miſtake. But the Fault is not, that they rely on their Memories for what they have before well judged, but becauſe they judged

judged before they had well examined. Who almoſt is there that hath the Leiſure, Patience, and Means to collect together, all the Proofs concerning moſt of the Opinions he has, ſo as ſafely to conclude that he has a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alledged for this better Information? And yet we are forced to determine our ſelves on one ſide or other: The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great Concerns, will not bear delay. For thoſe depend for the moſt part on the Determination of our Judgment in Points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace one ſide or the other.

The Propoſitions we receive upon Inducements of *Probability*, are of *Two ſorts: Firſt*, Concerning ſome particular Exiſtence, or Matter of *Fact*, which falling under our Obſervation, is capable of *Humane Teſtimony*. *Secondly*, Concerning Things, which being beyond the diſcovery of our *Senſes*, are not capable of Humane Teſtimony. Con-

Concerning the firſt of theſe, *viz.* *Particular Matter of Fact.*

Firſt, Where any particular Thing, conſonant to the conſtant Obſervation of our ſelves and others in the like Caſe, comes atteſted with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eaſily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge. Thus, if all *Engliſhmen* who have occaſion to mention it, ſhould report, that it *froze* in *England* laſt Winter, or the like, I think a Man would as little doubt of it, as that *Seven and Four are Eleven.*

The *Firſt*, and *higheſt* Degree of *Probability* then is, when the general conſent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a Man's own conſtant Experience in the like caſes, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact, atteſted by fair Witneſſes: Such are the ſtated *Conſtitutions* and *Properties* of Bodies, and the regular proceedings of *Cauſes* and *Effects* in the ordinary courſe of *Nature*; this we call an *Argument* from the nature of Things themſelves.

themſelves. For what we and others always obſerve to be after the ſame manner, we conclude with Reaſon, to be the Effects of ſteady and regular *Cauſes*, tho' they come not within the reach of our Knowledge. As that Fire warmed a Man, or made *Lead fluid*; that *Iron* ſunk in Water, ſwam in Quick-ſilver. A Relation affirming any ſuch thing to have been, or a Predication that it will happen again in the ſame manner, is received without doubt or heſitation: And our *Belief* thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance*.

Secondly, The next degree of *Probability*, is when by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a *Thing* is found to be for the moſt part ſo; and that the particular Inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted *Witneſſes*. Thus *Hiſtory* giving us ſuch an account of Men in all Ages, and my own Experience confirming it, that moſt Men prefer their own private Advantage, to the Publick. If all Hiſtorians that writ of *Tiberius*, ſay that he did ſo,

it

it is extreamly probable: And in this caſe, our *Aſſent* riſes to a Degree which we may call *Confidence*.

Thirdly, In matters happening indifferently, as that a *Bird* ſhould fly this or that way: when any particular matter of Fact comes atteſted by the concurrent Teſtimony of unſuſpected *Witneſſes*, there our *Aſſent* is alſo unavoidable. Thus, that there is in *Italy* ſuch a City as *Rome*; that about One thouſand and ſeven hundred Years ago, there lived ſuch a Man in it as *Julius Cæſar*, &c. A Man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himſelf is a witneſs.

Probability, on theſe grounds, carries ſo much Evidence with it, that it leaves us as little liberty to Believe or Disbelieve, as Demonſtration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the difficulty is, when Teſtimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Witneſſes claſh with the ordinary courſe of Nature, or with one another. Here Diligence,

ligence, Attention, and Exactneſs is required to form a *Right Judgment*, and to proportion the *Aſſent* to the Evidence and *Probability* of the Thing, which riſes and falls, according as the two Foundations of Credibility favour, or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſuch variety of contrary Obſervations, Circumſtances, Reports, Tempers, Deſigns, Over-ſights, *&c.* of Reporters, that it is impoſſible to reduce to preciſe Rules, the various Degrees wherein Men give their *Aſſent*. This in general may be ſaid, That as the *Proofs* upon due Examination, ſhall to any one appear in a greater, or leſs Degree, to preponderate on either ſide, ſo they are fitted to produce in the Mind, ſuch different Entertainments, as are called *Belief, Conjecture, Gueſs, Doubt, Wavering, Diſtruſt, Diſbelief*, &c.

It is a *Rule* generally approved, that any Teſtimony, the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth, the leſs Force it has: and in *Traditional* Truths, each Remove weakens the force of the *Proof*. There is a

Rule

Rule quite contrary to this, advanced by ſome Men, who look on *Opinions* to gain Force by growing *Older*. Upon this ground, Propoſitions evidently falſe or doubtful in their firſt beginning, come by an inverted *Rule* of *Probability*, to paſs for *Authentick* Truths; and thoſe which deſerved little Credit from the Mouths of their firſt Relators, are thought to grow *venerable* by Age, and are urg'd as undeniable.

But certain it is, that no *Probability can riſe above its firſt Original.* What has no other Evidence than the ſingle Teſtimony of *one Witneſs*, muſt ſtand or fall by his *only* Teſtimony, tho' afterwards cited by Hundreds of others; and is ſo far from receiving any Strength thereby, that it becomes the weaker. Becauſe Paſſion, Intereſt, Inadvertency, Miſtake of his Meaning, and a thouſand odd Reaſons, which Capricious Mens Minds are acted by, may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirmed upon ſlight grounds, can never

never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated.

The Second ſort of Probability, is concerning Things not falling under the reach of our Senſes, and therefore not capable of Teſtimony: And ſuch are,

Firſt, The Exiſtence, Nature, and Operations of *Finite*, *Immaterial* Beings without us, as *Spirits*, *Angels*, &c. or the Exiſtence of *material* Beings, ſuch as for their ſmalneſs or remoteneſs, our *Senſes* cannot take notice of: As whether there be any *Plants*, *Animals*, &c. in the *Planets*, and other Manſions of the vaſt Univerſe.

Secondly, Concerning the manner Operation in moſt parts of the Works of *Nature*; wherein, tho' we ſee the ſenſible *Effects*, yet their Cauſes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways, and manner how they are produced. We ſee *Animals* are generated, nouriſhed, and move; the *Loadſtone* draws *Iron*, &c. but the Cauſes that operate, and the Manner they are produced in, we can only gueſs,

and

and probably conjecture. In theſe matters *Analogy* is the only help we have; and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of *Probability*. Thus obſerving, that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another, produces *Heat*, and very often *Fire*; we have reaſon to think that what we call *Heat* and *Fire*, conſiſts, in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter. This ſort of *Probability*, which is the beſt conduct of rational Experiments, and the riſe of *Hypotheſes* has alſo its uſe and influence. And a wary reaſoning from *Analogy* leads us often into the diſcovery of *Truths*, and uſeful *Deductions*, which would otherwiſe lie concealed.

Tho' the common experience, and the ordinary courſe of Things, have a mighty influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuſe Credit to any thing propoſed to their Belief; yet there is one Caſe wherein the ſtrangeneſs of the Fact leſſens not the *Aſſent* to a fair Teſtimony given of it. For where ſuch ſupernatural

Events

Events are suitable to Ends aimed at by him, who has the power to change the course of Nature; there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observation. This is the proper case of *Miracles*, which well attested, do not only find Credit themselves, but give it also to other *Truths*.

There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our *Assent* upon bare Testimony, whether the Thing proposed Agree or Disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary course of Things or no: The reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such *an one* as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is *God* himself. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, *Revelation*, and our *Assent* to it, *Faith*; which has as much Certainty in it, as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own *Being*, as we can, whether

whether any *Revelation* from *God* be *True*. So that *Faith* is a ſettled and ſure Principle of *Aſſent* and *Aſſurance*, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Heſitation; only we muſt be ſure, that it be a Divine *Revelation*, and that we underſtand it right; elſe we ſhall expoſe our ſelves to all the extravagancy of *Enthuſiaſm*, and all the Error of wrong Principles if we have *Faith* and *Aſſurance*, in what is not *Divine Revelation*.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

THE Word *Reaſon* in *Engliſh* has different Significations. Sometimes it is taken for *True* and *Clear Principles*: Sometimes for *Clear* and *Fair Deductions* from thoſe Principles: Sometimes for the *Cauſe*, and particularly for the *Final Cauſe*; but but the Conſideration I ſhall have of it here, is, as it ſtands for a *Faculty*, whereby

whereby *Man* is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from *Beaſts*; and wherein it is evident he much ſurpaſſes them.

Reaſon is neceſſary, both for the enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Aſſent: for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other Intellectual Faculties; and indeed, contains *Two* of them, *viz. Firſt, Sagacity*, whereby it finds intermediate *Ideas*. *Secondly, Illation*, whereby it ſo orders and diſpoſes of them, as to diſcover what connexion there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extreams are held together, and thereby, as it were to draw into view the Truth ſought for; which is that we call *Illation* or *Inference:* and conſiſts in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the *Ideas*, in each ſtep of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to ſee, either the Certain Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, as in *Demonſtration*, in which it arrives at Knowledge: or their probable Connexion, on which it gives

or

or with-holds it *Aſſent*, as in *Opinion*.

Senſe and *Intuition* reach but a little way: The greateſt part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate *Ideas*. In thoſe Caſes where we muſt take Propoſitions for true, without being certain of their being ſo, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their *Probability*: In both Caſes, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to diſcover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call *Reaſon*. So that in Reaſon we may conſider theſe *Four* Degrees; *Firſt*, The diſcovering and finding out of Proofs. *Secondly*, The regular and methodical Diſpoſition of them, and laying them in ſuch order as their Connexion may be plainly perceiv'd. *Thirdly*, The perceiving their Connexion. *Fourthly*, The making a right Concluſion.

There is one thing more which I ſhall deſire to be conſidered concerning *Reaſon*, and that is, whether *Syl-*

logiſm, as is generally thought, be the proper Inſtrument of it; and the uſefulleſt way of exerciſing this Faculty. The Cauſes I have to doubt of it, are theſe.

Firſt, Becauſe *Syllogiſm* ſerves our *Reaſon* but in one only of the forementioned parts of it, and that is to ſhew the Connexion of the Proofs of any one Inſtance, and no more: But in this it is of no great uſe, ſince the Mind can perceive ſuch Connexion, where it really is, as eaſily, nay, perhaps better without it. We may obſerve that there are many Men that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a *Syllogiſm*: And I believe ſcarce any one makes *Syllogiſms* in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed, ſometimes they may ſerve to diſcover a Fallacy, hid in a *Rhetorical* Flouriſh; or by ſtripping an Abſurdity of the Cover of Wit and good Language, ſhew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakneſs or Fallacy of ſuch a looſe Diſcourſe it ſhews, by the Artificial Form it is put into, only to thoſe who have throughly

throughly ſtudied *Mode* and *Figure*, and have ſo examined the many ways, that three Propoſitions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what Grounds it is that they do ſo. But they who have not ſo far look'd into thoſe Forms, are not ſure by Virtue of *Syllogiſm* that the Concluſion certainly follows from the Premiſſes. The Mind is not taught to reaſon by theſe *Rules*; It has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its *Ideas*, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing *Repetitions*.

And to ſhew the Weakneſs of an Argument, there needs no more but to ſtrip it of the ſuperfluous *Ideas*, which blended and confounded with thoſe on which the Inference depends, ſeem to ſhew a Connexion where there is none, or at leaſt do hinder the diſcovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked *Ideas* on which the force of the Argumentation depends in their due Order; in which Poſiti-

on the Mind taking a view of them, ſees what Connexion they have, and ſo is able to judge of the Inference without any need of Syllogiſm at all.

Secondly, Becauſe Syllogiſms are not leſs liable to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Obſervation, which has always found theſe artificial Methods of Reaſoning more adapted to catch and entangle the Mind, than to inſtruct and inform the Underſtanding. And if it be certain that Fallacy can be couched in Syllogiſms, as it cannot be denied, it muſt be ſomething elſe, and not Syllogiſm that muſt diſcover them. But if Men skill'd in, and us'd to Syllogiſms, find them aſſiſting to their Reaſon in the diſcovery of Truth, I think they ought to make uſe of them. All that I aim at is, that they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe Forms than belongs to them; and think that Men have no uſe, or not ſo full a uſe of their Reaſoning Faculty without them.

But however it be in Knowledge, I think it is of far leſs, or no uſe at all in

in *Probabilities*: For the *Aſſent* there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs on both ſides, nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the Mind in that, as *Syllogiſm*; which running away with one aſſumed *Probability*, purſues that till it has led the Mind quite out of ſight of the Thing under Conſideration.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be ſaid) *in convincing Men of their Errors or Miſtakes*; yet ſtill it fails our Reaſon in that part, which if not its higheſt Perfection, is yet certainly its hardeſt Task; and that which we moſt need its help in, and that is, *The finding out of Proofs, and making new Diſcoveries*. This way of Reaſoning diſcovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of Marſhalling and Ranging the old ones we have already. A Man knows firſt, and then he is able to prove *Syllogiſtically*; ſo that *Syllogiſm* comes after Knowledge; and then a Man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out thoſe *Ideas* that ſhew the Con-

nexion of diſtant ones, that our Stock of Knowledge is encreaſed; and that uſeful Arts and Sciences are advanc'd.

Reaſon, tho' of a very large Extent, fails us in ſeveral Inſtances: As, *Firſt*, Where our *Ideas* fail. *Secondly*, It is often at a loſs, becauſe of the Obſcurity, Confuſion, or Imperfection of the *Ideas* it is employed about. Thus having no perfect *Idea* of the leaſt Extenſion of *Matter*, nor of *Infinity*, we are at a loſs about the Diviſibility of *Matter*. *Thirdly*, Our *Reaſon* is often at a ſtand, becauſe it perceives not thoſe *Ideas* which would ſerve to ſhew the certain or probable Agreement or Diſagreement of any two other *Ideas*. *Fourthly*, Our *Reaſon* is often engaged in Abſurdities and Difficulties, by proceeding upon falſe Principles, which being followed, lead Men into Contradictions to themſelves, and Inconſiſtency in their own Thoughts. *Fifthly*, Dubious Words, and uncertain Signs often puzzle Mens *Reaſon*, and bring them to a Nonplus.

Tho'

Tho' the deducing one Propoſition from another be a great part of Reaſon, and that which it is uſually employed about: yet the principal Act of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas* one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houſes to be of the ſame length, which could not be brought together to meaſure their Equality by *juxta-poſition*. Words have their Conſequences as the Signs of ſuch *Ideas*: and Things agree, or diſagree, as really they are; but we obſerve it only by our *Ideas*.

In Reaſoning Men ordinarily uſe *Four* ſorts of *Arguments*.

The *Firſt*, is to alledge the Opinions of Men, whoſe Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or ſome other Cauſe, has gained a Name, and ſettled their Reputation in the common Eſteem with ſome kind of Authority. This may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

Secondly, Another way is, to require the Adverſary to admit what

they alledge as a Proof, or to aſſign a better. This I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.*

A *Third* way, is to preſs a Man with Conſequences drawn from his own Principles or Conceſſions. This is already known under the Name of *Argumentum ad hominem.*

Fourthly, The uſing of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium.* This alone of all the Four, brings true Inſtruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For *Firſt*, It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, becauſe I, out of reſpect, or any other Conſideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. *Secondly*, It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the ſame with him, becauſe I know not a better. *Thirdly*, Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right way, becauſe he has ſhewn me that I am in the wrong. This may diſpoſe me perhaps for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not

to

to it; that muſt come from *Proofs* and *Arguments*, and Light ariſing from the Nature of Things themſelves; not from my Shame-facedneſs, Ignorance, or Error.

By what has been ſaid of *Reaſon*, we may be able to make ſome gueſs at the diſtinction of Things, into thoſe that are according to, above, and contrary to *Reaſon*. *According to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe Truth we can diſcover, by examining and tracing thoſe *Ideas* we have from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. *Above Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe *Truth* or *Probability* we cannot by *Reaſon* derive from thoſe Principles. *Contrary to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and diſtinct *Ideas*. Thus the *Exiſtence of one God*, is according to *Reaſon*: The *Exiſtence of more than one God*, contrary to *Reaſon*: The *Reſurrection of the Body* after Death, above *Reaſon*. *Above Reaſon*, may be alſo taken in a dou-

ble Senſe, *viz. Above Probability*, or, *Above Certainty*. In that large Senſe alſo, *Contrary to Reaſon*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

There is another uſe of the Word *Reaſon*, wherein it is oppoſed to *Faith*; which, though authorized by common uſe, yet is it in it ſelf a very improper way of Speaking: For *Faith* is nothing but a firm *Aſſent* of the Mind; which if it be regulated as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good *Reaſon*, and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes without having any Reaſon for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither ſeeks *Truth* as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Miſtake and Error. But ſince *Reaſon* and *Faith* are by ſome Men oppoſed, we will ſo conſider them in the following *Chapter*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon, and their diſtinct Provinces.

REASON, as contra-diſtinguiſhed to *Faith*, I take to be the diſcovery of the *Certainty* or *Probability* of ſuch Propoſitions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from ſuch *Ideas*, which it has got by the uſe of its natural Faculties, *viz.* by *Senſation* or *Reflection*.

Faith on the other ſide, is the Aſſent to any Propoſition, upon the Credit of the Propoſer, as coming immediately from *God*; which we call *Revelation*: Concerning which we muſt obſerve,

Firſt, That *no Man inſpired by God, can by any Revelation communicate to others any new* Simple Ideas, which they had not before from *Senſation* or *Reflection*: Becauſe Words,

by their immediate Operation on us, cannot cauſe other *Ideas* but of their natural Sounds, and as *Signs* of latent *Ideas* they can only recal to our Thoughts thoſe *Ideas*, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any new, and formerly unknown *Simple Ideas*. The ſame holds in all other *Signs*, which cannot ſignifie to us Things of which we have never before had any *Idea* at all. For our *Simple Ideas* we muſt depend wholly on our natural Faculties, and can by no means receive them from *Traditional Revelation*; I ſay *Traditional*, in diſtinction to *Original Revelation*. By the *One*, I mean that Impreſſion which is made immediately by *God* on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot ſet any Bounds. And by the *Other*, thoſe Impreſſions delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I ſay, that *the ſame Truths may be diſcovered by Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*;

ſon; but in ſuch there is little need or uſe of *Revelation*; *God* having furniſhed us with natural Means to arrive at the Knowledge of them: And Truths diſcovered by our natural Faculties, are more certain, than when conveyed to us by *Traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this *Revelation* came at firſt from *God*, can never be ſo ſure as the Knowledge we have from the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Agreement and Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*. This alſo holds in Matters of Fact, knowable by our Senſes: As the *Hiſtory* of the *Deluge* is convey'd to us by Writings, which had their Original from Revelation; and yet no body, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the *Flood*, as *Noah* that ſaw it, or that he himſelf would have had, had he then been alive and ſeen it. For he has no greater Aſſurance, than that of his *Senſes*, that it is writ in the Book ſuppoſed to be writ by *Moſes* inſpired. But he has not ſo great an Aſſurance that *Moſes* writ that Book,

as

as if he had ſeen *Moſes* write it; ſo that the Aſſurance of its being a *Revelation*, is ſtill leſs than the Aſſurance of his *Senſes*.

Revelation cannot be admitted againſt the clear Evidence of *Reaſon*: For ſince no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive ſuch a *Revelation*, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our *Intuitive* Knowledge; we can never receive for a Truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and diſtinct Knowledge. Thus the *Ideas* of *One Body* and *One Place* do ſo clearly agree, that we can never aſſent to a Propoſition that affirms *the ſame Body to be in two diſtinct Places at once*; however, it ſhould pretend to the Authority of a *Divine Revelation*: Since the Evidence, *Firſt*, That we deceive not our ſelves in aſcribing it to *God*: *Secondly*, That we underſtand it right, can never be ſo great as the Evidence of our own *Intuitive* Knowledge, whereby we diſcern it impoſſible for *the ſame Body to be in two Places at once*.

In

In Propoſitions therefore, contrary to our diſtinct and clear *Ideas*, it will be in vain to urge them as Matters of *Faith*. For *Faith* can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our *Knowledge*. Becauſe, though *Faith* be founded upon the Teſtimony of *God*, who cannot lie, yet we cannot have an Aſſurance of the Truth of its being a *Divine Revelation*, greater than our own *Knowledge*. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a *Divine Revelation*, than it has of the Principles of its own Reaſon; it can never have a Ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reaſon, to give place to a Propoſition, whoſe *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than thoſe Principles have.

In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our *Ideas*, and the Principles of Knowledge abovementioned, *Reaſon* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation* cannot in ſuch Caſes invalidate its Decrees; nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of *Reaſon*, to quit

it

it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is *Matter of Faith*, which can have no Authority againſt the plain and clear Dictates of *Reaſon*. But,

Thirdly, There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of whoſe paſt, preſent, or future Exiſtence, by the natural uſe of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all: Theſe being beyond the *diſcovery of our Faculties*, *and above Reaſon*, when revealed, become the *proper Matter of Faith*. Thus, that part of the Angels rebelled againſt *God*; that the Bodies of Men ſhall riſe and live again, and the like, are purely Matters of *Faith*, with which *Reaſon* has directly nothing to do.

Firſt then, Whatever Propoſition is revealed, of whoſe Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge, that is purely *Matter of Faith* and *above Reaſon*.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge from natural

tural acquired *Ideas*, are *Matter of Reaſon*; but with this difference; that in thoſe concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and ſo is perſwaded of their Truth only upon probable Grounds: In ſuch, I ſay, an *Evident Revelation ought to determine our Aſſent*, even againſt *Probability*. Becauſe the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, is bound to give up its *Aſſent* to ſuch a Teſtimony, which it is ſatisfied comes from one, who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it ſtill belongs to *Reaſon* to judge of the truth of its being a *Revelation*, and of the ſignification of the Words wherein it is delivered.

Thus far the Dominion of *Faith* reaches; and that without any Violence to *Reaſon*, which is not injured or diſturbed, but aſſiſted and improved by new Diſcoveries of Truth, coming from the *Eternal Fountain* of all Knowledge. Whatever *God* hath revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be

a Divine

a Divine *Revelation* or no, *Reaſon* muſt judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is leſs evident, nor prefer leſs Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any Traditional *Revelation* is of Divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and the Senſe we underſtand it, ſo clear and ſo certain, as that of the Principles of *Reaſon:* and therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to the clear and ſelf-evident Dictates of* Reaſon, *has a right to be urged or aſſented to, as a matter of Faith, wherein* Reaſon *has nothing to do.* Whatſoever is Divine *Revelation*, ought to overrule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Intereſts, and hath a right to be received with a full *Aſſent.* Such a ſubmiſſion as this, of our *Reaſon* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This ſhakes not the Foundations of Reaſon, but leaves us that uſe of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthuſiaſm.

HE that would ſeriouſly ſet upon the ſearch of Truth, ought in the firſt place to prepare his Mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he miſſes it. There is no Body who does not profeſs himſelf a Lover of Truth, and that would not take it amiſs to be thought otherwiſe of. And yet for all this, one may truly ſay, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truths ſake, even amongſt thoſe who perſwade themſelves that they are ſo. How a Man may know whether he be ſo in earneſt, is worth Enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Propoſition with greater aſſurance than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes

goes beyond this measure of assent, 'tis plain receives not Truth in the Love of it. For the Evidence that any Proposition is true (except such as are Self-evident) lying only in the Proofs a Man has of it, whatever degrees of Assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain all that Surplusage of Assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of Truth. Whatsoever Credit we give to any Proposition more than it receives from the Principles and Proofs it supports it self upon, is oweing to our Inclinations that way, and is so far a Derogation from the Love of Truth as such: which as it can receive no Evidence from our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no Tincture from them.

The assuming an Authority of Dictating to others, and a forwardness to prescribe to their Opinions, is a constant Concomitant of this Bias and Corruption of our Judgments. For how can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who has already impos'd on his own?

Upon

Upon this occaſion I ſhall conſider a third ground of Aſſent, which with ſome Men has the ſame Authority as either *Faith* or *Reaſon*, I mean, *Enthuſiaſm*; which laying by *Reaſon*, would ſet up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both Reaſon and Revelation, and ſubſtitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and aſſumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

Immediate Revelation being a much eaſier way for Men to eſtabliſh their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious labour of ſtrict Reaſoning, it is no wonder that ſome have been very apt to pretend to it, eſpecially in ſuch of their Actions and Opinions as they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge, and Principles of Reaſon. Hence we ſee that in all Ages, Men in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devotion, or whoſe conceit of themſelves has raiſed them into an Opinion of a greater familiarity with God than is allowed others, have often flattered themſelves

themſelves with a perſwaſion of an immediate Intercourſe with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the Divine Spirit. Their Minds being thus prepared, whatever groundleſs Opinion comes to ſettle it ſelf ſtrongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God; and whatſoever odd Action they find in themſelves a ſtrong inclination to do, that Impulſe is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and muſt be obeyed. This I take to be properly *Enthuſiaſm*, which tho' riſing from the conceit of a warmed or overweening Brain, works, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the Perſwaſions and Actions of Men, than either Reaſon or Revelation, or both together; Men being moſt forwardly obedient to the Impulſes they receive from themſelves. Strong conceit, like a new Principle, carries all eaſily with it; when got above common Senſe, and freed from all reſtraint of Reaſon, and check of Reflection, it is heighten'd into a Divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination. When

When Men are once got into this way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without ſearch, and of Certainty without proof, 'tis a hard matter to get them out of it. Reaſon is loſt upon them, they are above it: They ſee the *Light* infuſed into their Underſtandings, and cannot be miſtaken; 'tis clear and viſible there, like the light of bright Sun-ſhine, ſhews it ſelf, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: They *feel* the Hand of God moving them within, and the Impulſes of the Spirit, and cannot be miſtaken in what they feel.

This is the way of talking of theſe Men: they are ſure becauſe they are ſure: and their Perſwaſions are *right*, only becauſe they are *ſtrong* in them. For when what they ſay is ſtripped of the Metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to. Theſe Men have, they ſay, clear light, and they ſee; they have an awakened ſenſe, and they feel: This cannot, they are ſure, be diſputed them. But here let me ask: This *ſeeing* is it the Perception of the Truth of the Propoſition,

poſition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from God? This *feeling* is it a Perception of an Inclination to do ſomething, or of the Spirit of God moving that Inclination? Theſe are two very different Perceptions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation from God. Nay, I may perceive I came not by it in a natural way, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God. Becauſe there be *Spirits*, which without being Divinely commiſſion'd, may excite thoſe *Ideas* in me, and make their connection perceived. So that the Knowledge of any Propoſition coming into my Mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from God. But however it be called Light and Seeing; I ſuppoſe it is at moſt but Belief and Aſſurance. For where a Propoſition is known to be true, Revelation is needleſs. If therefore it be a Propoſition which they are perſwaded, but do not know to be true, it is not ſeeing but believing. What I ſee, I know

to be ſo by the Evidence of the Thing it ſelf: What I believe, I take to be ſo upon the Teſtimony of another: But this Teſtimony I muſt know to be given, or elſe what ground have I of believing? I muſt ſee that it is God that reveals this to me, or elſe I ſee nothing. If I know not this, how great ſoever my Aſſurance is, it is groundleſs: Whatever light I pretend to, it is but *Enthuſiaſm*.

In all that is of Divine Revelation, there is need of no other proof, but that it is from God: For he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how ſhall it be known that any Propoſition in our Minds is a Truth revealed to us by God? Here it is that *Enthuſiaſm* fails of the evidence it pretends to. For Men thus poſſeſs'd boaſt of a Light, whereby they ſay they are brought into the knowledge of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they muſt know it to be ſo, either by its own ſelf-evidence or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be ſo. If they know it to be a Truth either of theſe two ways, they

in vain ſuppoſe it to be a Revelation. For thus all Truths of what kind ſoever, that Men uninſpired are enlighten'd with come into their Minds. If they ſay they know it to be true, becauſe it is a Revelation from God, the Reaſon is good: but then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation from God. If they ſay by the light it brings with it, I beſeech them to conſider, whether this be any more, than that it is a Revelation becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be true. For all the light they ſpeak of, is but a ſtrong perſwaſion of their own Minds that it is a Truth, which is a very unſafe ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets or Actions.

True light in the Mind is nothing elſe but the *Evidence* of the Truth of any Propoſition: and if it be not ſelf-evident, all the light it can have is from clearneſs of thoſe Proofs upon which it is received. To talk of any other light in the Underſtanding, is to put our ſelves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of darkneſs. For if ſtrength of perſwaſion be the

light

light which muſt guide us, how ſhall any one diſtinguiſh between the Deluſions of *Satan*, and the Inſpirations of the *Holy Ghoſt?* He therefore that will not give up himſelf to Deluſion and Error, muſt bring this guide of his *Light within* to the Tryal. God when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves his Faculties in their natural State, to enable him to judge of his Inſpirations, whether they be of Divine Original or no. If he would have us aſſent to the Truth of any Propoſition, he either evidences that Truth by the uſual methods of Natural Reaſon, or elſe makes it known to be a Truth which he would have us aſſent to by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by ſome marks, which Reaſon cannot be miſtaken in. Reaſon muſt be our laſt Judge and Guide in every thing. I do not mean that we muſt conſult Reaſon, and examine whether a Propoſition revealed from God can be made out by Natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: But conſult it we

muſt, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from God or no: and if Reaſon finds it to be revealed from God, Reaſon then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that throughly warms our Fancies muſt paſs for an Inſpiration, if there be nothing but the ſtrength of our Perſwaſions whereby to judge of them: If Reaſon muſt not examine their Truth by ſomething extrinſical to the Perſwaſions themſelves, Inſpirations and Deluſions, Truth and Falſhood, will have the ſame meaſure, and will not be poſſible to be diſtinguiſhed.

Thus we ſee the Holy Men of God, who had Revelations from God, had ſomething elſe beſides that internal Light of Aſſurance in their own Minds, to teſtify to them that it was from God. They had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of thoſe Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a Power given them to juſtify the Truth of their Commiſſion from Heaven; and

and by visible Signs to assert the Divine Authority of the Message they were sent with. *Moses* saw the Bush burn without being consumed, and heard a Voice out of it. God by another Miracle of his Rod turn'd into a Serpent, assured him likewise of a Power to testify his Mission by the same Miracle repeated before them, to whom he was sent. This, and the like Instances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to shew, that they thought not an inward Seeing or Perswasion of their own Minds a sufficient Evidence without any other Proof, that it was from God, tho' the *Scripture* does not every where mention their demanding or having such Proofs.

I do not deny that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actions by the immediate Influence and Assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But in such Cases too we have Reason and the Scripture, unerring Rules to

know whether it be from God or no. Where the Truth embraced is conſonant to the Revelation in the written Word of God; or the Action conformable to the Dictates of Right Reaſon, or Holy Writ, we run no Riſque in entertaining it as ſuch; becauſe tho' perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are ſure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. Where Reaſon or Scripture is expreſs for any Opinion or Action, we may receive it as of Divine Authority: But 'tis not the Strength of our own Perſwaſions which can by it ſelf give it that Stamp. The Bent of our own Minds may favour it as much as we pleaſe; that may ſhew it to be a Fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an *Offspring* of Heaven, and of Divine Original.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Assent or Error.

ERROR is a Mistake of our Judgment, giving *Assent* to that which is not true. The Reasons whereof may be reduced to these *Four:* First, *Want of Proofs.* Secondly, *Want of Ability of use them.* Thirdly, *Want of Will to use them.* Fourthly, *Wrong Measures of Probability.*

First, Want of Proofs; by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had, but also of those Proofs which are in being, or might be procured. The greatest part of Mankind want the Conveniences and Opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves, or of collecting the Testimonies of others, being enslaved to the Necessity of their mean Condition, whose Lives are worn out only in the

Proviſions for living. Theſe Men are by the Conſtitution of Human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of thoſe Proofs on which others build, and which are neceſſary to eſtabliſh thoſe Opinions. For having much to do to get the Means of living, they are not in a Condition to look after thoſe of learned and laborious Enquiries.

It is true, that *God* has furniſhed Men with Faculties ſufficient to direct them in the way they ſhould take, if they will but ſeriouſly employ them that way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them leiſure. No Man is ſo wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of living, as to have no ſpare time at all to think on his *Soul*, and inform himſelf in Matters of Religion, were Men as intent on this, as they are on Things of lower Concernment. There are none ſo enſlaved to the Neceſſity of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge.

Secondly,

Secondly, Want of *Ability* to uſe them. There be many who cannot carry a Train of Conſequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Teſtimonies. Theſe cannot diſcern that ſide on which the ſtrongeſt Proofs lie; nor follow that which in it ſelf is the moſt probable Opinion. It is certain, that there is a wide difference in Mens Underſtandings, Apprehenſions and Reaſonings, to a very great Latitude, ſo that one may, without doing Injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater diſtance between ſome *Men* and *others* in this reſpect, than between ſome *Men* and ſome *Beaſts*: But how this comes about is a Speculation, though of great Conſequence, yet not neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe.

Thirdly, For want of *Will* to uſe them. Some, tho' they have Opportunities and Leiſure enough, and want neither Parts nor Learning, nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the knowledge of ſeveral Truths that lie within

their reach; either upon the account of their hot purſuit of Pleaſure, conſtant Drudgery in Buſineſs, Lazineſs and Oſcitancy in general, or a particular Averſion for Books and Study: And ſome out of Fear that an impartial Inquiry would not favour thoſe Opinions, which beſt ſuit their Prejudices, Lives, Deſigns, Intereſts, *&c.* as many Men forbear to caſt up their Accounts, who have reaſon to fear that their Affairs are in no very good Poſture.

How Men, whoſe plentiful Fortunes allow them leiſure to improve their Underſtandings, can ſatisfie themſelves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their *Souls*, who lay out all their Incomes in Proviſions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge. I will not here mention how unreaſonable this is for Men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do ſometimes: Nor ſhall I take notice what a ſhame it is

to the greateſt Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know. But this, at leaſt, is worth the Conſideration of thoſe who call themſelves *Gentlemen*; that however they may think Credit, Reſpect, and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all theſe ſtill carried away from them by Men of lower Condition who ſurpaſs them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by thoſe that ſee, or elſe fall into the Ditch: And he is certainly the moſt ſubjected, the moſt enſlaved, who is ſo in his Underſtanding.

Fourthly, Wrong Meaſures of *Probability*; which are,

Firſt, *Propoſitions that are not in themſelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falſe, taken for Principles.* Propoſitions looked on as Principles, have ſo great an Influence upon our Opinions, that it is uſually by them we judge of Truth; and what is inconſiſtent with them, is ſo far from paſſing for *Probable* with us,

that it will not be allowed *Poſſible*. The Reverence born to theſe Principles is ſo great, that the Teſtimony, not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senſes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to theſe eſtabliſhed Rules. The great Obſtinacy that is to be found in Men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, tho' many times equally abſurd in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof, as they are an unavoidable Conſequence of this way of Reaſoning from received Traditional Principles: So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senſes, and give their own Experience the Lye, rather than admit of any thing diſagreeing with theſe Sacred Tenets.

Secondly, *Received Hypotheſes*. The difference between theſe and the former, is, that thoſe who proceed by theſe, will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Diſſenters in that; but differ in aſſigning of Reaſons, and explaining the manner of Operation.

Theſe

These are not at that open Defiance with their *Senses* as the former: They can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevailed on by *Probabilities* which would convince them, that Things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are.

Thirdly, *Predominant Passions or Inclinations*: Let never so much *Probability* hang on one side of a *Covetous* Man's Reasoning, and *Money* on the other, it is easie to foresee which will prevail. Tho' Men cannot always openly gain-say, or resist the force of manifest *Probabilities* that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Understanding, constantly to close with the more probable side: But yet a Man hath Power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory Examination. Until that be done, there

there will be always these *two ways* left for evading the most apparent *Probabilities*.

First, That the Arguments being brought in *Words*, there may be *Fallacy* latent in them; and the Consequences being perhaps many in train, may be some of them incoherent. There are few Discourses so short and clear, to which Men may not with Satisfaction enough to themselves raise this Doubt, and from whose Conviction they may not without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonableness set themselves free.

Secondly, Manifest *Probabilities* may be evaded upon this Suggestion, that *I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side*: and therefore, tho' a Man be beaten, it is not necessary he should yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reserve behind.

Fourthly, *Authority*, or the *giving up our Assent to the common receiv'd Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other

Ground

Ground for their Tenets, than the ſuppoſed Honeſty or Learning, or Number of thoſe of the ſame Profeſſion? As if Honeſt or Bookiſh Men could not err; or Truth were to be eſtabliſhed by the Vote of the Multitude. Yet this with moſt Men ſerves the turn. All Men are liable to Error, and moſt Men are in many Points by *Paſſion* or *Intereſt* under temptation to it. This is certain, that there is not an Opinion ſo abſurd, which a Man may not receive upon this Ground. There is no Error to be named, which has not had its Profeſſors. And a Man ſhall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, whereever he has the Footſteps of others to follow. But, notwithſtanding the great Noiſe is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I muſt do Mankind that right as to ſay, there are not *ſo many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions as is commonly ſuppoſed*: Not that I think they embrace the Truth, but indeed, becauſe concerning thoſe Doctrines they keep ſuch a

Stir

Stir about, they have *no Thought, no Opinion at all.* For if any one ſhould a little catechize the greateſt part of the *Partiſans* of moſt of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning thoſe Matters they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: Much leſs would he have reaſon to think that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments and Appearance of Probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt has engag'd them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhew their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Diviſion of the Sciences.

ALL that can fall within the compaſs of Human Underſtanding, being either, *Firſt*, The Nature of

Things, their Relations, and their manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which *Man* himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent for the attainment of any End, especially *Happiness*: Or, *Thirdly*, The Ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both of these are attained and communicated. I think *Science* may be properly divided into these *Three Sorts*.

First, The Knowledge of Things, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, whether Material or Immaterial: This, in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call Φυσικὴ, or *Natural Philosophy*. The end of this is bare *Speculative Truth*, and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this Branch: Whether it be *God* himself, *Angels*, *Spirits*, *Bodies*, or any of their Affections, as *Number*, *Figure*, &c.

Secondly, Πρακτικὴ, the Skill of right-applying our own Powers and Actions for the attainment of Things good and useful. The most considerable under this Head, is *Ethicks*, which

which is the ſeeking out thoſe Rules and Meaſures of Human Actions which lead to *Happineſs*, and the Means to practiſe them. The end of this is not bare *Speculation*; but *Right*, and a Conduct ſuitable thereto.

Thirdly, Σημειωτικὴ, Or the *Doctrine of Signs*: The moſt uſeful being *Words*, it is aptly enough term'd *Logick*: The Buſineſs whereof is to conſider the Nature of *Signs*, which the Mind makes uſe of for the Underſtanding of Things, or conveying its Knowlegde to others. Things are repreſented to the Mind by *Ideas*: And Mens *Ideas* are communicated to one another, by *Articulate Sounds*, or *Words*. The Conſideration then of *Ideas* and Words, as the great Inſtruments of Knowledge makes no deſpicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of Human Knowledge in the whole Extent of it.

This ſeems to me the *firſt and moſt general, at well as natural Diviſion* of the Objects of our Underſtanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the

the Contemplation of *Things* themſelves for the diſcovery of Truth, or about the *Things* in his own Power, which are his *Actions* for the Attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes uſe of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which *Three*, viz. *Things*, as they are in themſelves Knowable: *Actions*, as they depend on us in order to Happineſs, and the right uſe of *Signs*, in order to Knowledge, being *Toto Cœlo* different; they ſeemed to me to be the Three great Provinces of the *Intellectual* World wholly ſeparate, and diſtinct one from another.

FINIS.

The CONTENTS of the Second BOOK.

THE *Introduction.* Page 1

Chap. 1. *Of* Ideas *in General, and their Original.* 9

Chap. 2. *Of Simple* Ideas. 15

Chap. 3. *Of* Ideas *of one Sense.* 17

Chap. 4. *Of Solidity.* 18

Chap. 5. *Of Simple* Ideas *of divers Senses.* 22

Chap. 6. *Of Simple* Ideas *of Reflection.* ibid.

Chap. 7. *Of Simple* Ideas *of Sensation and Reflection.* 23

Chap. 8. *Some farther Considerations concerning Simple* Ideas. 28

Chap. 9. *Of Perception.* 35

Chap. 10. *Of Retention.* 39

Chap. 11. *Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.* 43

Chap. 12. *Of Complex* Ideas. 46

Chap. 13. *Of Simples Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of Space.* 50

Chap.



Chap. 14. *Of Duration and its Simple Modes.* 54
Chap. 15. *Of Duration and Expansion considered together.* 60
Chap. 16. *Of Numbers.* 62
Chap. 17. *Of Infinity.* 64
Chap. 18. *Of other Simple Modes.* 68
Chap. 19. *Of the Modes of Thinking.* 69
Chap. 20. *The Modes of Pleasure and Pain.* 71
Chap. 21. *Of Power.* 74
Chap. 22. *Of Mixed Modes.* 82
Chap. 23. *Of our Complex* Ideas *of Substances.* 89
Chap. 24. *Of Collective* Ideas *of Substances.* 96
Chap. 25. *Of Relation.* 97
Chap. 26. *Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.* 99
Chap. 27. *Of Identity and Diversity.* 102
Chap. 28. *Of other Relations.* 111
Chap. 29. *Of Clear, Obscure, Distinct, and Confused* Ideas. 120
Chap. 30. *Of Real and Fantastical* Ideas. 125.

Chap.

Chap. 31. *Of* Ideas *Adequate or Inadequate.* Page 128
Chap. 32. *Of True and False* Ideas. 131
Chap. 33. *Of the Association of* Ideas. 138

The CONTENTS of the Third BOOK.

Chap. 1.

OF Words or Language in General. 146
Chap. 2. *Of the Signification of Words.* 149
Chap. 3. *Of General Terms.* 154
Chap. 4. *Of the Names of Simple* Ideas. 164
Chap. 5. *Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations.* 169
Chap. 6. *Of the Names of Substances.* 173
Chap. 7. *Of Particles.* 182
Chap. 8. *Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.* 185

Chap. 9. *Of the Imperfection of Words.* 187
Chap. 10. *Of the Abuse of Words.* 193
Chap. 11. *Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.* 205

The CONTENTS of the Fourth BOOK.

Chap. 1.
OF *Knowledge in General.* P. 211
Chap. 2. *Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.* 217
Chap. 3. *Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.* 227
Chap. 4. *Of the Reality of our Knowledge.* 248
Chap. 5. *Of Truth in General.* 256
Chap. 6. *Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.* 260
Chap. 7. *Of Maxims.* 266
Chap. 8. *Of Trifling Propositions.* 275

The Contents.

Chap. 9. *Of our Knowledge of Existence.* 280

Chap. 10. *Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.* 282

Chap. 11. *Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.* 290

Chap. 12. *Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.* 299

Chap. 13. *Some farther Considerations concerning Knowledge.* 309

Chap. 14. *Of Judgment.* 311

Chap. 15. *Of Probability.* 313

Chap. 16. *Of the Degrees of Assent.* 316

Chap. 17. *Of Reason.* 327

Chap. 18. *Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.* 339

Chap. 19. *Of Enthusiasm.* 347

Chap. 20. *Of wrong Assent or Error.* 359

Chap. 21. *Of the Division of the Sciences.* 368

